IS A GOD NECESSARY FOR MORALITY? A Debate in Cyberspace [NOTE: The following exchange(s) are taking place between the following people: "Alcuin," a channel operator on the #apologetics channel on the Undernet IRC (http://mcu.edu/apologetics/), who is a Christian theist; and two skeptics of theism, John Leckie and his mentor of sorts, Dr. Ed Buckner of the Atlanta Freethought Society. The original challenge was given by Mr. Leckie to Alcuin and ProfG, another channel operator, to attempt to refute a short statement given by Dr. Buckner. It is Alcuin who has picked up the gauntlet. Enjoy.] ============================================================== [The following is a draft (v.2.2) of the Opening Statement in the AFS vs. CBL (Center for Biblical Literacy) Debate, "Is a GOD Necessary for Morality?" 22 May 1995. You may do with it as you wish, but I posed it because I'm hoping that it will spark up some very good debating in the groups I have posted it to. - John Leckie ] What does "GOD" have to do with morality? Imagine for a moment that there are no gods, no heaven, no hell. Think about your family, your friends, your neighbors, your reputation, and your self-respect- would you suddenly start killing, stealing, and lying if you truly no longer believed in any gods? Freethinkers and atheists and secular humanists think better of you than that, and we ask you to give yourselves- and us- more credit. Human beings are important. Our culture can be improved for all our sakes- we can and should learn to treat each other better- but there is no necessary connection between believing in any god and morality. If, unlike us, you believe there IS a God on whom to base moral questions, how can you know what He's like, what He wants or expects of us? Do you believe that God himself is moral- and what makes you think so? Could God do something immoral? If not, do you believe that if we humans follow God's example in all things, we will necessarily be moral? If you accept the _Holy Bible_ as the basis for understanding what's expected of us, how and why do you choose that book and not some other text, sacred to Muslims or Jews or Buddhists, as the source of truth? And how can differences in interpretations of the text ever be settled- that is, other than by starting a new Baptist congregation? We expect our opponents will argue that mere humans are inadequate to set up moral standards- and are arrogant to even try and that we must therefore instead rely on God's word, as revealed in the Bible, to set so-called "absolute" moral standards for us. We expect to be able to show you tonight that our opponents themselves do not really accept what they will claim is obvious and necessary. They will join us in demonstrating that religion presents no more absolute, no less "relative" a moral code than any other, and that the supposedly absolute religious moral codes are, in their opinion as well as in ours, inferior to codes with no pretensions of having come from God. We want to emphasize that we think they will contradict their own most basic argument, not because of some rhetorical trick on our part, but because their beliefs on morality are inherently contradictory and cannot be logically sustained. The rational position freethinkers defend is that supernatural beings are not needed to come up with effective, systematic, predictable ways of living and treating one another. We go further: reliance on unreliable, probably nonexistent, superhuman authorities make for at least slightly LESS effective, LESS just, LESS merciful systems of morality. Moral codes have always been, MUST be, products of human intelligence, based on human experience, individual and collective, contemporary and historical. Experience- what actually happens when we do things- and our parents and our other teachers of all sorts, teach us right and wrong in much the same way we learn that fire burns or that sugar tastes good. Moral codes have gradually evolved in this way in every known human society. Many societies have claimed, supported by the sincere beliefs of many or most members, that their moral code was provided for the society by God or by a group of gods- but that doesn't make it so. Although there's no persuasive evidence of any supernatural force in this universe (despite the undoubtedly sincere beliefs of many people here tonight), humans have nevertheless developed a bewildering variety of moral codes. These aren't perfect but they do allow societies to regulate human behavior, for better or worse. ONLY humans have ever developed moral standards, so only humans have produced effective or ineffective standards, positive laws and codes or terrible ones. And only humans can find better moral codes or better ways to apply the ones we have. We're on our own, and no amount of self-delusion will change that. When moral codes rely on supernatural forces and any form of Unquestionable Truth, whether the source of the supposed truth is God or some Marxist proletariat or a Nazi Fuhrer, the codes have historically often tended to spin our of control and harm individual humans and families. Rigid theocracies (Iran comes to mind), Communist dictatorships, and the Nazis all attempted to regulate behavior in more or less the same way: either accept some absolute truth, as our interpretation of our text reveals it, or we will be justified in killing you, putting you in jail, torturing you, burning you at the stake, or in some other way "enlightening" you- all for your own good, of course. And, as you think of the Nazi example in particular, keep in mind the cultural history that preceded and accompanied Hitler's rise to power and the horrors he provoked. Humans suffer greatly in this world, though not from any supernatural source. (Freethinkers have no more belief in Satan than in any other supernatural being.) Deciding what constitutes immorality is not always simple or obvious- indeed is it often quite difficult. But whenever man causes pointless, avoidable harm to man, we think that's immoral. Turning on your neighbor, attacking him physically or killing him just because his ideas are different is immoral. Imprisoning people for their religious or political beliefs, or for what they say, or for not being sufficiently respectful of authority is immoral. Discrimination against people based on their race or gender or ethnicity or age or religious beliefs or sexual orientation is immoral. Murder, rape, child abuse, theft, lying (most of the time) and other acts are immoral as well- but deciding what is immoral is not helped by referring to contradictory, ambiguous 'holy" books. Some other opinions on the morality of behavior we freethinkers hold (and we know we join many good religious folds in at least some of these): unlike our opponents, we believe that "owning" other human beings or accepting such slavery is immoral. We do not accept that "might makes right"- if I am bigger than you, or have a more powerful weapon, that does not give me the right to force you to do my bedding. Even if I were omnipotent, I would not have any such right (though I would obviously have the power then). We do not accept that human beings are inherently corrupt or worthless- and we think that teaching people that they and others are inevitably worthless is dangerous as well as immoral. We think putting a church or the state or a business ahead of family members' welfare is usually wrong. On the other hand, we think "coveting" someone else's stuff is hardly worth worrying about, much less being the subject of a major ethical commandment- and it would surely be awful for many American retailers if coveting stuff suddenly stopped. Masturbation is rarely harmful to anyone and is there fore not immoral. Gaining knowledge is nearly always a positive good, and striving to keep people ignorant is probably immoral. Another major difference we expect to have with our opponents is that we're convinced that forgiveness can ONLY be granted, in a moral society, by those who have been harmed. In fact we argue that a belief that forgiveness can be granted by anyone other than the victim is not only immoral but can contribute to other immoral acts. After all, what is the real incentive for doing what's right if you can be absolved of responsibility for your acts if you're just obsequious enough towards some spirit when you ask IT for forgiveness? Punishment for wrongdoing must be appropriate to the wrong committed- and justice demands that innocent people not be punished for the crimes of others. Rewards should also be in just proportion- and rewards, in a moral society, should come to those who deserve them for actions they have taken, not for mere beliefs or religious "penances." Mass murder or genocide is always horribly wrong, is never justifiable, no matter who carries it out or why- and the more extensive the mass murder is, the more obvious is its immoral character. Torture is obviously immoral and unending torture is even more plainly immoral. And folks, picking up sticks on Saturday is not, by any stretch of any interpretation of any moral code, so immoral as to justify the whole community getting together and stoning the offender to death. (People should be of course able to set aside one day of the week from the others, to call it "holy," if they wish- but it's immoral to use force to impose such ideas on others.) Finally, while our opponents will probably argue that immorality and evildoers should NOT be resisted, at least not by mere humans, we insist that humans should resist and oppose immorality as much as reasonably possible in any given situation. As Dan Barker, fundamentalist Christian preacher turned freethinker, wrote in his book, _Losing Faith in Faith_, we "have something to say to the religionist who feels atheists never say anything positive: You are an intelligent human being. Your life is valuable for its own sake. You are not second-class in the universe, deriving meaning and purpose from some other mind. You are not inherently evil- you are inherently HUMAN, possessing the positive rational potential to help make this a world of morality, peace and joy. Trust yourself." For another freethinker's positive comments on morality and its origins, consider the words of Mangasar Mangasarian, a Turkish-Armenian who graduated from Princeton Theological Seminary in 1882. He wrote, "Morality is ability. Whatever increases our powers, ennobles us. The freer, braver, and more devoted we are, the better men and women we shall become. 'Conscience is born of love,' wrote Shakespeare. In the alembic of this glorious truth all the terrors of the Jewish-Christian religion dissolve into nothingness. A word from Shakespeare, and the nightmares of the past are no more. Love!- behold the cradle in which conscience was born! Fear is the mouth of hell. Love is life, nursing into being and maturity all that is good, all that is true, all that is beautiful. Says Tennyson: 'Perplext in faith, but pure in deeds, At last he beat his music out. There lives more faith in honest doubt, Believe me, than in half the creeds.' This is music, and it descends over the babel of wrangling creeds, as the sunlight, after a long storm, streams over the spent and weary waves." As Mangasarian also wrote (in the same essay), "it is evident that in associating belief with morality the preacher is trying to save THE BELIEF, and not morality...It is much like the Republican party going before the country and saying, 'You cannot have prosperity in America unless you keep us in power,' or like the Democratic party claiming that it alone can save the country. In the same way the theologian says, 'You cannot have morality unless you have my creed.' He is playing politics, just as much as the Czar of Russia, or the Tammany 'boss' in New York, and like his fellow politicians, he would see the country ruined if that would advance his party or his church." We urge you to think positively, to think for yourself, to reject the idea that anyone's idea of a God is necessary for human morality, and to reject as well some religious ideas of morality in favor of more human-and humane-standards. =============================================================== From: Alcuin Subject: Credit where Credit is Due It is a standard feature of debate theory that a debate consists of some proposition, the truth of which is asserted by the affirmative participant[s] and denied by the negative participant[s]. Typically, the process of assertion and denial consists of the presentation and refutation of rational arguments. Apart from these adversarial characteristics, a debate would be little more than conversation. What is most surprising, then, about the "draft (v.2.2) of the Opening Statement in the AFS vs. CBL...Debate" is the absence of rational argumentation. The issue at stake in the debate for which the statement was composed is just the sort of proposition one might expect to discover at the heart of a heated formal controvery: "Is a God Necessary for Morality?" The author's Statement offers virtually no refutation of the claim at issue, and in a weak effort at constructing a countercase that a God is *not* necessary for morality, the author of this statement commits errors of reasoning so egregious that one is led to question his competence to debate on this topic. To understand fully the inadequacy of the case made in this Statement, consider the author's claims about morality. The author states that the following, among other things, are immoral: pointless avoidable harm to man, physical attack, murder, rape, child abuse, theft, and slavery. It is of course commendable to condemn such behavior. In keeping with the particular ethical interests of late twentieth-century political culture, the author also condemns discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, age, beliefs, or sexual orientation and he endorses masturbation and coveting. As a rhetorical measure employed to win the sympathy of the audience, the author's litany of yea's and nay's is calculated to appeal to the broad consensus of the culture within the context of which the debate takes place. As a rational argument, however, these bald assertions are entirely *irrelevant* to the claim at issue. The issue is *not* whether atheists can *posit* moral precepts, nor whether the atheist can perform acts that are susceptible to being called "good" or "bad," nor even whether society is able to construct and enforce behavioral codes. It is fairly obvious that all of these things do in fact take place. The issue, however, is whether an atheistic account of reality can *justify* the precepts that are posited; whether there is any rational method for discriminating between "good" and "bad" in a non-theistic universe. All of the sentences in the Statement that merely *describe* a hypothetical moral system (or perhaps the author's personal moral code) are just so much empty verbiage as far as the debate goes. The author has confused *description* (e.g., of the fact that murder *is* considered immoral) with *prescription* (e.g., of the precept that murder *ought* to be so considered). This is a notorious fallacy, and its presence in the opening statement of the debate can only constitute an embarrassing revelation of inadequate reasoning. Anyone can walk into a store and write a check, flash some identification, and walk out with the merchandise; the issue is whether or not the check is being kited. Does the author of the Statement provide any basis whatsoever for thinking that his claims as to what is right and what is wrong are true? A vague gesture is made in that direction when the author claims that "pointless, avoidable harm to man", "turning on your neighbor", and "teaching people that they are inevitably worthless" are immoral. The author claims that "our culture can be improved for all our sakes." What seems to be in view here is utilitarianism, more precisely described as universal ethical hedonism: a behavior is moral if it contributes to the greatest good of the greatest number in society. Unfortunately, that view is not given explicit articulation, and is in fact in conflict with some of the author's other statements regarding the notion that "might makes right" (see below). Moreover, the author makes no effort to forestall refutation. What reason is there to believe that man is inherently valuable? How would philosopher P or truckdriver Q know that this criterion (and not some other criterion) is genuine? Are there other values apart from the worth of the person? If so, how are such values related to the value of the person? Is the person valuable only as a member of society, or only as an individual, or both, and how do we know? Can the needs of the collective trump those of the individual? Or vice versa? The fact that the author makes not the slightest reference to these well-known problems with the view that he (vaguely) espouses debilitates his case. Furthermore, the criterion of human worth is detrimentally vague, not offering clear guidance on important ethical issues. For example, some might see abortion as a desecration of the value of the human fetus, while others might see abortion as an endorsement of the value of the human mother. How in a non-theistic frame of reference are such differences of opinion to be decided? Clearly, appeal to the standard of human worth would be question-begging. Likewise, the author asserts that "punishment for wrongdoing must be appropriate to the wrong committed." Who would disagree with that precept? Yet, opinions can and do differ as to what counts as "appropriate." How is it possible to *rationally* resolve such an issue in the atheist worldview? What is the appropriate penalty for rape? Public service? Imprisonment? Castration? Death? Is stealing justified, if I am better able to use the stolen car to the greater good of society than my neighbot is? Cannot the pleasure of the many be understood as permitting the torture of a few on the basis of "the greatest good for the greatest number," as long as the benefit of the pleasure outweighs the detriment of the pain? Oddly, the author also asserts that "humans have nevertheless developed a bewildering variety of moral codes. These aren't perfect but they do allow societies to regulate human behavior, for better or worse." In thus conceding the plurality of models of morality that obtains and the various outcomes dictated by their application, the author unwittingly grants that there is no means of discriminating among ethical codes. He asserts that ethical precepts are learned empirically, are not absolute, and are subject to change in variance with the evolution of society. Thus, morality apart from God is arbitrary, indeterminate, and inconsistent. The only guidance offered to tell the "better" from the "worse" is the author's arbitrary and therefore non-rational opinion on matters ethical. Again, a person who happens to think that torture is ok as long as the victim is preadolescent need only assert *his* claim, and on the author's basis there's no way to *rationally* dispute him. The author goes mighty far, in spite of his atheism, toward supporting the theist's case! Likewise, the walls of this author's construct crumble further when he asserts that "We do not accept that "might makes right"- if I am bigger than you, or have a more powerful weapon, that does not give me the right to force you to do my bidding." The supposed criterion for positing morality is the inherent worth of mankind. But there are differences of opinion as to how this criterion is to be applied. If in a given society, the majority opinion does *not* trump minority views, then the moral predilection of a few (say, serial killers or the torturer of children) could not be legitimately proscribed. Thus, the value of the individual whim would take precedence over the value of the collective. Chaos would ensue. On the other hand, if the majority *does* rule (if might does make right), then a consensus of 50%+1 (say, that members of a specific ethnicity should be exterminated) must, on the author's criterion, count as moral. Chaos would ensue. So which do we accept: murder at the hands of the many, or murder at the hands of the few? The author wishes to proscribe murder entirely, but provides no basis upon which to stake such a claim. How do differences of opinion as to what is moral get resolved in the author's utopia? As he asserts [a] "We insist that humans should resist and oppose immorality as much as reasonably possible in any given situation." And yet he professes [b] "turning on your neighbor, attacking him physically or killing him just because his ideas are different is immoral." What if there's an atheist who believes [a] and not [b]? Chaos would ensue. The walls of atheist morality come tumbling down. The author rails against the theistic position, describing it as irrational, arbitrary, and mythical. He asks that the theist "give [him] credit." However, no amount of vitriolic rhetoric against theism can draw attention away from the utter bankruptcy of the position posited here as an alternative. The author of the statement can state that such and such a behavior is or isn't moral. The author can also write checks at the store. In this debate, those "checks" are drawn on funds for which he has failed to give an account. If we value rationality, we must mark them boldly with "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and send them back. Appendix The author fails utterly to make a countercase to the claim that "a GOD is Necessary to Morality." Does the author at least successfully refute the affirmative case? Well, that case is not on offer here, nor is a detailed transcript of the debate. However, if the gestures toward characterizing theism in this opening Statement are any indication, the author's negative case probably fares no better than his countercase. The following are some of his specious claims about theism: * There is no necessary connection between believing in any god and morality. * Moral codes have always been, MUST be, products of human intelligence, based on human experience, individual and collective, contemporary and historical. * There's no persuasive evidence of any supernatural force in this universe. * [Theists] will contradict their own most basic argument, not because of some rhetorical trick on our part, but because their beliefs on morality are inherently contradictory and cannot be logically sustained. The following are some of the questions that he (naively) considers particularly telling against theism: * How can you know what God is like? * How can you know what He wants or expects of us? * Do you believe that God himself is moral? * What makes you think so? * Could God do something immoral? * If not, do you believe that if we humans follow God's example in all things, we will necessarily be moral? * If you accept the _Holy Bible_ as the basis for understanding what's expected of us, how and why do you choose that book and not some other text, sacred to Muslims or Jews or Buddhists, as the source of truth? * And how can differences in interpretations of the text ever be settled- that is, other than by starting a new Baptist congregation? The present essay is an analysis of the case made offered in the Statement, and is not itself a part of the debate for which that Statement was prepared. Therefore, the case *for* the necessity of theism in ethics will not be offered here. However, the issues and questions listed above merit answers, and we are prepared to answer them. Likewise, we are ready to explain how Christian Theism provides a cogent ethical system without requiring the same sort of irrationality exemplified in the Statement, and without doing disservice to the human intellect and to human dignity. You are welcome to visit the IRC Undernet channel #apologetics, on the us.undernet.org server or one of its nodes, where these and other questions are debated daily. Alcuinus Yalensis =============================================================== Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 17:02:12 -0700 From: jdl@iamerica.net (John Leckie) Subject: Re: Your email At 3:34 PM 3/19/96, you wrote: >I am attaching the response to your posting, penned by Alcuin from the >Undernet IRC #apologetics Channel; it has been linked from >http://www.fiu.edu/~wgreen01/apologetics.html at the "Feedback" section. > >Sorry Alcuin decimated the argument so thoroughly; better luck next time! >(If there *were* such a thing as luck :-) > >Bill (ProfG on IRC) I wouldn't say "decimated," if I were you. :) I saw the debate. The points in that refutation of Alcuin's were predictable and unoriginal, and so padded with superfluous wording. Is this person capable of stating a point succinctly? At any rate, the same reactions were observed from CBL. I am sorry that I caused Alcuin to take the time to construct such a long reply to the opening statement, but you and Alcuin must understand that it was all just an OPENING STATEMENT, *designed* to bring up the same points that Alcuin was unremarkably able to bring up. It worked brilliantly, I might add-- on CBL and Alcuin, and you, apparently, judging from your opinion of his refutation. If I had been able to send a transcript of the debate in its entirety, Alcuin would have had nothing to say. Every point Alcuin brought up was later addressed in the debate and, in my opinion, was quickly dispatched. Had I known that he would have given so much wasted effort to phrasing such a long response, I would not have sent just the opening statement. I have a copy of the VHS tape handy. Interested? Think you can handle it? :) I have sent Alcuin's evaluation of Dr. Buckner's Statement to Dr. Buckner himself, and he will most likely write something for Alcuin that was NOT designed to appeal to the masses, as Al so quickly picked up on in Dr. Buckner's rather tame opening statement. John I rather expected more from you guys. I was so hopeful for some intelligent exchanges and was grabbing at the chance with you and whomever else was interested from your group. I go dig up Dr. Buckner's Statement, and I get the same stuff I've always heard from apologetics. I would think that a Yale PhD could do better than that... Sigh... Better luck next time. If there is one. "The walls of the author's construct crumble further"? Could we possibly be more dramatic? We aren't evangelical by any chance, are we? ====================================================================== From: Alcuin Subject: Re: >Date: Tue, 19 Mar 1996 16:58:57 -0600 >From: John Leckie >If I had been able to send a transcript of the debate in its entirety, >Alcuin would have had nothing to say. I suspect that Mr. Leckie's confidence is inversely proportional to his grasp of the issues. However, I'm willing to have him attempt to negate that suspicion, if he feels so inclined. >Had I known that he would have given so much wasted effort to phrasing >such a long response, I would not have sent just the opening statement. Don't fret over my time, Mr. Leckie--*very little* was required :). >I have a copy of the VHS tape handy. Interested? Think you can handle >it? :) Will the refutation of Dr. Buckner's argument distress you? If not, send the tape in all haste. >I rather expected more from you guys. I was so hopeful for some >intelligent exchanges and was grabbing at the chance with you and whomever >else was interested from your group. I go dig up Dr. Buckner's Statement, >and I get the same stuff I've always heard from apologetics. I would think >that a Yale PhD could do better than that... Sigh... Poor John; he went to all the trouble of digging up a flimsy argument, and is disappointed that the response to that argument merely refutes it. You may have expected more, John. However, you did not offer much by way of substance with which to interact. If you'd like to hear a more sophisticated apologetic than "the same stuff" with which you're familiar, wouldn't it make sense to proffer an argument that begins, however humbly, to gesture in the direction of raising the critical philosophical issues that merit superior apologetic response? Notwithstanding your adolescent ad hominem, you are welcome to back up your easy protestations with an objection to theism that you reckon more difficult to defuse than what you have thus far supplied. In other words, put up.... Alcuin =============================================================== Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 14:37:55 -0700 From: jdl@iamerica.net (John Leckie) Subject: Re: Your email At 12:05 PM 3/21/96, you wrote: >>If I had been able to send a transcript of the debate in its entirety, >>Alcuin would have had nothing to say. > >I suspect that Mr. Leckie's confidence is inversely proportional to his >grasp of the issues. However, I'm willing to have him attempt to negate >that suspicion, if he feels so inclined. Please be patient. Meanwhile, suspect all you like. I've forwarded your response to Mr. Buckner's Statement to the man himself, and I'm waiting for a reply from him. I think he has a stake in this as well. He loves debate. Besides which, I can't write as well as either of you, and I'd like to level the playing field a bit and see how it turns out. I readily admit that you are a formidable opponent, but that doesn't make you right. I'm glad I started it, even though I must enlist Mr. Buckner's help to finish it. I've learned a lot from this already. I've been made to look foolish because I have never debated before and I had no idea what I'd be up against. I'm also bad about letting people get to me and letting my temper flare. While I'm sure you'll eagerly second that, keep in mind that I do admit it and I'd like to work on that and keep the exchange going. Praise your God if (Satan forbid) I might actually be convinced by you! :) I am also embarassed because, like a first year debate student, you used pat transitional phrases very well ("Credit Where Credit is Due" positively REEKED of them) to make your opponent look bad, which is of course the adult thing to do and has everything to do with disproving his point. Sigh... :) >Don't fret over my time, Mr. Leckie--*very little* was required :). I doubt that. I didn't exactly "fret," either. I think that the effort you put into your refutation is a good indication of how well the Statement pushed the right buttons. Clearly, if the Statement was as bad as you say it was, why did you even dignify it with a response? Let me guess-- "It's stupidity demanded a response." See below (the part about the inner child)* >>I have a copy of the VHS tape handy. Interested? Think you can handle >>it? :) > >Will the refutation of Dr. Buckner's argument distress you? If not, send >the tape in all haste. You are dismissing it before you view it. That isn't an open-minded attitude at all. Is your purpose REALLY to participate in intelligent discussion and debate, or to go into it with the idea that the opposing party is wrong? Well, of COURSE you believe them to be wrong from the outset, but to go in presupposing that whatever they say is bunk is hardly the right attitude for debate. I have little experience with debate, but if I were in one I'd really *listen* to what the other side had to say _before_ proclaiming them wrong. That's why I posted Mr. Buckner's statement to begin with. Does this have more to do with your ego than even *you* realize? Are you just trying to make clear to me just how cocky you are? I suppose with God as your copilot... ;) >Poor John; he went to all the trouble of digging up a flimsy argument, and >is disappointed that the response to that argument merely refutes it. The argument wasn't flimsy at all. It would have been if it were presented as the opinion of AFS members in its entirety. It served its purpose well in the debate. It worked on you. It raised the same questions from you that it was DESIGNED to. You still don't get that, do you? It wasn't really much trouble to dig it up, either. >may have expected more, John. However, you did not offer much by way of >substance with which to interact. If you'd like to hear a more >sophisticated apologetic than "the same stuff" with which you're familiar, >wouldn't it make sense to proffer an argument that begins, however humbly, >to gesture in the direction of raising the critical philosophical issues >that merit superior apologetic response? I'm working on it, I'm working on it! :) Truth be told, I did not expect such a detailed analysis of that Statement. I assumed that it was understood that that statement was intended to open up a debate and NOT answer all questions at once. That's what the rest of the debate was for. >Notwithstanding your adolescent ad hominem, you are welcome to back up >your easy protestations with an objection to theism that you reckon more >difficult to defuse than what you have thus far supplied. In other words, >put up.... > >Alcuin Yes, yes, very cute. As I said, I'm working on it. Speaking of adolescent ad hominem, I can see your gears turning with every exchange, and your inner child* definitely has something to prove beyond the actual point being argued. You disguise it well with excellent writing, but good grammar does not a genius make. After boiling away the fluff in "Credit Where Credit is Due", I don't see much substance, really. Not that it wasn't well written. You are saying that without a God, mere humans (not individually, but as a race) are not capable of making their own system of laws and punishments and living by them. Was God present when the Constitution was written? The system we live under today owes its existance to a godless Constitution. When legislators set up systems of punishments that lead, say, to a criminal serving three years in prison for robbing a store at gunpoint, they do not turn to God for guidance. Do you believe that, while they may not *consciously* call on God to help them set up laws, they are nevertheless guided by Him somehow? You also make it clear that the issue is not whether atheists can put forth moral codes and actually "behave," but that whatever laws they set up are not "justified" because they do not believe in God. What constitutes *Justified* by your reckoning? I believe that you are saying that, because my opinion of what is right and wrong might differ (greatly or slightly) from that of my neighbor, we as atheists are incapable of developing a system of moral codes that will work for everyone without some divine stamp of approval/dissapproval. Am I right, or do I misunderstand you? I'd like to point out how happy I am to live in America, because this system comes closest to being able to do just that. Majority rule is probably the only thing that can come close to achieving our goal. No one said it's easy to govern, even according to majority rule. People everywhere are unhappy with the way their country is being run. I just don't see where God enters into it. The abortion issue was a good one to bring up. You ask how, in a non-theistic frame of reference, are such differences of opinion to be decided. I think I can tell you how YOU would decide it. In your ideal world, abortion would be absolutely forbidden. Period. How did I know that? :) Personally, I don't like abortion. I think that it's as much a matter of personal responsibility as it is human worth (and I really *do* grasp the concept without God) to reap what one sows. BUT-- There are people in the world whose beliefs differ from yours whose rights must be spoken for. If aborting one's child is a Sin, then, according to your beliefs, that person guilty of making that decision will be dealt with in The End. Am I assuming too much? You DO believe abortion to be TOTALLY wrong no matter WHAT, right? What of the people who aren't Christians who don't want a child but accidently get pregnant, or worse, were raped? Sure, it's a bad choice to make, in my opinion as well, to erase a child out of convenience, but what of those people nevertheless? Is your attitude toward them one of indifference? "She wants an abortion? Tough. She's an unbeliever, anyway. It's for her own good. The Lord works in mysterious ways." If your God gave us free choice, then we should be able to exercise that choice and then suffer the consequences. Do you believe that Man is inherently evil? Why or why not? Do you believe that YOU would commit atrocities without God and the Bible to guide you? Of course YOU wouldn't, but do you believe that everyone else would? Would mankind as a whole? I'll try to get something from Mr. Buckner to you ASAP. Sorry for the delay, AND that *I* had to be the go-between (I'm not worthy! I'm not worthy!), but he's not internet saavy as yet, (doesn't even have an e-mail address), and I have to use the phone and snail mail to coordinate with him. Take care, John =============================================================== From: Alcuin Subject: John, How spirited of you to have continued our little discussion! I'm pleased to have the opportunity to address your most recent remarks. I hope that our ongoing dialog proves interesting to you. You remark: >like a first year debate student, >you used pat transitional phrases very well ("Credit Where Credit is Due" >positively REEKED of them) to make your opponent look bad, which is of >course the adult thing to do and has everything to do with disproving his >point. Well, I'm not interested in making my "opponent" look "bad" but I am quite interested in exposing inadequate reasoning and in praising sound and valid arguments. If there are "pat transitional" passages in my little review which seem to you to be purely rhetorical in function--which add nothing by way of analysis or assessment--I'm certainly open to your providing a list of them, so that I can ensure that my future reviews will not "reek". :) >>Don't fret over my time, Mr. Leckie--*very little* was required :). >I doubt that. I didn't exactly "fret," either. I think that the effort >you put into your refutation is a good indication of how well the Statement >pushed the right buttons. Doubt is ill-advised in this particular case; the original essay was drawn up while I was participating in an online discussion in #apologetics. Thus it took little time. Moreover, it was written in response to an acquaintance's request; thus the modicum of effort that went into the review is nothing more than a token of my respect for that acquaintance's desires. Whether the Opening Statement particularly "pushed" my "buttons" is irrelevant, since I would have reviewed it as asked, *regardless of its quality*. For information's sake, however, I'll let you know that I found it less compelling (by quite a bit) than other expressions I've seen of viewpoints with which I disagree. >Clearly, if the Statement was as bad as you say >it was, why did you even dignify it with a response? Let me guess-- "It's >stupidity demanded a response." Nope. See above. >>Will the refutation of Dr. Buckner's argument distress you? If not, send >>the tape in all haste. >You are dismissing it before you view it. That isn't an open-minded >attitude at all. Is your purpose REALLY to participate in intelligent >discussion and debate, or to go into it with the idea that the opposing >party is wrong? John, you should think about the fact that one *can* hold strong opinions while being open-minded about alternative viewpoints (though some folks hold strong opinions merely because they're pig-headed). The imperative "send" is not ordinarily taken as a means of "dismissing" something! [You wouldn't be waxing judgmental, would you, John? :)] Likewise, to express the likelihood that an argument will disappoint is merely to state a probability, not to "dismiss as bunk". >Does this have more to do with your ego than even *you* realize? >Are you just trying to make clear to me just how cocky you are? The reason that ad hominem is fallacious, John, is that it suffers from irrelevance. For example, if I *were* tapping the unfathomed depths of my ego in order to clarify for you the extent of my cockiness, would that in any way affect whether my position is correct or incorrect with respect to the issue? >The argument wasn't flimsy at all. It would have been if it were presented >as the opinion of AFS members in its entirety. It served its purpose well >in the debate. It worked on you. It raised the same questions from you >that it was DESIGNED to. You still don't get that, do you? As I stated in my review, the opening statement of the *more rigorous* styles of debate require the advancement of a case by the affirmative and the refutation of each affirmative argument by the negative. So, either the debate of which the Opening Statement was a part was not especially rigorous, or this statement fails. Its weakness is apparent either way. You have mentioned more than once that you find the Statement to have succeeded since it "worked on" me by causing me to raise specific issues. This "working" seems to impress you. I find that surprising, since the issue at hand has been discussed in print at such length that the issues are well-known. There is nothing difficult about drawing one's attention to some very broad issues. For that to be the *chief* merit of an opening statement is hardly something about which to boast. >I assumed that it was >understood that that statement was intended to open up a debate and NOT >answer all questions at once. That's what the rest of the debate was for. See above re the ordinary expectations in debate. >ad hominem, I can see your gears turning with every exchange, and your >inner child* definitely has something to prove beyond the actual point See above re the irrelevance of ad hominem observations. >You are saying >that without a God, mere humans (not individually, but as a race) are not >capable of making their own system of laws and punishments and living by >them. Was God present when the Constitution was written? Wrong. The issue is not whether people do perform behavior X (such as Constitution-writing) with or without reference to God. The issue is whether the performance of X can be explained cogently without reference to God. You are aware, of course, that this is a fallacious move on your part, since you ask: >Do you believe that, while they may not >*consciously* call on God to help them set up laws, they are nevertheless >guided by Him somehow? ...which is within spitting-distance of the ballpark, though not yet inside the foul-line. >What constitutes *Justified* by your reckoning? Oh, rational cogency and practical applicability would be nice. >Am I right, or do I misunderstand you? I believe your summary of my position misses the central thrust of my remarks. However, all I have done is point out the inadequacies of the Opening Statement that you supplied. Since I haven't made a case yet, you needn't try to refute me yet! If you're interested in the case *for* theistic ethics, then perhaps I can be persuaded to make that case for you, whereupon you're welcome to try with all your gusto to trample it. >People everywhere are unhappy >with the way their country is being run. I just don't see where God enters >into it. Just to help you see the issue more clearly, here's a kernel for thought: The theistic objection to the possibility of ethics in an atheistic universe does not deal with the general observation that some people in that universe may not be happy or satisfied. Rather, the objection deals more narrowly with the fact that for any given ethical scenario E wherein a moral precept P may be applied to situation S, the atheistic model cannot provide a reason in S under E for doing P instead of its inverse (~P). Concretely, there's no particularly compelling reason to tie one's shoes, *rather than* to shoot the neighbor; no reason *not* to torture kindergarteners; etc. Reasons can be *offered* ad infinitum; but *reasons to accept those reasons* (rather than ignore them) are impossible to come by, apart from an appeal to ethical universals. >What of the people who aren't Christians who >don't want a child but accidently get pregnant, or worse, were raped? >Sure, it's a bad choice to make, in my opinion as well, to erase a child >out of convenience, but what of those people nevertheless? Is your >attitude toward them one of indifference? "She wants an abortion? Tough. Since you find the concrete example of elective abortion interesting, let's look at it more closely: My personal belief is that one should provide practical material help to those in the position you described (mother with a child conceived in rape). Can you as an atheist provide any basis for deciding among the following options [which I reckon are all repugnant, except e]: [a] kill both mother and child [eliminate the burden on society]; [b] wait till the child is old enough to survive outside the womb, then kill the mother [who drains society] and rear the child [as a labor slave]; [c] compel the mother to abort immediatly [so that, regardless of her views, she won't end up a burden to society]; [d] require the mother to be sexually available to rapists, since she has already been raped anyway [thus eliminating the risk of other women]; [e] none of the above. I'll be interested to learn [a] how many hypothetical answers to this little dilemma you think there are, and [b] how you think you are able to select among them in a principled rather than arbitrary manner. Regards, Alcuin =============================================================== Date: Thu, 28 Mar 1996 13:33:49 -0700 From: John Leckie Subject: Onward... Incidentally, Bill, (That IS who I'm writing to first, yes?), does Alcuin (not to speak of you in 3rd person, Alcuin, but I'm trying to find something out from Bill) have an e-mail address of his own? I don't MIND the mail being forwarded, and if both of you wish to keep it that way it's fine with me. If you'd rather me write you directly, Alcuin, then just send me your address... Now, before I go on, I'd like to set a few things straight. I feel the need to explain something to you so that you may realize that you really ARE dealing with someone who is capable of a *mature* ongoing dialog, and will not simply bore you with constant little personal jabs. That will stop from here on out. I see an opportunity for us to learn from each other. I feel that if I do well enough in this informal debate, then I've upheld what I view (presently) to be the truth. If I "lose," then I will certainly have gained a knowledge that is more beneficial to me than that which I possessed before. Namely, knowledge of God's existence. It's a win-win situation, is it not? :) I will be more of the person I really am, and not the angry person you've seen so far. I'm well aware of what I looked like to you (and whoever else might have been reading this thread) in the beginning. I tend to be pointlessly insulting when angered. I know you didn't purposely provoke me. Your writing style just takes getting used to. It seemed to me that you just got so personal with (and practically insulted) someone whom I admire and respect. I thought that there were better ways to critique the statement which would not have been quite so pompous. The day after I sent a given letter to you, I would think of how foolish I had been, and how I wished I could have been more to the point and less personal from the outset. That's what I get for letting my emotions rule me in the process of writing. Of course, I had to deal with what I had already started when you responded to my insults with insults, etc... I'd like to end that. It's really not me, and I apologize. In order for you to understand any of what I just said and not have it sound like pointless babble (or, to understand how I could react the way I did), I must tell you a little about myself and my experience with Atheism and Mormonism (and now you're saying "Ah HA! That explains why he is so screwed up..."), and about my limited exposure (till now) to "believers" who were beyond halfway intelligent who could actually be a challenge to me. I was raised in a pretty strict Mormon household. At the age of about 14, the questions that I had been discouraged to ask in church got louder and louder in my mind, and eventually I broke away from church because I saw it all for what it really was. Since that's not the point of our discussion right now, I won't go into that part, but one thing that should be made clear in this is NEVER did I hear ANYTHING from ANYONE, in the church or in my family, then or since, that made me change my way of thinking. People DID try, too. By the time the church had given up on me, at least five different elders of the church had had me in a private discussion, which they all entered with an attitude (apparent to me at the outset) that here was some child going through the usual questioning "stage" who would be easily dispatched. When the meeting didn't go the way they planned (No, I was not rebellious or belligerent-- I simply asked too many questions that could not be answered to my satisfaction), they got pretty frustrated and eventually gave up. One of them even threatened me with some kind of manefestation "right then and there," which I asked to see and of course did not. I consider myself a very intelligent person. I didn't say completely mature, just very intelligent. I know I have a lot to learn. The more I know, the less I know, and so on... :) Anyway, I have always been used to easily "taking care of" anyone who wanted to argue with me about the existence of God, or any other supernatural garbage. I think this has something to do with the fact that I haven't finished college yet, and that in the Air Force there's not much to be found in the way of intelligent conversation at work. Therefore, my exposure has been limited-- I've led a sheltered life. Anyway, my best friend and his family are Atheists whom I love very much, and (being stuck out here in Oklahoma, the buckle of the Bible Belt) I often talk with them about my beliefs because I'm pretty alone here. Even my wife is a believer. The end result of all that I've explained so far is that I have little experience with not being able to talk people into seeing things my way. My first such experience is with you, and it's not because I haven't heard any of this about "justification" for morality and the failure of the atheistic moral system. It's the level on which you discuss things. Sometimes you go off into realms that I don't really see the point of, and it has piqued my interest. The approaches that you and ProfG take are of some kind of existential, transcendental nature. It's my understanding that this is a favorite tactic of apologetics, because if you get "meta" enough you can claim anything you like and leave absolutely no opening or flaw in your "logic" for a *truly* logical atheist to take advantage of. This has the effect of frustrating us, but that frustration doesn't equate to defeat. Rather, it indicates an inability on both our parts to relate to each other. If we can't RELATE then no progress can be made. You can spout off anything you like to us and feel like you're talking over our heads, but it has accomplished nothing. You mention "concrete" when addressing one of my points, and I'd like to jump in on that and say that I'm hoping for solely concrete discussion, if you don't mind. I like talking about evidence (and/or lack thereof), not whether or not *I* actually exist, or whether what is obviously a gun could be called an "orange" by someone else and there existing no way to prove him wrong. I know you see everything you say as concrete, but again there's the question of whether we RELATE on this. I mean, some of the stuff I see from you, especially on IRC, about the universe being absurd and such will just not do it for me. Being able to understand what you think you understand is not enough. You MUST be able to "come down to our level," if it pleases you, if you hope to really make a point. I have come into #apologetics to see you and Zo go on and on for an hour or more about stuff that, frankly, I have no concept of, only to hear you conclude by saying "It's been a fun 3 hours, but I have to go..." *3 Hours* of that?! :) If what I'm saying right now only makes it more obvious to you that we have no way of understanding each other due to my ignorance or inability to rise to your level of metaphysical understanding, let me know now, ok? :) >If there are "pat transitional" passages >in my little review which seem to you to be purely rhetorical in >function--which add nothing by way of analysis or assessment--I'm >certainly open to your providing a list of them, so that I can ensure >that my future reviews will not "reek". :) The following clips are from "Credit Where Credit is Due," your response to a statement made by Dr. Buckner, who had, remember, not insulted you or the theistic community in any way. Had you had an opportunity to debate with him, and not only to review one of his more mild (and, I agree, softer) statements, and STILL felt this way about his reasoning skills, you may have been justified in making the following observations privately. Even so, the following phrases serve only to express your personal opinion of Dr. Buckner and to make clear your attitude, and do nothing toward making your point-- *begin quotes* the author of this statement commits errors of reasoning so egregious that one is led to question his competence to debate on this topic. the walls of this author's construct crumble further an embarrassing revelation of inadequate reasoning if the gestures toward characterizing theism in this opening Statement are any indication, the author's negative case probably fares no better than his countercase *end quotes* You were saying NOTHING in the above quotes that had anything to do with what was being debated. You were only saying how incompetent you thought the author was. What prompted you to respond in this way? This is the first glimpse I got of you. I don't think it's the real you any more than I know that what you've seen of me until now is not the real me. I responded in kind. >The reason that ad hominem is fallacious, John, is that it suffers from >irrelevance. For example, if I *were* tapping the unfathomed depths of >my ego in order to clarify for you the extent of my cockiness, would that >in any way affect whether my position is correct or incorrect with respect >to the issue? No, it would not, so why include it in your very first response? It's not as if I need to be told this. See above about reacting to what I reckoned as an insult to a friend. At least you're not denying that you're pretty cocky, OR that the fact that you are comes out in your writing. I guess there's nothing wrong with that, but to cross that line from confidence into utter cockiness... So if it's irrelevant, let's leave it out, shall we? >>The argument wasn't flimsy at all. It would have been if it were presented >>as the opinion of AFS members in its entirety. It served its purpose well >>in the debate. It worked on you. It raised the same questions from you >>that it was DESIGNED to. You still don't get that, do you? > >As I stated in my review, the opening statement of the *more rigorous* >styles of debate require the advancement of a case by the affirmative >and the refutation of each affirmative argument by the negative. So, >either the debate of which the Opening Statement was a part was not >especially rigorous, or this statement fails. Its weakness is apparent >either way. You have mentioned more than once that you find the Statement >to have succeeded since it "worked on" me by causing me to raise specific >issues. This "working" seems to impress you. I find that surprising, >since the issue at hand has been discussed in print at such length that >the issues are well-known. There is nothing difficult about drawing one's >attention to some very broad issues. For that to be the *chief* merit of >an opening statement is hardly something about which to boast. You are right. I think I did mention something about the statement being tame in a past letter, and the debate was not of a rigorous nature at all. I spoke to Dr. Buckner's son (my best friend to whom I e-mailed a copy of "Credit") to find out that he hasn't given "Credit Where Credit is Due" to his father yet, but from what he told me Dr. Buckner is planning to read it and respond to it, and I'm sure he'll give you the kind of response you are begging for to excercise your brain. :) >>You are saying >>that without a God, mere humans (not individually, but as a race) are not >>capable of making their own system of laws and punishments and living by >>them. Was God present when the Constitution was written? > >Wrong. The issue is not whether people do perform behavior X (such as >Constitution-writing) with or without reference to God. The issue is >whether the performance of X can be explained cogently without reference >to God. You are aware, of course, that this is a fallacious move on >your part, since you ask: > >>Do you believe that, while they may not >>*consciously* call on God to help them set up laws, they are nevertheless >>guided by Him somehow? > >...which is within spitting-distance of the ballpark, though not yet inside >the foul-line. So do you believe that we are guided by him somehow? Can you elaborate on that? If you believe that such law-writing and moral code-devising cannot take place "without reference to God," would you explain to me how that reference to God fits in to the process? >>What constitutes *Justified* by your reckoning? >Oh, rational cogency and practical applicability would be nice. I agree. Why is "practical applicablility" missing from the statement that something is "justified" if it protects the rights of others and does no preventable harm to anyone? Am I in error in saying that life is valuable for its own sake? >>Am I right, or do I misunderstand you? >I believe your summary of my position misses the central thrust of my >remarks. However, all I have done is point out the inadequacies of >the Opening Statement that you supplied. Since I haven't made a case >yet, you needn't try to refute me yet! If you're interested in the >case *for* theistic ethics, then perhaps I can be persuaded to make >that case for you, whereupon you're welcome to try with all your gusto >to trample it. If I'm off the mark then set me straight, by all means. Give me that central thrust. I don't want to put forth the effort to argue against a view which I perceive you hold when in fact you don't *exactly* hold that view. >Concretely, there's no particularly compelling reason to >tie one's shoes, *rather than* to shoot the neighbor; no reason *not* to >torture kindergarteners; etc. Reasons can be *offered* ad infinitum; but >*reasons to accept those reasons* (rather than ignore them) are impossible >to come by, apart from an appeal to ethical universals. Ethical universals = God's implantation in us of the knowledge of good and evil? Do we need reasons not to shoot our neighbors? Are you saying that without God we would be individuals committing random acts without a care as to the consequences, or that we would be people who would just as soon shoot their neighbor as tie their shoe? Do you think that without God we would be able to perform one act, such as doing the dishes, and then another, such as running out into the street naked and assaulting someone, and not FEEL any difference between the two acts? I just *can't* see that. I don't even need a *compelling* reason not to shoot my neighbor. Do you mean that I know that shooting my neighbor is wrong courtesy of God? >>What of the people who aren't Christians who >>don't want a child but accidently get pregnant, or worse, were raped? >>Sure, it's a bad choice to make, in my opinion as well, to erase a child >>out of convenience, but what of those people nevertheless? Is your >>attitude toward them one of indifference? "She wants an abortion? Tough. >Since you find the concrete example of elective abortion interesting, let's >look at it more closely: > >My personal belief is that one should provide practical material help to >those in the position you described (mother with a child conceived in rape). Elaborate on the practical material help, please. >Can you as an atheist provide any basis for deciding among the following >options [which I reckon are all repugnant, except e]: > >[a] kill both mother and child [eliminate the burden on society]; >[b] wait till the child is old enough to survive outside the womb, then kill > the mother [who drains society] and rear the child [as a labor slave]; >[c] compel the mother to abort immediatly [so that, regardless of her views, > she won't end up a burden to society]; >[d] require the mother to be sexually available to rapists, since she has > already been raped anyway [thus eliminating the risk of other women]; >[e] none of the above. > >I'll be interested to learn [a] how many hypothetical answers to this >little dilemma you think there are, and [b] how you think you are able >to select among them in a principled rather than arbitrary manner. Ahem. I happen to think that all are repugnant except [e] myself. Why do you present such awful possiblilties? Is that what you think of the end result of the atheistic paradigm of existance and the extent of our compassion? What point are you trying to make with these possibilities? [a] To a mother with a child conceived in rape, I would offer the following possibilities: 1. have the baby, and give it up for adoption if she doesn't want (or wants but is unable to care for) the child 2. abort the fetus before it takes on the attributes that would make it a complete *thinking* human (i.e. brain activity, no vestigial tail, etc...) if and only if she does not elect to carry it to term (as would be her right) 3. have and keep the baby The rapist is the only burden on society I see here and should be locked up for life. That's in my ideal world, though. I'm aware that some people would be for rehabilitating the rapist so that he would ultimately be a contributor to society, but the only way to know if the attempt failed would be to see another woman raped, so I don't subscribe to that view. [b] I take into account the rights of the Woman and the good of society as a whole. God didn't tell me any of that, not even unconsciously. Also, as a person who does not believe in an afterlife, I think that this is the only life we have, so I feel that I value it more than people who think that whatever happens here, as long as they ask forgiveness near the end, they will live forever in a much better eternity afterwards. Remember, though, before you jump at the chance to compare my "value life" statement with the possibility of "killing a baby," that I don't think one is killing a baby until it takes on the attributes that would scientifically classify it as officially human, i.e. brain activity. None of this is arbitrary. It's all principled. See if you can find David B. Wong's _Moral Relativity_, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. The tricky thing is, this particular view of abortion is very different from those of some atheists I know. I think the government should not be able to decide moral and religious issues for us. If it's scientifically possible and safe, a procedure should be made available. Let the people who make the "wrong" choices be dealt with on Judgement Day, in the meantime. John =============================================================== Date: Sat, 30 Mar 1996 22:02:22 -0600 From: Alcuin Subject: Re: Onward and Upward John, Since ProfG initiated this dialog, he is interested both in following it as it develops and in posting it to the #apologetics website. For this reason, it seems as good a method as any that he continue to function as the middleman in this exchange. >It's a win-win situation, is it not? :) Yes, our dialog looks like a win-win situation. As long as you are interested in orderly and sometimes rigorous analysis of the "God" issue, I'm interested in continuing our discussion. I think we agree here. Though I am willing and able to apologize where I have drifted into excess, I must plead "not guilty" to your charge that I have exchanged insult for insult. I can find nothing in my comments to you that functions to insult rather than to analyze. Likewise, I deny that I have insulted Dr. Bucknell. I have nothing against him personally, and have only assessed the quality of his written Statement. The remarks that you quoted in your last note (which I reproduce below) are not specimens of fallacious ad hominem, since they *are* in fact relevant to the review. More on that later. In the meantime, concerning the autobiographical data you provided: >clear in this is NEVER did I hear ANYTHING from ANYONE, in the church >or in my family, then or since, that made me change my way of thinking. It is typical of 20th century Christendom that tough questions are suppressed rather than allowed by the "people in charge" of the group context. That's a shame. If Christianity is true, then there is of course no question whatsoever that is threatening; every inquiry is legitimate, because satisfactory answers are in principle possible, even though particular Christians may not be able to come up with them. If Christianity is true, then there is by definition no compelling evidence against its truth. It is unfortunate that Christians have retreated from their intellectual responsibilities in the last ten or fifteen decades. >I was not rebellious or belligerent-- I simply asked too many questions >that could not be answered to my satisfaction), they got pretty frustrated Nothing wrong with that, as long as the measure of your satisfaction is reasonable. >I consider myself a very intelligent person. I didn't say completely >mature, just very intelligent. I know I have a lot to learn. The more I >know, the less I know, and so on... :) It's good to have a clear notion of the extent of one's intelligence. A corollary to that, however, is that one is at risk of *not realizing* just how many very intelligent people there are, among whom some believe outlandish things, some are confused, and some are lucid and commited to reason. Likewise, some less intelligent folks have a pretty good grasp of what's going on in a particular area of inquiry. The lesson of this corollary--which is a lesson of maturity--is that intelligence is fine, but provides little guarantee of the viability of espoused beliefs. Take a look at the works of Frederic Jameson or Jacques Derrida, and you'll perceive that a high degree of intelligence is distinct from a high degree of truth-affirmation. There are intelligent atheists and obnoxious ones and foolish ones; and there are intelligent Christians, and obnoxious ones and foolish ones. >Anyway, my best friend and his family are Atheists whom I love very much I commend your regard for their friendship and love. Their support of you is significant. If theism is true, then their support of you is important *in spite of*, rather than because of, the claims that you and they share concerning God. So, I am pleased that you are in a position to report that someone takes your serious concern for ideas seriously. Understanding is terribly important, and too often neglected. Though the friendship that you describe with them matters, I believe that the answers that your friends propose in response to your concerns are incorrect. >The approaches that you and ProfG take are of >some kind of existential, transcendental nature. It's my understanding >that this is a favorite tactic of apologetics, because if you get "meta" >enough you can claim anything you like and leave absolutely no opening or >flaw in your "logic" for a *truly* logical atheist to take advantage of. Well, the presuppositional approach to apologetics is surely *not* a favorite tactic among Christians, since many are not sufficiently versed in philosophy or apologetics to successfully offer a transcendental argument. Such an argument should only be as "meta" as the topic under discussion requires. If your desire is to put out a fire, a glass of water is not sufficient; if you wish to analyze bacteria, a magnifying glass will not do. Likewise, if the question is how to demonstrate the existence and nature of an abstract being such as God, the philosophical tools that are necessary involve a high degree of precision and complexity (but no more complexity than is called for by the question, one hopes). >This has the effect of frustrating us, but that frustration doesn't equate >to defeat. Rather, it indicates an inability on both our parts to relate >to each other. John, there are two issues here. One issue is what to do with an argument in which there is no "flaw" in the "logic." Such an argument is said to be valid, and is compelling, in the absence of any serious objection to the premises of that argument. If you reject logic, then the issue of whether your atheism is irrational or not is settled, isn't it? But I don't think you want to reject logic. I do not wish to reject logic, for which reason I subscribe to a view of the world in which logic can be accounted for. The other issue is that of "common ground." You are correct that if Person P uses philosophical concepts and vocabulary with which Person Q is unfamiliar, not much communication will take place. My view, and perhaps ProfG's, is that the level of discussion should be as straightforward as possible, given the nature of the question. If there are technical terms, they should be defined. If there are technical notions, they should be explained. Since you see yourself as "very intelligent" you are doubtless confident in your ability to follow such a discussion, and to contribute substantially to it. I propose that we all ask for definitions in instances where one or the other of us seems to be lapsing into "jargon." Thus, we won't fail to "relate." >If we can't RELATE then no progress can be made. You can >spout off anything you like to us and feel like you're talking over our >heads, but it has accomplished nothing. I agree with the sentiment you're expressing here. I assure you that I have no interest in spouting off technicalities that are over the heads of whomever I'm addressing. What would be the point of so empty a gesture? I'm interested in communicating on what I consider an important topic. You seem to be interested as well. If I use any vocabulary with which you are unfamiliar, please ask for clarification, and I shall do the same of you. >You mention "concrete" when addressing one of my points, and I'd like to >jump in on that and say that I'm hoping for solely concrete discussion, if >you don't mind. I like talking about evidence (and/or lack thereof) Here, I believe some clarification is in order. By concrete, I mean non-abstract or, technically, "not extended in space". For example, a spinach leaf is concrete, but laws of logic are abstract. A raven is concrete, but liberty is abstract. Now, as far as I can tell, some evidence is concrete and some is abstract. So, I'm deeply committed to discussing "evidence," but it is important for you to realize that doing so assumes a "philosophy of evidence." It seems to me that the notion that we can only discuss *material* data in an analysis of whether God (an *immaterial* being) is relevant to moral laws (which are abstract) is somewhat confused. Human experience cannot be explained successfully in purely material terms. >some of the >stuff I see from you, especially on IRC, about the universe being absurd >and such will just not do it for me. Nor for me. In fact, I'm *counting* on the fact that an absurd universe will not satisfy you, since atheism reduces inevitably to such absurdity. The challenge for you, on the other hand, is to gesture however sketchily in the direction of showing that atheism *can* provide a rational (non-absurd) account of human experience. >You MUST be able to "come down to our >level," if it pleases you, if you hope to really make a point. I have come >into #apologetics to see you and Zo go on and on for an hour or more about >stuff that, frankly, I have no concept of, only to hear you conclude by >saying "It's been a fun 3 hours, but I have to go..." *3 Hours* of that?! I will gladly speak with you in terms that are appropriate to your training and interests. Surely you realize, however, that the person with whom I spent 3 hours discussing "that stuff" of which you have "no concept" simply has a different set of intellectual needs than you do at this time. He seems to have thought that the discussion was pointed. The logs are available for others to judge whether the time was wasted or not. On the allegedly negative rhetoric in Alcuin's "Credit Where Credit's Due": [Alcuin said]: >>If there are "pat transitional" passages >>in my little review which seem to you to be purely rhetorical in >>function--which add nothing by way of analysis or assessment--I'm >>certainly open to your providing a list of them, so that I can ensure >>that my future reviews will not "reek". :) [and John said]: >so, the following phrases serve only to express your personal opinion of >Dr. Buckner and to make clear your attitude, and do nothing toward making >your point-- > >>the author of this statement commits errors of reasoning so egregious that >>one is led to question his competence to debate on this topic. >[snip] >>the walls of this author's construct crumble further >[snip] >>an embarrassing revelation of inadequate reasoning >[snip] >>if the gestures toward characterizing theism in this opening Statement are >>any indication, the author's negative case probably fares no better than >>his countercase > >You were saying NOTHING in the above quotes that had anything to do with >what was being debated. You were only saying how incompetent you thought >the author was. Here, John, I believe you are mistaken. I did not insult Dr. Buckner's intelligence. Note that I didn't question his competence to debate on other topics, since I have no evidence of what he might say in doing so. Rather, I asserted that he had [a] committed errors of reasoning in the "Statement" I was analyzing, and that [b] these errors were of so fundamental a sort that it suggested his lack of familiarity or facility with the commonly recognized issues relevant to the debate. Then I went on to *specify* the errors in question (Moore's naturalistic fallacy--a confusion of description with prescription-- and the denial of majoritarianism in a utilitarian model) and to *show* that he committed them. This does not at all suggest that Dr. Buckner is not an intelligent man. He may very well be. He may also be a kind man, as indeed you assure me that he is. Despite the weaknesses of his Statement, he may even be able to debate well concerning ethics. However, it seems as if an appropriate rebuttal of my assessment of his Statement would be to demonstrate that the fallacies of reasoning I mentioned are *not* present in it, rather than merely to assert that I'm personally attacking Dr. Buckner. It's important, John, to grasp the nature of an ad hominem argument. You may have taken personal offense at this assessment of Dr. Buckner's statement. That fact does not *establish* that the remarks you found offensive were irrelevant or out of line. As far as I can tell, the remarks you single out here are the sort of thing that a responsible reviewer ought to offer, in response to so "soft" a presentation as Dr. Buckner drafted. A fallacious ad hominem argument is the sort, for example, that would say something like "Dr. Buckner's argument is flimsy, and I would have expected more from a Harvard man" or "Clearly Dr. Buckner's atheism is an expression of the insecurity of his inner child".... Do you see the difference, John? The comments concerning the specific argument, its relation to established fallacies, and whether the introduction bodes well for the subsequent argument *are* relevant. Remarks about the debater's personal characteristics apart from the specific issue at hand are irrelevant. >What prompted you to respond in this way? This is the first glimpse >I got of you. I don't think it's the real you any more than I know >that what you've seen of me until now is not the real me. I responded >in kind. My commitment to analytic thinking prompted me to respond in this way. As I have noted, I didn't personally attack Dr. Buckner. I'm afraid that this *is* the real me, warts and all. I hope that my analytic bent doesn't dissuade you from engaging in a discussion with me. Likewise, I'd gladly have coffee and danish with Dr. Buckner, and chat about the state of the union. My goodwill toward him personally, however, would not inhibit me from offering the best assessment of his public statement that I can. Is it unkind to point out to a neighbor that a skunk has crawled into his basement? Is it unkind to suggest that wrangling that skunk ought to be done by someone who shows familiarity with the ins and outs of skunk-wrangling? Of course not. Both would be reckoned friendly acts. Likewise, pointing out that someone's public pronouncements concerning Ethics are fallacious and that such matters are best handled by those familiar with the ins and outs of ethical analysis is not unkind. I'm afraid that you've shown nothing yet for which I should apologize, though it concerns me that you took offense at my analysis of your friend's comments. >At least you're not denying that you're pretty cocky, OR that the fact >that you are comes out in your writing. I guess there's nothing wrong >with that, but to cross that line from confidence into utter cockiness... >So if it's irrelevant, let's leave it out, shall we? Not so slippery, John. I haven't denied that I'm cocky, nor have I affirmed that I am cocky. I have argued that the issue of my personality is not relevant. Likewise, your claiming that negativity comes across in my writing is not the same as your *showing* that negativity comes across. As far as I can tell, what you find negative is the fact that someone you admire was subjected to telling, relevant criticism. That's why, in a previous message, I asked: "Will the refutation of Dr. Buckner's argument distress you? If not, send the tape in all haste." Do you feel comfortable with the notion that I will be disagreeing with your friends, and analyzing their comments where appropriate? >but from what he told me Dr. Buckner is planning to read it >and respond to it, and I'm sure he'll give you the kind of response you are >begging for to excercise your brain. :) I look forward to the opportunity to engage Dr. Buckner in discussion. Your commendation of him suggests to me that such a dialog would be interesting. >So do you believe that we are guided by him somehow? Can you elaborate on >that? If you believe that such law-writing and moral code-devising cannot >take place "without reference to God," would you explain to me how that >reference to God fits in to the process? Sure. Such an explanation would require greater attention to detail and more clarification than I shall provide in this answer, since I'm just going to offer a thumbnail sketch here. I'll be glad to provide further information in connection with this question later, if you wish. Briefly, however, Christians hold [a] that the universe was created by God, an abstract being who actively sustains and perpetuates every process or event that occurs. Christians hold that [b] this creator is capable of self-expression through the agency of free created beings such as people, and that the Bible is a collection of such self- expressions. Thus, Christians hold that the Bible is authoritative. Likewise, Christians hold [c] that the external physical world may be known by human minds precisely because both are created and sustained in such a way that knowledge is possible. It is my understanding that [d] this view of knowledge is taught in the bible. Now, if the Christian sees a world in which the relation of mind to data is always actively mediated by God, then it follows [e] that the Christian will consider *all* formulations of philosophy--even those that are not in accord with reality--*dependent* on human knowledge of God and God's interpretation, whether that dependence is acknowledged by the knower or not. To take this analysis back to the issue of ethics: [f] the practice of identifying situations, identifying principles of ethics, and applying the relevant principles to the situations requires certain assumptions about the world; [g] such assumptions are consistent with the Christian theistic paradigm, and are inconsistent with a denial of that paradigm. So, an atheist who posits, say, human life as the highest good must account for how it is possible to account for the practice of rendering that judgment, given the atheist's assumptions about reality (including the absence of a self-revelatory God). A rough analogy that will, I trust, help to clarify the Christian's view of the discussion at hand is this: two people sitting in a Boeing 747, en route to New York, where one person argues that air flight *is* possible, and the other argues that air flight *is not* possible. Or, more to the point, two people out loud about whether speech is possible. The whole exchange presupposes the truth of the claim under dispute. Does that sketch help clarify the issue a bit? >Why is "practical applicablility" missing from the statement that >something is "justified" if it protects the rights of others and does no >preventable harm to anyone? Am I in error in saying that life is valuable >for its own sake? Simply, because "justification" involves the notion that there is some non-circular reason to prefer one viewpoint over another, while "practical applicability" involves the notion that disagreements over what a given precept means can be objectively resolved in principle. More complexly: Whether you are in error in positing that standard of morality is only half the issue. The weightier question is, can an atheist's worldview account for the possibility of asserting that that standard is better than, say, its opposite? I believe you want to safeguard human worth and dignity, John. I wonder what reasons you have for thinking that atheism can accomplish this goal for you. The principle [P0] "Protects the rights of others and does no preventable harm to anyone" fails to be justified in an atheist's frame of reference (commendable though [P0] is) because [h] in terms of that frame of reference, it is not possible to demonstrate *why* anyone *should* hold [P1] that preventable harm is undesirable; because [i] from such a point of view it is not possible to identify rationally just what are and are not the "rights" that a person can claim (in other words, just sticking a principle out there isn't good enough, since mere assertion is arbitrary and therefore non-rational); and fails to be practically applicable because [j] both [h] and [i] indicate that the atheist viewpoint allows for *unresolvable* differences (i.e., contradictions) over what counts as a practical application of precept [P0]. >Ethical universals = God's implantation in us of the knowledge of good and >evil? Well, I'd say God's self-revelation in the Bible, including general precepts of ethical behavior and concrete illustrations of their practical application, alongside his "implantation in us" of certain knowledge both of him and of our obligations to him. Appealing to the subjective conscience alone, apart from some objective propositional standard, would seem to lead to irrationality. So, conscience is necessary, but not sufficient for a model of ethics. >Are you saying that without >God we would be individuals committing random acts without a care as to the >consequences, or that we would be people who would just as soon shoot their >neighbor as tie their shoe? No, I'm saying that [k] none of us is ever without God in a sense, even when we tell ourselves that we don't know whether he exists; [l] that his existence and our knowledge of it allows for the very possibility of posing and deliberating rationally over ethical questions; but that [m] if what atheists claim about reality were true, there would be no rational *basis* for avoiding the kind of scenario described above (whether or not it actually ensued. As it happens, I doubt that atheists would allow a scenario of chaos, precisely because it is impossible to live that way, because [k], and because God mercifully prevents those who deny him from living consistently with their espoused premises. Speaking atheism is much easier than living consistently with its assumptions, and atheists typically tacitly borrow capital from the theistic account, in order to function). As for whether you need universal standards so as not to shoot your neighbor: you might simply think that shooting your neighbor is wrong because elders of society (such as school teachers, media personalities, or parents), have told you that it it wrong. It would be a mistake to confuse one's subjective moral convictions with objective ethical reality. You may not personally require much persuasion on the issue of murder. (Why, by the way, don't you feel inclined to murder?). The issue is what to say to the person who *does* happen to enjoy murder. How does an atheistic universe provide mechanisms for dealing *rationally* with such a difference of opinion. >>My personal belief is that one should provide practical material help to >>those in the position you described (mother with a child conceived in rape). >Elaborate on the practical material help, please. Money, time, counseling, material provision, and adoption are appropriate responses to the scenario you describe, in my opinion. I believe this because I believe that there are ethical absolutes from which such a response follows logically. Whether or not you hold to the same view of how to deal with crisis pregnancies as I, how do you account for your holding to what you hold, rather than to anything else (for example the horrible alternatives that I proposed)? [Alcuin challenges]: >>Can you as an atheist provide any basis for deciding among the following >>options [which I reckon are all repugnant, except e]: >> >>[a] kill both mother and child [eliminate the burden on society]; >>[b] wait till the child is old enough to survive outside the womb, then kill >> the mother [who drains society] and rear the child [as a labor slave]; >>[c] compel the mother to abort immediatly [so that, regardless of her views, >> she won't end up a burden to society]; >>[d] require the mother to be sexually available to rapists, since she has >> already been raped anyway [thus eliminating the risk of other women]; >>[e] none of the above. >> >>I'll be interested to learn [a] how many hypothetical answers to this >>little dilemma you think there are, and [b] how you think you are able >>to select among them in a principled rather than arbitrary manner. [and John responds]: >Ahem. I happen to think that all are repugnant except [e] myself. Why do >you present such awful possiblilties? Is that what you think of the end >result of the atheistic paradigm of existance and the extent of our >compassion? What point are you trying to make with these possibilities? I'm pleased that you prefer [e]. That's very Christian-theistic of you. However, you have managed to sidestep the key challenge posed by the example. The point is precisely that you, John, are inconsistent with your professed atheism, insofar as you have an opinion on this issue. Specifically, you choose [e]. Yet you offer no explanation of how atheism allows you to rationally prefer [e] over [a]-[d]. The point is not that atheism implies [a]-[d], but rather that atheism implies anything and nothing. It is a contradictory, irrational worldview. *If you disagree with this assertion, the question is waiting to be answered: how do atheists non-arbitrarily assign moral values?* >[a] To a mother with a child conceived in rape, I would offer the following >possibilities: >1. have the baby, and give it up for adoption [snip] >2. abort the fetus [snip] >3. have and keep the baby Why those? How do you derive a value system from which your choices follow? >The rapist is the only burden on society I see here and should be locked up >for life. That's in my ideal world, though. I'm aware that some people Reflect, John. I hold that the rapist is a burden on society because I hold a worldview that provides specifically for the condemnation of rapists. Where do your (mere) preferences come from? Are they arbitrary or principled? >[b] I take into account the rights of the Woman and the good of society as >a whole. The naturalistic fallacy--it's awfully hard to avoid, isn't it? Nevertheless, I'll try to steer back to the issue: *Why* do you prefer the "good of society"; *how* do you determine what that good is (when there is disagreement); *how* do you determine what does and does not count as a woman's rights; *how* do you determine how other rights interact with what you take to be the woman's rights? >only life we have, so I feel that I value it more than people who think >that whatever happens here, as long as they ask forgiveness near the end, Non sequitur, John! Your worldview doesn't provide a means for you to rationally value anything in particular at all (though you value some things anyhow)! To determine whether you value life more than someone who happens to believe in an afterlife, you would have to have a perspective that allows for the evaluation of different value systems. Yet, evaluation assumes that there are standards (unless morality amounts to subjective irrationality). Where do you get your standards, and why should anyone think that yours are more compelling than those, say, of a sociopath? Does the sociopath have rights? Why or why not? Besides, your comparison assumes that the motive for moral behavior is necessarily connected with views of the afterlife (a teleological ethic), while Christianity provides a deontological ethic as well (i.e., things are wrong because of an objective set of standards, so that consequentialism is not the only factor that determines whether or not an agent chooses to perform an action). >None of this is arbitrary. It's all principled. See if you can find >David B. Wong's _Moral Relativity_, Berkeley: University of California >Press, 1984. I would recommend that you formulate and then explain what you think these two terms mean: [n] "arbitrary" [o] "principled". I contend that, by definition, no model of ethical relativism can satisfy the conditions implicit in these terms. Of course, principles can be *posited*. So what? Why should posited principles be accepted rather than rejected? It is one thing to describe that moral relativists *do* happen to hold to some ethical precepts. It is another thing to *show* that in so doing, they are rational, justified, or consistent. >I think the government should not be able to decide moral and religious >issues for us. Every governmental action has an ethical aspect. The government makes moral decisions that affect our lives daily. Likewise, the principles that underlie many such decisions are no less religious than ethical systems in general. John, I hope that these responses to the interesting comments you offered provide some food for thought. I respect your having shared something of your personal story and your reasons for finding the analysis of these matters interesting. I look forward to receiving whatever comments you care to offer in our ongoing discussion. Alcuin =============================================================== From apologete@orthodox.com Mon Dec 2 00:08:18 1996 Message-Id: <199612020419.XAA26402@babe.globecomm.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Sun, 01 Dec 1996 23:19:31 -0500 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Ethics Debate--[2b-part one of two] Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: apologetics-list@mcu.edu (apologete@orthodox.com (Alcuin)) X-Sender: apologete@orthodox.com (Alcuin) Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Now that the wafting olfactory stimulation of Thanksgiving repast is resolving into a memory, it is my pleasure to take the time to respond to Ed Buckner's interesting and thoughtful comments. In order to facilitate the evaluation of each side of this discussion, I have constructed an outline of the main points in Ed's original statement, the main points in my response to that statement, and the main points in his first rebuttal. I hope that these outlines will provide a means for referring to various arguments that might otherwise be neglected or misremembered in the flow of discourse. In a rational debate, one hopes that the claims made by either participant will be argumentative. By "argumentative," I do not mean that the tone or attitude of the discussion should lack cordiality and goodwill, but rather that the comments offered should be substantive and should be supported by the citation of specific relevant evidence. Likewise, arguments themselves should be logically valid, should not beg the questions at issue, and should have their soundness demonstrated. Mere stipulation, description, or assertion do not count as rational arguments--they count as verbal exercises. Moreover, personal attacks that have no bearing on the issue under discussion are instances of fallacious _ad hominem_ argumentation and should carry no weight in rational discussion. Bearing in mind these guideposts to evaluation, let's have a look at the first exchange in this debate. In his Statement, Ed Buckner made the following eight *kinds* of remark [in roughly the order indicated]: [B1] Buckner asserts that human beings will manage to develop morality without God. [B2a] Buckner wonders how one can know what God is like and what God expects. [B2b] Buckner wonders whether God can be immoral, and whether people are bound, under theism, to obey God even if his command is an immoral one. [B2c] Buckner wonders why Christian Theists would see the Bible as inspired but would reject other religious books that claim to be inspired. [B3] Buckner declares that "religion" presents no absolute ethical standards. [B4] Buckner declares that supernatural beings are not essential to the generation of effective, systematic, predictable "ways of living." [B5] Buckner asserts that only humans produce moral codes. [B6] Buckner asserts that a moral codes that did depend on the supernatural would be less efficacious that one free of supernatural aspects [B7] Buckner provides a long list of declarations that certain practices are either moral or immoral. [B8] Buckner provides several literary quotes pertaining to morality. [B9] Buckner exhorts others to think for themselves [presumably in contrast to the prescriptions of some theists]. It should be noted that there are some similarities among these groups. B1, B4, and B6 are claims about the possibility of ethics in an atheistic frame of reference. Claims B2a-c are questions about Christian philosophy. The remarks labelled B7 and B8 are ethical evaluations (sometimes concerning specific cases). B3, B5, and B9 are expressions of Ed's opinion regarding whether God is relevant to ethics. In my first response to Ed's Statement, I made the following kinds of remarks [in roughly the order indicated]: [A1] Alcuin argues that there is a surprising lack of rational argumentation in Buckner's text. [A2a] Alcuin argues that Buckner commits egregious errors of reasoning in his effort to construct a counterclaim on behalf of atheism. [A2b] Alcuin argues that Buckner's declarations concerning what is or is not moral are irrelevant to the issue under scrutiny. [A2c] Alcuin claims that Buckner's statements concerning the origin and nature of morality are entirely unsubstantiated by argument and evidence. [A2d] Alcuin argues that Buckner's stipulation of a utilitarian standard is unsupported by argument. [A2e] Alcuin argues that Buckner neglects to deal with the well-known problems that are raised by an appeal to ethical hedonism. [A3] Alcuin argues that Buckner's *view of the difficulties* of his ethical relativism contradicts Buckner's *view of the adequacy* of his ethic. [A4] Alcuin argues that Buckner's view of the inherent worth of the individual fails to hedge out "might makes right" pragmatism. [A5] Alcuin lists various claims made by Buckner that illustrate Buckner's lack of familiarity with some of the basics of Christian philosophy. It seems to me that the various remarks that I made address the various remarks that Ed made. Specifically, I think that A1 treats the begging of questions in B1, B3, B4, B5, B7, and B9. A2a is a claim that Ed committed fallacies A2b-e explain the specifics of those fallacies. A2b deals with B7 and B8. A2c-e deal with B5 and B6. A3 and A4 address B1, B4, and B6. A5 addresses B2a-c. I hope that we'll be able to maintain order in the discussion, so that the flow of the argument will be susceptible to evaluation without the reader's having to do backflips! Now, in Ed Buckner's rebuttal to my evaluation of his remarks, Ed makes several kinds of comments: He evaluates the tone of my remarks; he repeats the gist of his comments B1 and B4 [that ethics is awfully hard, but folks'll do just fine with God]; he posits a couple of standards by which to judge whether God speaks and whether Christian Ethical standards are adequate; he reiterates his unargued claim [B5] that human persons are the only source of moral standards; and he names some specific concerns with the interpretation of the Bible's ethical code [largely a rehash of B2b, B2c, B3, and B6]. Ed also offers a few more irrelevant comments. I shall deal with each subset of Ed's comments in turn. First, Buckner explains that >I found your "analysis" (I believe it would be fairer to call it simply an >attack, rather than an analysis or a response) of the AFS Opening Statement >in our debate with the Center for Biblical Literacy maddeningly >unsatisfactory Having registered his discontent, Ed goes on to explain that the format of the debate for which he had written his Statement did not call for the introduction of specific, tight arguments in the opening statements. [Perhaps the informality of the "debate", then, helps to account for the lack of conceptual rigor in the Statement]. Buckner continues: >I hardly expected a theist like Alcuin to stagger backward in awe and give >up upon hearing my opening questions/arguments, but I did think a theist >might see fit to engage in more verbal combat at the argument level than >Alcuin did. Ed's specific complaint here is that I did not provide argumentation in my remarks. As I have indicated above, in my prefatory outline, my comments went *directly and relevantly* to specific aspects of Ed's paper, with the explicit intent of identifying and explaining logical fallacies. I believe, therefore, that my comments *did* constitute "verbal combat at the argument level" in a rather specific and obvious way. Having ignored my specific arguments, Buckner goes on to reflect: >Gratuitous insults ("virtually no refutation," "weak effort," "inadequacy," >references to "errors of reasoning so egregious that one is led to question >his competence to debate on this topic," declarations of my "irrationality" >or to how "naively" I propose questions, and the unsupported assertion that >my assertions are "specious") may make Alcuin feel smug, but they do >nothing to enlighten nor to advance anyone's argument. Now, by isolating these phrases [and citing none of their accompanying context], Ed means to suggest that I engaged in mere _ad hominem_ name-calling. He labels my remarks "insults" and expresses his conviction that they are "gratuitous." In all of this, however, Ed is mistaken. It is objectively the case that Ed's comments contain nothing like a "refutation" of the theistic claims regarding morality. If he thinks there is refutation in his Statement, he is hereby invited to point it out. He will have trouble doing so, however, because Ed merely *declares* that morality has it origin in the immanent experience of humans [see his B1, B3, and B4 and my A1 and A2c]. My comment that his effort in the Statement was a "weak" one was meant as a compliment, since my remark implies that Ed is able to provide better than what was on show in that document. As for the "errors of reasoning," my claim that Ed had committed them was *substantiated* by a rather explicit indication of what the fallacies were and where Ed had committed them. Here's a rehash: Ed committed the naturalistic fallacy [moving from descriptions to prescriptions of morality]; he presented claims without argument; and he committed the fallacy of affirmation of the consequent [Starting with the hypothesis "If Christianity cannot provide absolute ethical principles, then proponents of Christianity will behave inconsistently", Ed then affirmed that proponents of Christianity *do* behave inconsistently, and then he drew the fallacious inference that *for that reason* Christianity could be seen as failing to provide absolute ethical principles.] Now, not only are these fallacies real and instantiated in Ed's discourse, they are also elementary. This makes his commission of them an *egregious* error. Pointing this out does not constitute "gratuitous insult". The rigor of debate *requires* that such mistakes be identified for what they are, regardless of whether so doing is uncomfortable for the person who committed the errors. Of course, the *manner* of pointing out fallacies should not be rude, vindictive, or insensitive--I do not believe that my remarks in my response to Ed's Statement possess those defects. Sadly, Ed seems to take my objective, logical evaluation of the merits of his case somewhat personally. He feels that by calling certain intellectual principles that he posits "irrational", I am attacking him. Taking the evaluation of an argument as an evaluation of the arguer is an easy mistake to make, and in making it, Ed perhaps imagines that I'm engaging in unfriendly rhetoric. I have nothing at all against Ed Buckner and if I ever pass through Atlanta, I'll certainly consider taking him up on his generous offer to meet over coffee. He might be quite a nice fellow. However, his remarks in the Statement that I have evaluated reflect a philosophical outlook that entails irrationality. Moreover, his dismissal of Christian Theism on the grounds that he provides *does* reflect a lack of familiarity with the common Christian answers to those commonplace, _prima facie_ objections. Thus, Ed's comments concerning the consistency of the Christian Ethic [see his B2a-c and my A5] are, according to my Random House Dictionary, "naive" in the sense of "underinformed." It seems to me that the haste with which Buckner concluded that I was engaged in _ad hominem_ argumentation [despite my explicit demonstration of the fallacies that warranted my language] is related to the haste that resulted in his commission of those fallacies in the first place. Thus my broad claim about Buckner's interaction with Moral Philosophy stands. Finally, Ed suggests that by using language that describes the less fortunate aspects of his Statement, I am trying to make myself feel "smug" and am failing to advance an argument. It is interesting that although there is no comment in any of my remarks that can be reasonably construed as reflecting on Ed's personality, psychology, or character, Ed feels free *in the very context of erroneously accusing me of personal attacks* to put forth what is unequivocally an _ad hominem_ remark. No, Ed, it does me no pleasure to point out the errors of your reasoning. However, I was invited to do so, and have done so systematically and in a measured way. I have provided specific justification of the language that I employed. What is perhaps uncomfortable for you is that you have not yet demonstrated that my assessment of your statement is in error. Having provided this detailed treatment of Ed's personal accusations, I can now go on record as hoping that we can all sustain a level of discourse that doesn't sink to unwarranted sensational commentary and inquisitions into the personal motivations of the participants. Let's stick to the public statements at hand, shall we? I hope that the readers of this list will find the detail with which I have addressed the issue of erroneous accusation of _ad hominem_ to be of general interest beyond the context of this debate. To the remainder of the specifics of the debate, however, I now turn in part two of this document. Alcuin =============================================================== From EDBuckner@aol.com Sun Dec 1 12:29:28 1996 Date: Sun, 1 Dec 1996 12:29:04 -0500 Message-ID: <961201122903_1985412533@emout07.mail.aol.com> To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu, John David Leckie Subject: Re: Ethics debate--Intro Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 From: apologetics-list@mcu.edu (EDBuckner@aol.com) X-Sender: EDBuckner@aol.com Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Dear Leckie and Alcuin et alia, I got a message saying we'd begun, but not any response to my last to Alcuin--I suspect some technical error or incompetence on my part, but really don't know. BTW, I prefer e-mail on this or related subjects to come here (my home e-mail, , but that will probably soon change to a Mindspring.com address--I'll notify you when it does). Anyway, at the moment I'm most eager to learn of the response from Alcuin (real name or screen name only--I still don't know), assuming there has now been one, to my response of some months ago. Somebody--Leckie?--please advise if I'm foolishly omitting some step in downloading, etc. Ed Buckner, POB 813392, Smyrna GA 30081 =============================================================== From EDBuckner@aol.com Tue Dec 3 22:23:56 1996 Date: Tue, 3 Dec 1996 22:23:25 -0500 Message-ID: <961203222325_1684683599@emout15.mail.aol.com> To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Re: The Debate Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Mime-Version: 1.0 From: apologetics-list@mcu.edu (EDBuckner@aol.com) X-Sender: EDBuckner@aol.com Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu sent to (apologetics bounced, resent): Alcuin , John Leckie , Apologetics , Clark Adams Dear Clark (for Alcuin and Leckie and others, Clark is a listmaster and internet guru for us Infidels), David Leckie, a friend of my son's (Michael's), sent a summary of AFS's opening statement in our debate in May 1995 to a Christian apologetics Internet group. It was critiqued briefly by "Alcuin," a Christian apologist; in turn, I critiqued his critique. (Copies of all of these readily available for anyone who wants them.) Now, Alcuin and I are about to engage in an extended (probably) exchange on morality on an apologetics site. I would like to see this exchange posted for the infidels of the web to read both sides as well. Is such technically feasible, and do you, Clark, think it's a good idea if it is technically do-able? Also, to all addressees, future correspondence on any of this should be directed only to my home e-mail or to my new Internet Infidels e-mail address (to be in place very soon). Many thanks to all recipients for the chance to test ideas in a free and civil exchange. Ed Buckner At 03:44 AM 11/27/96 -0500, Alcuin wrote: >To Ed Buckner and John Leckie, > >This message is to test the distribution filter that I will be >using for the ethics debate. Mail to me should be sent to >. The following addresses are included >in my distribution and should be included in replies: > > ebuckner@admin1.atlanta.tec.ga.us, > jdl@iAmerica.net, > apologetics-list@mcu.edu > >The listserv address is included so that ProfG, who has followed >the dialog from the beginning, may continue to do so. Likewise, >other participants in the apologetics list may be interested in >the forthcoming dialog. Are there any other addresses that should >be included in the distribution as we undertake this debate? > >Regards, > >Alcuin > > > > Ed Buckner Home: =============================================================== From webmaster@mcu.edu Wed Dec 4 09:07:07 1996 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Wed, 04 Dec 1996 10:05:44 -0500 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Re: The Debate Cc: apologete@orthodox.com.jdl@iAmerica.net.cdadams@whale.st.usm.edu Message-Id: <199612041358.3085000@elink.net> Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit From: apologetics-list@mcu.edu (webmaster@mcu.edu (Bill Greene)) X-Sender: webmaster@mcu.edu (Bill Greene) Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Dr. Buckner: This would be fine. I am sure the discussants on apologetics-list (http://mcu.edu/apologetics/listserv.htm) will be very interested in seeing the ongoing debate on the topic of whether ethics are possible without God. You asked about whether this debate could be posted; it is already being posted, at the Miami Christian University "Virtual Library" (http://mcu.edu/library/morality.txt). It's been there since this debate started, and I'm glad to see it's being picked up again. Of course, expect voracious discussions on apologetics-list as a result of posting the debate there. :-) In His service, ProfG At 10:23 PM 12/3/96 -0500, EDBuckner@aol.com wrote: >sent to (apologetics bounced, resent): Alcuin , John >Leckie , Apologetics , Clark >Adams > >Dear Clark (for Alcuin and Leckie and others, Clark is a listmaster and >internet guru for us Infidels), > >David Leckie, a friend of my son's (Michael's), sent a summary of AFS's >opening >statement in our debate in May 1995 to a Christian apologetics Internet >group. It was critiqued briefly by "Alcuin," a Christian apologist; in turn, >I critiqued his critique. (Copies of all of these readily available for >anyone who wants them.) Now, Alcuin and I are about to engage in an extended >(probably) exchange on morality on an apologetics site. I would like to see >this exchange posted for the infidels of the web to read both sides as well. >Is such technically feasible, and do you, Clark, think it's a good idea if >it is technically do-able? > >Also, to all addressees, future correspondence on any of this should be >directed only to my home e-mail or to my new Internet >Infidels e-mail address (to be in place very soon). Many thanks to all >recipients for the chance to test ideas in a free and civil exchange. > >Ed Buckner > >At 03:44 AM 11/27/96 -0500, Alcuin wrote: >>To Ed Buckner and John Leckie, >> >>This message is to test the distribution filter that I will be >>using for the ethics debate. Mail to me should be sent to >>. The following addresses are included >>in my distribution and should be included in replies: >> >> ebuckner@admin1.atlanta.tec.ga.us, >> jdl@iAmerica.net, >> apologetics-list@mcu.edu >> >>The listserv address is included so that ProfG, who has followed >>the dialog from the beginning, may continue to do so. Likewise, >>other participants in the apologetics list may be interested in >>the forthcoming dialog. Are there any other addresses that should >>be included in the distribution as we undertake this debate? >> >>Regards, >> >>Alcuin >> >> >> >> >Ed Buckner >Home: =============================================================== Date: Wed, 25 Dec 1996 16:54:45 GMT To: Alcuin , ProfG , Leckie , Jim and Kimberly , Julia Rachel , Don Thompson , Clark , Jeff Lowder IntInf , Farrell Till , Dan Barker , Fred Whitehead , Tim Gorski FTObserver <72724.3223@compuserve.com>, Tim Madigan COSH , Conrad Goeringer AA , Atheist Agnostic Students , Derek Araujo CFAPres , Fred Edwords AHA Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner on morality From: apologetics-list@mcu.edu (edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner)) X-Sender: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu 25 Dec 96 (SMYRNA GA). Beginning soon (probably in early Jan 97), "Alcuin," a Christian apologist, and Ed Buckner, VP of the Atlanta Freethought Society, will engage in an on-line exchange on the question of whether ethics is rational apart from God. The primary exchange will take place via an apologetics site (one can subscribe by sending an e-mail message reading "subscribe apologetics-list", without the quotes marks, to "list-request@mcu.edu" again w/out the quotes.) Cross-postings to freethought or atheist lists are possible but not yet set up. This grows out of a debate AFS had with the Center for Biblical Literacy in May 1995 on the question of whether God (or "a god") is necessary for morality. John David Leckie, a friend of Ed's, sent the AFS opening statement, written by Ed, to Alcuin. Alcuin critiqued it, Ed replied to that, and Alcuin is now in the process of composing and posting a two-part statement to open our on-line exchange. Please e-mail Ed Buckner (Ed's AOL address is defunct; Ed's work e-mail is functional, but please use this Mindspring address) if you want more info., when it becomes available, on possible cross-postings, or if you want to learn more about the debate, have it posted to you, get copies of the earlier bits, etc. Alcuin will alert Ed, and presumably any of you who want to be alerted, when he's ready to get started. =============================================================== Date: Sat, 25 Jan 1997 18:45:07 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner, morality Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu >From Ed Buckner (real name & handle) about the discussion he is engaging in with "Alcuin" (after Englishman Flaccus Albinus Alcuinus, or Alcuin, who lived from 735 to 804 CE, I presume. The same Alcuin who wrote, "Vox populi, vox dei"--"the voice of the people is the voice of God"--to Charlemagne? and who also wrote "Men can be attracted but not forced to the faith. You may drive people to baptism, you won't move them one step further to religion"? Pity more Christians over the centuries have not been of this Alcuin's opinion concerning force; if our modern Alcuin was named after the eighth century one, let us hope that our Alcuin, whatever his real but secret identity, is as committed to mere persuasion as was his handle-sake): My initial posts on this list will be in 6 parts on 6 successive days starting today (and on the 7th day I shall rest-- well, at least until I read something from Alcuin--and, given the pressures of having to earn a living and the pleasures of being a husband, I shall no doubt "rest" out of the lists/posts fairly often, though I will, whenever possible, announce my temporary absences in advance); Alcuin is invited to wait for all 6 or to respond to each as they are posted, whichever better suits his schedule and inclination. I'd intended to wait to start posting until after Alcuin issued "Part 2" of his statement, but the time the apologetics server was down and my uncertainty as to when Alcuin will finish his statement have made me impatient. If in what follows it seems strange that Buckner sometimes refers to himself as "Buckner," it's only to make it easier for casual readers to know who is saying what to (or about) whom. I'll also, after these first 6 posts in 6 days, keep whatever I am responding to at the bottom of my posts. Subscribers who do not need to see the earlier posts of others can easily ignore these, but newcomers and people off the list to whom I will be sending these can follow the whole argument. ANYONE who gets my posts as duplicates (because they are subscribing to apologetics and getting posts from me directly as well) or who otherwise does not want them need only e-mail me and I'll remove you from my list right away. The 6 parts will be: 1, introduction & background; 2, some preliminary assertions from Buckner; 3, some preliminary questions for Alcuin from Buckner; 4, a brief reply from Buckner regarding the "fallacy of affirmation of the consequent"; 5, a discussion from Buckner of the Christian doctrine of salvation by grace and of forgiveness, of his friend Oliver's "Jew from Dunwoody," and of a related point on theologically-based morality; and 6, a short rehash of what Buckner would see as sufficient evidence to conclude that a god is indeed necessary and desirable for morality. PART 1, introduction & background, Saturday, 25 Jan 97. >From Ed Buckner: This began in a debate held in Atlanta in May 1995 ("Is God (or "a God") Necessary for Morality?") between the Center for Biblical Literacy (affirmative) and the Atlanta Freethought Society (AFS--negative), with 3 debaters and 2 alternates on each team. J. D. Leckie, a friend of my son Michael, forwarded the AFS opening statement, which I wrote, to Alcuin, who responded to it. Then I responded to that, and now Alcuin is in the process of responding to that. Alcuin has said that he will respond, at least for the most part, to me and not to comments others may post; given my painfully limited time, it is my plan to do the same, though I cannot promise not to stray occasionally. I also plan to stay with this, albeit perhaps sometimes with announced absences from the list for a week or two while I do other things, for as long as it remains interesting and not too repetitious, probably from a few weeks to a few months. I do NOT plan to keep at it until either Alcuin or I is converted or cries, "Uncle!"--I doubt if any of us have that much time. For those who may just now be wandering in, more about me, just so that you'll know my prejudices, world-view, etc.: I'm a white Southerner in my early fifties, raised by devoutly religious parents as an Episcopalian in the late 1940s and the 1950s; I have entirely lacked any religious faith for over 30 years (I had significant doubts before then). While I've had lots of training and formal education, my education regarding philosophy and religion has been mostly self-directed and informal. I've been happily married for nearly 30 years to Diane Buckner, a life-long atheist/freethinker, and we are the proud parents of a 26-year-old son, Michael (also, at least so far, an atheist/secular humanist/freethinker). I don't claim to be a professional philosopher and may thus inadvertently misuse philosophical terms. I do claim to be a thoughtful person who's interested in ideas and in religion and who's capable, usually, of saying what I mean. I'm willing to listen to opposing or differing points of view (not just regarding religion) and to consider changing my mind if I find some other view persuasive (I have changed my mind before, profoundly-- including about religion--but I don't pretend that I'm very likely to change my mind on the matters we'll be discussing; I only assert that it's possible, not that it's likely). I urge Alcuin not to waste time vigorously proclaiming how irrational or wrong-headed or naive my statements or my arguing techniques are (nor to waste time by declaring how logical and objective someone has been in concluding that I am wrong), but instead to attack my points head on. Ask me for clarification wherever you think I'm being obscure, give me evidence or logic that counters my claims, point out contradictions that you think I am making, or ask me what evidence leads me to draw the conclusions I do. But don't waste everyone's time with attaching pejorative labels to me or to my arguments or to my assertions (I stipulate that no one should ever accept an assertion anyone makes merely because he made it), or airily asserting that all this has already been dealt with. And please don't credit or blame me with the views of someone else with whom I happen to have something in common--and please point it out to me if I make that mistake about you. My goal is to better understand my own views (by forcing myself to think them through and to genuinely consider contrary views), and to try to understand the views of someone who has a very different set of views. Assuming I do not change my views, I will also be trying to change Alcuin's (or the readers') views. I can, IMNSHO, "win" in any of three ways: by expressing and defending my views effectively enough to suit myself OR by "gaining converts" to my views OR by being persuaded that some other positions are the best ones for me to adopt. But no one should expect to persuade me simply by asserting that my assertions are not as impressive (or as rational or as whatever) as his are. In any case, I would prefer to HAVE our debate/ exchange/discussion first and THEN let anyone who likes, including Alcuin, "analyze" the argument. I also ask that Alcuin join me in trying to make most of our arguments in our posts rather than merely referring readers to some philosophical texts, other than in passing (e.g.,"For a fuller explanation than I can give here, see John Hodcakes Smithly, 1952, 'Ways to Whip Up on Sin'"). We should all recognize that many, many thinkers have preceded us on these grounds, and for those who have a few years to read up on the subject, a better understanding of all these issues can certainly be had by broad study and reading--Alcuin and I can only give relatively superficial summaries here, and the likelihood of either of us producing an original argument is quite small. I will be happy to provide a bibliography of some good sources to consider for any who want that, and I have no doubt that Alcuin can do likewise. I'll begin tomorrow by making some assertions (most of them repeats as far as Alcuin is concerned) to foreshadow where my interests and likely discussion directions are. Ed Buckner, VP, Atlanta Freethought Society P O Box 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392, USA =============================================================== Date: Sat, 25 Jan 1997 20:48:36 -0500 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Re: Alcuin v. Buckner, morality From: apologete@orthodox.com (Alcuin) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Not too long ago, Ed Buckner stated: >My initial posts on this list will be in 6 parts on 6 successive days >starting today (and on the 7th day I shall rest-- well, at least until >I read something from Alcuin [snip] >I'd intended to wait to start posting until after Alcuin issued "Part >2" of his statement, but the time the apologetics server was down and >my uncertainty as to when Alcuin will finish his statement have made >me impatient. Now, I was somewhat surprised to learn that Buckner was planning to send daily essays rather than respond interactively with the second part of my rebuttal. I was in the process of writing that second half when Buckner's message arrived, and I was surprised at his "uncertainty" since he and I had made a specific arrangement by private email. Indeed, Buckner's memory was a bit more responsive on 11 January 1997, when he announced his awareness of our arrangement on this very list, saying: >I've just gotten an e-mail from Alcuin, who has been away for two or >three weeks, and who says he will be posting "Part 2" of his statement >weekend-after-next, which I assume means on about 25 January 1997. >(Since that is soon after I get back from a six-day absence, the >timing will work well for me.) As soon after the 25th as I can read >and consider his statement, I will post something in reply, and we'll >be off to the races. Now, since today is 25 January, I am hardly derelict in keeping my word on this matter. To the extent that Buckner's "uncertainty" has the rhetorical effect of suggesting that I have either disappeared or neglected to keep this commitment, to that extent Buckner's latest statement is misleading. Indeed, he has my email address and knows perfectly well how to reach me and clear up any "uncertainty" that the passage of a couple of weeks may have wrought in his mind. Since Buckner has apparently found time to do a bit of composing, I'll be glad to interact with whatever he chooses to send. Nevertheless, I'll be trying as well to stick to the interactive format that we had originally agreed upon. My hope is that the issues Buckner raises may be integrated nicely into that format. I shall post part 2 of my rebuttal later tonight. Anyone who missed the initial exchanges should email me at apologete@orthodox.com to request them or should consult http://www.mcu.edu/apologetics for the logs of the discussion. If I receive several email messages in this regard, I'll simply post the previous exchanges to the list again. Regards, Alcuin =============================================================== >From Buckner: My impatience was more a matter of my having written some stuff and wanting to go ahead and get it out--not an indication of, and not intended to be an indication of, a conclusion on my part that Alcuin had not met his obligations or commitments, and certainly not meant to imply that he was "derelict." I apologize if Alcuin thinks I have implied that he was to blame for my impatience--that was not my intention. The specific arrangement Alcuin wrote of in our private e-mail was that he told me "I'll probably have 'part 2' ready weekend-after-next," which I interpreted to mean as this weekend--but it was only "probably." In any case, I look forward to Alcuin's Part 2 and expect to "respond interactively" with it as it appears--though possibly after I launch my remaining five parts. No doubt each of us will do some of the agenda-setting, as seems only fair. Regards, Ed Buckner, VP, Atlanta Freethought Society P O Box 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392, USA =============================================================== Date: Sun, 26 Jan 1997 19:10:06 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner, 2, morality Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu PART 2/Day 2, Sunday, 26 Jan 97--some preliminary assertions from Buckner Among other things, I assert (that is, I declare without any necessary expectation that others will accept any of these as true merely because I state them--but with a willingness on my part to answer questions about and thereafter to defend with logic and examples) the following. I do NOT present these as either starting assumptions or as conclusions for others to accept now. These are conclusions I have come to--after experience, reading, and reflection--which could lead to interesting exchanges with Alcuin. Any he agrees with me on would probably not be fruitful fodder for discussion, but I expect most are not in that category. 1. Human beings have developed ethical principles and moral codes with no help from any supernatural forces. 2. There is no persuasive evidence that any supernatural being has ever made any declarations about desirable or undesirable human behavior. 3. There are a) great fundamental inconsistencies in the ethical principles allegedly promulgated by various gods; b) there are as well great inconsistencies in the ethical principles allegedly ordained as absolute and immutable by the Christian, Biblical God; and c) there are as well great inconsistencies in the ethical principles understood by Christians in different places and times as being THE principles by which all Christians should live. I must stress here that I am not primarily referring to the inability of Christians to live up to their moral code, though that is worth discussing as well--I am instead referring to shifts and changes in the principles, in the moral code itself--the sort of inconsistency that happens in the course of long and extensive evolution of complex ideas (which is, I assert, the most likely way all moral codes have come about). Nor is there any reason to believe that these inconsistencies are now resolved or likely to be in the foreseeable future. No Christian I have ever known accepts as valid, much less follows, all of the clear behavioral prescriptions in the Bible. There are many examples of the kind of inconsistency to which I refer (including in behavioral codes related to marriage, abortion, rebellious teen-agers, avoiding worldly riches, treating certain days as "holy," abortion, etc.), but I plan to focus on slavery as a good first example in the discussions that follow. 4. Those humans who proclaim that the moral system that they would urge others to follow is based on something bigger and more important than the interests of the "mere" human beings involved--whether that something bigger is "God" or "the Aryan People" or "the Proletariat"--have repeatedly proven to be dangerous to individuals and to groups and, sometimes, to human society itself. While the interests of human beings extend well beyond their immediate survival needs, only real interests of humans, individuals and groups, should be considered in developing or changing moral principles. 5. Human life doesn't have--but, luckily, does not need to have--a "Purpose" imposed from "outside" of life. Human life can nevertheless be interesting, pleasant, productive, or good (in each case, by various subjective definitions) without external "Purposes"--though I am not asserting that the absence of an imposed purpose is sufficent to make life interesting, pleasant, etc. 6. Human morality has evolved rather than been derived from some set of objective first principles; almost never have people actually living in complex groups based their behaviors on a moral code which has been logically derived from agreed-on basic principles in a rigorous and well-defined way--and this is just as true of moral codes supposedly based on declarations coming from some god or group of gods as it is of moral codes without pretensions of being divinely inspired. Any possible exceptions to this pattern--I have in mind here a few "utopian" communities, some religion-based and some not--have been of short duration and involved relatively few people. Were I to be forced to provide a "first principle" (or set of them) to attempt to derive logically a "good" moral code, I would start with something like "Do no harm" or "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you" (Luke 6:31) or "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others" (Confucius, circa 500 BCE). "Love thy neighbor as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18) is a reasonably good variation of the same theme, though not the best, IMNSHO. Moral codes, even though always imperfectly related to first principles, are far more important than mere matters of taste because they relate to our behavior in ways that protect the interests of individuals and groups of humans. That such codes are much more than matters of taste can easily be demonstrated to any human being with even a modicum of intelligence and interest in his own safety and well being--and the most important parts of such codes can be enforced much of the time by sanctions such as criminal penalties or social ostracism even with those lacking the minimal intelligence needed for understanding morality. I do not, however, claim that it is possible to derive an entirely rational or objective moral code for human behavior, no matter what principles or assumptions one starts with (whether or not one includes supernatural elements). Indeed, I insist that no completely satisfactory, completely just, comprehensive moral code ever has been developed--and that none is likely to be. Tomorrow, in Part 3, I will pose some questions I would like for Alcuin to answer if he is willing to do so. Ed Buckner, VP, Atlanta Freethought Society P O Box 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392, USA =============================================================== Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 03:11:58 -0500 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Ethics Debate--[2b-part two of two] From: apologete@orthodox.com (Alcuin) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu In the first part of this two-part rebuttal, I offered the following summary of the nature of the comments Ed Buckner made in his rebuttal to my essay "Credit Where Credit is Due": > 1. He evaluates the tone of my remarks; > 2. he repeats the gist of his comments B1 and B4 [that ethics is > awfully hard, but folks'll do just fine with God]; > 3. he posits a couple of standards by which to judge whether God > speaks and whether Christian Ethical standards are adequate; > 4. he reiterates his unargued claim [B5] that human persons are > the only source of moral standards; and > 5. he names some specific concerns with the interpretation of > the Bible's ethical code [largely a rehash of B2b, B2c, B3, > and B6]. > 6. Ed also offers a few more irrelevant comments. The first part of my present rebuttal consisted of a detailed treatment of Buckner's _ad hominem_ fallacies as they occurred in those sections I have names #1 and #6 above. Having dispensed with the merely personal and logically irrelevant material in which Buckner couched his comments, I now move on to the bulk of his rebuttal, points 2 through 5. What first strikes me as noteworthy about the substance of Buckner's response is that he repeats points he had already made--points with which I have already dealt adequately, his B1 and b4--but still offers no *arguments* on the basis of which to think that his atheistic view of morality is correct. HE REITERATES HIS UNARGUED CLAIM THAT HUMAN PERSONS ARE THE ONLY SOURCE OF MORAL STANDARDS First, Buckner begins his text [which I have labelled "Ethics Debate --2a"] by asserting [without argument] that "morality is *always* determined by the 'broad consensus of the culture'". That is, of course, the precise claim at issue. I draw a distinction--a commonplace one in ethical discourse--between what people *do* and what people *should do*. My claim in this debate is and has been that from a mere description of what people in fact *do*, it is not possible to derive ethical norms. Put differently, my claim is that the Christian philosophy of life--in particular, the Christian God--is necessary to the construction of an ethical system. This is an important distinction to bear in mind in the present debate, because the word "morality" may be used in several different ways. If "morality" refers *merely* to "how people in fact behave", then morality is descriptive and can tell us nothing about how we should live. By contrast, if "morality" expresses "how people should behave," then the term is prescriptive. My claim is that on the basis of the merely descriptive, it is not possible to generate rational norms of behavior, so that an atheist has no access to the prescriptive. Thus, Buckner cannot merely appeal to descriptive consideration in his effort to show that ethics can be salvaged in the absence of theism. Raw assertions that ethics *can* be salvaged do not constitute arguments to that effect. Among the theses Buckner puts forth without any supporting argument whatsoever is the claim that "discriminating between good and bad is something we learn to do as we are educated, formally or informally", even though the point *at issue* is whether learning such precepts can occur apart from God. Likewise, he claims that "broad consensus" is "sometimes easily developed from our shared interests and evolved instincts", even though he has neither proven the existence of instinct [nor the rationality of the concept "instinct"] nor has demonstrated the possibility of developing a consensus in that fashion; and he states that certain ethical premises "killing other human[s] . . . for sport is bad" *follow* from his undefended premises, though it is obvious that he is mistaken about this. Now, it won't do to simply *declare* these things to be so. An atheist must provide a cogent account of *why anyone should believe that things are as he says*. It will not do simply to express one's wishful thinking. I happen to assert that apart from a certain kind of relationship with God, it is not even possible to be educated at all, much less to undergo the inculcation of moral principles. I assert that from our shared interests and biological predispositions, nothing whatsoever follows if God's revealed ethical norms are not taken into account. I point to the countless murderers, rapists, and violent criminals in our society and affirm that given education, socialization, and biological disposition apart from God, there's no *empirical* basis for arguing against murder, rape, and mayhem *at all*. Of course, my assertions are *not proofs* any more than Buckner's are. However, I am able to assert principles which contradict Buckner's. This points to what I have said several times already: that the rational resolution of the differences between the atheist and the theist requires that a *justification* be offered for the stance taken. Likewise, the theist must justify his claims. I hope that by rehearsing these observations, the focus of the debate will be nudged in the direction of reasons instead of mere assertion. HE POSITS A COUPLE OF STANDARDS BY WHICH TO JUDGE WHETHER GOD SPEAKS AND WHETHER CHRISTIAN ETHICAL STANDARDS ARE ADEQUATE. Second, Buckner states that "if we are to be convinced that theistic morality is superior to atheistic morality, logic or history (ideally both) should provide some bases for understanding why." Likewise, Buckner speculates that "if an all-powerful, all-knowing God announced to everyone simultaneously in their own language what he/she/it supports as a moral code, it would be damned. . . hard to argue against that code being the right one. . . .". Now, with respect to both of these quotes, it is difficult to believe that Buckner means them to carry much weight. In the first case, Buckner demonstrates some confusion about what is at issue. He wants ethical principles to be based on logic or history or both. Now, ethical principles should be logical; on this we seem to agree. But to ask that such precepts be based on history is to beg the question between us. I deny that *any* amount of contemplation of mere historical data will provide access to ethical precepts. But perhaps Buckner means something weaker: perhaps he doesn't want the ethical precepts to *derive* from history, but merely to be *shown to work* in history. In that case, he is still begging the question between us, since *what counts* as "succeeding" in history will largely be determined by one's ethical outlook. Ethical precepts provide a means of interpreting historical facts. That the converse is not true should be obvious. In the second case, Buckner suggests that a miraculous occurrence would be sufficient to persuade him of the necessity of theism in ethics. We have to be skeptical in regard to such a claim, especially in light of the fact that [a] apparent miracles have occurred without inspiring belief on the part of witnesses, [b] the empirical observation of something such as Buckner describes would just as likely be relegated to the realm of the as-yet unexplained until some naturalistic hypothesis could be developed. Perhaps Buckner himself would respond as he describes; however, we have plenty of reason to think that in general, persons whose hearts are set against the prospect of believing in God and acknowledging his authority will bracket out those things for which they can offer no account, rather than convert. Indeed, my argument is that *everything* around us provides constant miraculous testimony to the existence and ethical requirements of God, and that in trying to generate ethics apart from acknowledging this, the atheist [in this case, Buckner] is precisely bracketing out the authority of God's self-revelation. Thus, there is ample reason to doubt that Buckner would really take polyglot voices from the sky any more seriously than he takes the other ample evidence of God's requirements. HE NAMES SOME SPECIFIC CONCERNS WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE BIBLE'S ETHICAL CODE Though ethical principles can be neither established nor defeated on the basis of a mere recounting of history, Buckner proceed to try to do just that. Thus, he argues that though the Germans in the early 20th century were "steeped in long-established Catholic and Protestant moral codes", they succumbed to the evils of Nazism. Of course, the obvious response is that having the *cultural trappings* of a particular institutional religion is logically distinct from actually endorsing, in principle and practice, the ethical code of such a religion. Thus, the example is a strawman. I would argue the historical point that Christian ethical principles hadn't been seriously in play in Germany since the seventeenth century. Buckner's point is especially weak as a strawman, though, because *even if* Germany of the early 20th century *had been* a culture that explicitly endorsed Christian Theistic ethics, the moral failure that constitutes the horror of Nazi Germany would not tell against the *ethical system* but rather against the immoral people who failed to live up to it. By analogy, the [hypothetical] fact that everyone on the freeway in Houston drives 75 miles per hour doesn't at all indicate that the [hypothetical] *rule* about driving 55 miles per hour is a failure or lacks merit. Indeed, it is only because the standard is in place that speeding can be identified and evaluated in the first place! Why Buckner does not recognize the difference between the validity of ethical norms and the historical vagaries of their application or misapplication is a bit mysterious to me. It is clear to me, however, that Buckner *doesn't* see this distinction, for he says: "If the Christian claim. . . is correct, there should be some evidence or logic that God or religion pays off in this way." Now, my personal opinion is that all of history points to the truth of God's claims. Buckner may interpret history differently than I. Since our frames of reference determine our views of historical evidence, *how does Buckner expect a mere appeal to such evidence to settle anything between us*? Historical evidence is always interpreted relative to a frame of reference that makes the evidence and the selection of evidence intelligible. This is a dispute between two mutually exclusive frames of reference, and I argue that Buckner's frame of reference can offer no cogent account of ethics. In response, Buckner offers coarse generalities about historical particulars. Thus, when Buckner points to the US, "a nation with an utterly godless constitution," as savior of the European theater during the war, the supposed secularism of that country is just about as relevant as the supposed Christianity of Germany--to wit, not at all. The question is whether specific behaviors did or did not conform to Christian Theistic ethical precepts, and whether those precepts are necessary. In an equally confused vein, Buckner confuses *historical disagreement* concerning the meaning of the decalogue [10 commandments] with the issue of the *objective clarity and sufficiency* of the text. But this is a notorious fallacy. The mere fact that there have been various opinions about a text doesn't mean that the sense of that text is inaccessible. We might say that it is difficult to arrive at the meaning of Marlowe's _Faust_, but we would hardly argue that Marlowe meant nothing in particular at all. Likewise, identifying the import of a passage of the Torah is a matter of metacritically identifying the valid hermeneutic principles appropriate to that interpretive act. Valid hermeneutics would quickly eliminate the vast majority of proposed interpretations for the Old Testament passages in question. Thus, Buckner wonders "Does Alcuin accept the Decalogue as necessary *or* as sufficient for morality?" and he apparently expects a negative response, since "history supports no assertion of invariability" in the interpretation of the decalogue. Nevertheless, I affirm that the Decalogue *is* necessary for morality, but is *not* sufficient for morality, since the decalogue is a summary of the principles which are illustrated in the accompanying case laws. In affirming this, I underscore the fact that it is logically possible to posit the relevance and applicability of that moral code *regardless* of whether it happens to have been misinterpreted or misapplied in history at various times and places. Positing this merely involves the corollary claim that despite such differences, it is hermeneutically possible to make a convincing case for the meaning of the text in question. Buckner wonders why "theists. . . vary so very much in their interpretation." The answer, of course, is that theists are subject to sin, ignorance, and misunderstanding, even as atheists are. That fact doesn't tell against the objective clarity, necessity, sufficiency, or authority of the revelation and is no more a problem for the theist than for the atheist. At least Christian Theists *have* an objective finite body of ethical principles about which to argue. An atheist's frame of reference gives him access to no principles at all. Buckner wonders whether anyone believes that coveting a neighbor's ox is sin while believing that slavery and poltical torture are not worth mentioning. Of course, such a question betrays a certain degree of ignorance of the issues being raised. I imagine that Buckner means to offer this question with the implication that the Old Testament law condemns coveting but allows for torture and slavery. The illustration of coveting an ox is a particular case law that is meant to communicate [within the cultural context of an agrarian community] the general ethical principle of refraining from coveting. I personally endorse both the particular example and the general precept that it illustrates. More importantly, Buckner seems to confuse the immoral institution of chattel slavery [which constituted the reprehensible economic and social practice for which the American South was rightly condemned] with the social institution of ancient Israel which is called "slavery" in some English translations of the Hebrew Bible. However, the institution of "slavery" that is endorsed in the Torah is not at all equivalent to chattel slavery, and is actually a means of ensuring the social rehabiliation of debtors under strictly regulated conditions that do not involve a denial of personhood or indefinite periods of wage- attachment. The institution described in the OT is arguable more humane than the current welfare system in the United States, which *does* seem to result in a dehumanization and enslavement of the demographic to which it is addressed. That Buckner allows red herrings of this nature to slip into his discourse suggests a lack of familiarity with the particulars of the issue he is treating. Anyone who endorsed ethical principles about coveting while tolerating either chattel slavery or political torture would be ethically inconsistent, by Christian Theistic standards. Buckner's illustration concerning Christian Scientists who allow their children to die rather than seek medical help is a moving one. I join Buckner in condemning such behavior, but I assert that the behavior does not follow *persuasively* from scriptural teachings. Again, there is no shortage of *poor reading* of the texts [as with any texts in human experience], but that has little relevance to the truthvalue of what the texts *actually* propose. Buckner asks whether "anyone den[ies] that theistic formulations have failed to resolve the same difficult moral questions" that atheism has failed to resolve. I answer that *of course* many people deny this. I am among them. The theistic principles of ethics *do* provide answers to the difficult moral questions that we all face. The problem is not that the principles fail to provide resolutions, but that *people tend to dislike the resolutions*. Therefore, to the extent that the existence of Christian Theistic answers to moral problems has not resulted in a resolution of those problems, to that extent, people have failed to accept and apply those answers. The answers, however, are readily available to anyone willing to do the work. Likewise, Buckner asks whether it isn't the case that theistic justifications lead to a variety of codes. Well, people do generate a variety of codes. That much is sure. Since proponents of both atheism and theism produce a bewildering variety of recommendations, that scenario suggests that the existence of such a variety must be *logically distinct* from the merits of either theism or atheism [i.e., must be relative to how people *handle* either system]. Thus, Buckner again misses the point by raising this issue. Buckner worries that "it is terribly difficult to make adjustments in the light of changing facts if you are claiming to have an absolute code set forth by an omniscient being." This worry demonstrates a real misunderstanding of the philosophical issue at stake. If there is an absolute code of ethics [say, the Mosaic Law] and if historical reality is in a process of development and change, then the application of the general precepts of the code to particular circumstances must be guided by illustrations of *how* the absolute principles relate to *kinds* of circumstances. It so happens that the Mosaic Law *does* consist of just this combination: general ethical precepts [such as, "thou shalt not murder"] and particular illustrations that *explain* what counts as "murder" and what doesn't [such as laws about liability due to negligence, manslaughter, abortion, etc]. Now, I do not mean to suggest that the Mosaic law explicitly illustrates every possible contingent application of the general norms. However, it does illustrate a large number of applications to *types* of situations, from which further applications may be deduced. Thus, the Law is wide-ranging in its cultural scope. Where the Law does not speak at all and where no relevant application seems to range over a particular real-life circumstance, that circumstance is _a diaphora_, or not subject to sanctions beyond the general duty to love God and neighbor. CONCLUSION Buckner meant to raise this issue of the dificulty of application as evidence that "there are overwhelming disadvantages for the theistic approach." Embarrassingly, the shoe is on the other foot. Atheism cannot *begin* to posit general ethical principles that have particular applications. Instead, every supposed principle and every possible application is subject to dispute and skepticism, with no objective procedure in place for resolving such mutually exclusive stipulations. Buckner is aware of this, admitting that "this is all very messy and means that [making moral judgments] is difficult. It means that conflict . . . is unlikely to be efficiently or permanently resolved. . . . It means that choosing between the good of an individual and that of some larger group can be tricky and even dangerous." It is not at all surprising that Buckner makes these concessions about his espoused view, since atheism *necessarily vitiates the possibility of ethics*. What is surprising, however, is that Buckner hedges about the implications of this admission. He seems to think that *somehow* *despite* these problems, a non-theistic frame of reference can generate ethical precepts. What, I ask, is the basis for his optimism in that regard? The prospects look pretty grim according to Buckner's description. Christian Theism alone can both posit and justify an objectively available set of ethical precepts with relevant applications to changing circumstances. Now, I have taken the time to address a number of Buckner's *particular* concerns about historical change in the interpretation of Christian doctrine. Strictly speaking, it was not necessary to do so, since Buckner's method of basig his evaluation of a system of thought on whether there have been various interpretations of that system over time is not rational. Nevertheless, I have gone ahead and met each of Buckner's objections on his terms, to show that when we look at the particular import of Buckner's objections one by one, they turn out not to tell against the general claim that theism is necessary to ethics. Likewise, Buckner's illustrations do nothing to support his contrary claim. As a final clarification of Buckner's misunderstandings, I will affirm in contrast to his allegations that Biblical Theism DOES NOT [a] tolerate human slavery [understood as chattel slavery], [b] require a subservient status for women, [c] differentiate among ethnicities and posit some as superior to others, [d] allow the argument that God's punishment of sinners in hell authorizes human torture of other humans, [e] allow for killing people over religious differences, [f] execute citizens for *simply* not honoring a religious day, [g] recommend the acceptance, fearing, or respecting of spiritual adversaries, [h] endorse anti-family practices, [i] validate ascetic practices, nor [j] require a hands-off acquiescence to the impact of evil in everyday life. Buckner suggests a contrary thesis in each of these cases, and there have been Christians in history who have taken up each of those views. However, to the extent that they did so, they failed to conform to God's Law. What is noteworthy about this issue is that *again* Buckner appeals to historical particulars as if they had the potential to settle the issue under debate [a notorious fallacy]. Moreover the *correct, orthodox* reading of the Biblical standards is not a 20th-century innovation [as if I simply thought I had special access to *the* truth and could simply declare _ex cathedra_ that Christians in the past were wrong]. The doctrines I propound are the traditional interpretations of classical protestantism, and the Reformers derived them from the Augustinian tradition, the mainstream expression of the faith of the apostles. There is nothing novel about my readings of Christian Ethics, and the fact that there have been many in history who have read these matters differently fails to address the real question of whether the viewpoint I'm propounding is correct. Hoping to see some arguments, Alcuin =============================================================== Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 03:54:47 -0500 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Ethics Debate--[3b] From: apologete@orthodox.com (Alcuin) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu >From Ed Buckner (real name & handle) about the discussion he is engaging in >with "Alcuin" (after Englishman Flaccus Albinus Alcuinus, or Alcuin, who >lived from 735 to 804 CE, I presume. Well, the Carolingian Alcuin to whom you refer was indeed English, though "Flaccus Albinus Alcuinus" was not his name. Rather, "Alcuin" was a transliteration of his Anglian name Ealhwine, Albinus was a Latin translation of that name, and Flaccus was the name of Horace, whose moniker Alcuin adopted in a classicizing affectation that was common among the educated members of Charlemagne's court. >The same Alcuin who wrote, "Vox populi, vox dei"--"the voice of the >people is the voice of God"--to Charlemagne? Well, Ed, he *did* write that, but I find it interesting that you do not include the *entire* quote. As you present the material, it looks as if Alcuinus of York was *endorsing* the notion that the voice of the people is the voice of God. Here's what Alcuin *really* said: Nec audiendi qui solent dicere, vox populi, vox Dei, quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit. This translates as follows: And those people should not be listened to who keep saying, the voice of the people is the voice of God, since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness. [Alcuin of York, Letter 164, Works (1863)] So, I must credit you, Ed, with a [perhaps accidental] bit of historical revisionism which, when rectified, provides a nice bit of decorative commentary on just why atheism cannot yield an ethical theory! >and who also wrote "Men can be attracted but not forced to the >faith. You may drive people to baptism, you won't move them one >step further to religion"? Pity more Christians over the centuries >have not been of this Alcuin's opinion concerning force; Amen. >if our modern Alcuin was named after the eighth century one, let >us hope that our Alcuin, whatever his real but secret identity, is >as committed to mere persuasion as was his handle-sake): Thank you for the complimentary comparison, Ed. My handle does *not* derive from the 8th-9th century deacon but rather from a certain 16th century figure who found it appropriate to use "Alcuin" as a pseudonym under particular and interesting circumstances. I assure you, however, that I join the earlier Alcuin in endorsing persuasion over compulsion. >PART 1, introduction & background, Saturday, 25 Jan 97. [snip] >process of responding to that. Alcuin has said that he will respond, at >least for the most part, to me and not to comments others may post; given >my painfully limited time, it is my plan to do the same, though I cannot >promise not to stray occasionally. This is my understanding of the format as well. I call attention to it here so that I may take the opportunity to join Buckner in pointing out to the readers of this exchange that the purpose behind not addressing every comment that the readers provide is to maintain the order and focus of the discussion. Our hope is that this restriction will make the resulting dialog more useful by keeping its scope manageable. >repetitious, probably from a few weeks to a few months. I do NOT plan to >keep at it until either Alcuin or I is converted or cries, "Uncle!"--I >doubt if any of us have that much time. The goal here is not so much conversion or concession, but a determination of the comparative merits of the cases made by either participant. Again, I agree with Ed's evaluation of the terms of the discussion. >I urge Alcuin not to waste time vigorously proclaiming how irrational or >wrong-headed or naive my statements or my arguing techniques are (nor to >waste time by declaring how logical and objective someone has been in >concluding that I am wrong), but instead to attack my points head on. Forgive me for taking this issue head on, Ed, but to point out that some proposition is irrational, naively constructed, or illogical *is* to attack that proposition head on. Apart from undermining the rationality, relevance, or logical validity of your arguments, what would you have me do to them to satisfy your request for head-on attacks?? Shall I point out that they don't match the drapes? >Ask me for clarification wherever you think I'm being obscure, give >me evidence or logic that counters my claims, point out contradictions >that you think I am making, or ask me what evidence leads me to draw >the conclusions I do. The record is available to the public and shows that I have offered steady, measured analytical responses to your remarks. While I have said nothing against you personally, you *have* questioned my motives called me names. Clearly, the _ad hominem_ shoe is on the other foot, so when you say: >But don't waste everyone's time with attaching pejorative labels to me or >to my arguments or to my assertions it is difficult to take seriously the idea that you think people do not see through the charade of your suggesting that I have labelled you in any way not indicated by reasonable analysis and argumentation. Indeed, I have provided a *point by point* explanation of every supposed "label" to which you objected; while still not addressing that demonstration, you feel free to exhort me not to engage in _ad hominem_? >I can, IMNSHO, "win" in >any of three ways: by expressing and defending my views effectively enough >to suit myself OR by "gaining converts" to my views OR by being persuaded >that some other positions are the best ones for me to adopt. But no one >should expect to persuade me simply by asserting that my assertions are not >as impressive (or as rational or as whatever) as his are. If rationality is *not* the standard of persuasiveness for you, Ed, then what is? Gaining converts to your viewpoint or to mine will not tell whether our views are correct. Subjective satisfaction with one's expression and defense of some views tells nothing about the objective merits of those views. Why, then, would a demonstration *that your views make no sense* be inadequate to persuade you to abandon those views, when such a demonstration is about the *objective* impotence of, and weaknesses of, your espoused view of the world? Isn't rational disputation of principles the *essence* of debate? >In any case, I would prefer to HAVE our debate/ exchange/discussion >first and THEN let anyone who likes, including Alcuin, "analyze" the >argument. I am not sure I can join you in drawing a distinction between analysis and presentation. Analyzing the objective contradictions of atheism is part and parcel of demonstrating just why theism is necessary to the construction of ethics. You want to *sound* fair ["let's just talk first, and analyze later"], but you recommend a kind of so-called dialog that seems to beg the question. I may be misunderstanding your intent here, Ed; I believe that your comment is unclear. >I also ask that Alcuin join me in trying to make most of our arguments in >our posts rather than merely referring readers to some philosophical texts, I join you in affirming that the debaters should do the debating, rather than providing footnotes to extant discussions elsewhere. I take it that this introduction on your part constituted a sort of laying out of ground rules. While it would have been better form to raise these issues privately with me so that we could hash out such details off list, it appears to me that we agree, by and large, on the format of things. All I would add is that I hope you will resist the temptation to ignore those junctures where I argue that your specific arguments are either illogical or irrelevant. Specific rebuttal to one another's objections would seem to be the efficient path to covering substantial ground in this dialog. Am I to assume that if you do not address some telling objection I have raised, that you therefore concede the point of that objection? Regards, Alcuin =============================================================== Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 04:38:25 -0500 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Re: Alcuin v. Buckner, 2, morality (Ethics Debate--[4b] From: apologete@orthodox.com (Alcuin) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu >PART 2/Day 2, Sunday, 26 Jan 97--some preliminary assertions from Buckner In response to Buckner's offering of several propositions which he personally reckons true, I offer the following counterpropositions. Not intending that these should be taken as proof or argument, I offer them as Buckner did, to provide stimulating brain candy to the readers of this exchange. >1. Human beings have developed ethical principles and moral codes with no >help from any supernatural forces. 1a. Human persons cannot so much as think or breath without the knowledge of God; the knowledge of who God is and what he requires is a *precondition* of the possibility of human predication, differentiation, logic, science, and morality. 1b. All human persons who make use of such skills as predication or casuistry *know* God necessarily, though many such persons do not *know that they know* God, having suppressed that ineluctable knowledge for psychological reasons. >2. There is no persuasive evidence that any supernatural being has ever made any >declarations about desirable or undesirable human behavior. 2. There is persuasive evidence that human persons have never been without the explicit verbal revelation of God, and that apart from such a revelation, it is in principle impossible to interpret human experience at all. >3. There are a) great fundamental inconsistencies in the ethical principles >allegedly promulgated by various gods; b) there are as well great >inconsistencies in the ethical principles allegedly ordained as absolute >and immutable by the Christian, Biblical God; and c) there are as well >great inconsistencies in the ethical principles understood by Christians in >different places and times as being THE principles by which all Christians >should live. 3. There are [a] inconsistencies among ethical principles posited by the world's religions and philosophies; [b] there are no inconsistencies in the ethical principles of Christian Theism; [c] there has been disagreement in the history of virtually every philosophical and religious system concerning the meaning of its ethical precepts; [d] neither point [a] nor point [c] have logical relevance to the claim that Christian Theistic Ethics is necessary and consistent. When Buckner asserts: >Nor is there any reason to believe that these inconsistencies are now >resolved or likely to be in the foreseeable future. No Christian I have >ever known accepts as valid, much less follows, all of the clear behavioral >prescriptions in the Bible. He is perhaps being autobiographical but is hardly being historical. There is a solid tradition of biblical hermeneutics within the framework of which theological discussions and disagreements take place. However, none of those disagreements is of such a nature that the taking of one position or another would undermine the ethical system as a whole. Those of a Calvinist stripe, a Lutheran stripe, and an Augustinian stripe can join hands in praising the holy perfection of God's law and in thanking God for the mercy of Christ's having kept that law perfectly. What I assert is this: Non-Christian ethical systems present a boggling panoply of stipulations and assertions while offering nothing by way of justifying, in even a rudimentary way, the claim that any such recommendations have prescriptive force. While Christian Theists may have to work out the tiny particulars of classical protestantism, atheists have no cogent particulars to work out at all. >4. Those humans who proclaim that the moral system that they would urge >others to follow is based on something bigger and more important than the >interests of the "mere" human beings involved--whether that something >bigger is "God" or "the Aryan People" or "the Proletariat"--have repeatedly >proven to be dangerous to individuals and to groups and, sometimes, to >human society itself. 4. Those humans who proclaim that their moral system is either subjective or based on something immanent and material in human experience--whether that something is "the historical dialectic" or "the will of the majority" or "the [supposed] greatest good for the greatest number"--have repeatedly proven to be dangerous to individuals and to groups and, sometimes, to human society itself. Moreover, the *reason* immanent, naturalistic bases for morality are dangerous is precisely because they are *not* transcendentally grounded and therefore *always* reduce to pragmatic implementations of political or social power apart from any external standards of justice. >While the interests of human beings extend well beyond their immediate >survival needs, only real interests of humans, individuals and groups, >should be considered in developing or changing moral principles. For any standard S, the atheist cannot provide an account of why S should be taken as the "real" factor to be considered in developing moral principles. Likewise, for any standard S, if an atheist posits a moral principle P on the basis of S, the atheist cannot provide an account of how to determine whether P is, in fact, a moral thing to practice. >5. Human life doesn't have--but, luckily, does not need to have--a >"Purpose" imposed from "outside" of life. Human life can nevertheless be >interesting, pleasant, productive, or good (in each case, by various >subjective definitions) 5. Human life does have a purpose, and apart from such a purpose, it is not even possible to make sense of such concepts as "interesting", "pleasant", "productive", or "good", subjectively or otherwise. The very possibility of subjectivity presupposes the necessary objective knowledge of God as its precondition. >6. Human morality has evolved rather than been derived from some set of >objective first principles; almost never have people actually living in >complex groups based their behaviors on a moral code which has been >logically derived from agreed-on basic principles in a rigorous and >well-defined way-- 6. Ethical standards are absolute, universal, and objectively available in finite special revelation [scripture]; though human behavior has evolved, changed, and though humans have failed to apply true ethical precepts to their behavior in many circumstances, such personal failures are irrelevant to the question of the truth of the standards in question. I assert that the plurality of moral codes and material practices is not a problem for the theist but rather for the atheist. The theist has a historical and psychological account of why such plurality obtains. An atheist perspective can provide no cogent account whatsoever for why any particular aspect of human experience is as it is. >neighbor as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18) is a reasonably good variation of >the same theme, though not the best, IMNSHO. Moral codes, even though >always imperfectly related to first principles, are far more important than >mere matters of taste because they relate to our behavior in ways that >protect the interests of individuals and groups of humans. Though Buckner likes to talk about the fact of moral codes, the real challenge that he will face is why *any* first principle should carry weight in an atheist's universe. To say that it should "because it relates" in a protective way to special interests is merely to push the problem back a step. The challenge for Buckner, then, is why any particular interests should be privileged over any others in an atheist's universe. No amount of mere description or assertion will meet this challenge to justification. >That such codes are much more than matters of taste can easily be >demonstrated to any human being with even a modicum of intelligence >and interest in his own safety and well being--and the most important >parts of such codes can be enforced much of the time by sanctions >such as criminal penalties or social ostracism even with those lacking >the minimal intelligence needed for understanding morality. While Buckner wishes to align the possession of intelligence with the acceptance of his arbitrary viewpoint, no such alignment will be allowed to go unquestioned in this debate. Buckner's claim that moral codes are not reducible to matters of taste is arbitrary just because it has no justifying basis. His claim that criminal penalties constitute evidence that moral codes are not mere matters of taste is a specimen of question-begging par excellence. After all, the application of a socially promulgated penal sanction to some behavior merely tells the intelligent, informed person that a legislative process has marked certain displays of power and coercion on the part of the civil government as correlates to particular behaviors. But the exertion of power *does not at all* justify the principle that was enacted through legislative power. So, the issue of whether the morality being legislated in such a case is a matter of taste is unaddressed by Buckner's example. The challenge for Buckner is not merely to *descriptively* declare that certain behaviors by individuals meet with certain behaviors by institutions, but rather to account *prescriptively* for why such a response *should* occur, and *how*. >I do not, however, claim that it is possible to derive an entirely >rational or objective moral code for human behavior, no matter what >principles or assumptions one starts with (whether or not one >includes supernatural elements). Indeed, I insist that no completely >satisfactory, completely just, comprehensive moral code ever has been >developed--and that none is likely to be. Including the word "entirely" seems to suggest that you mean to salvage *some* rationality in your view of ethics. Likewise, your inclusion of the word "completely" suggests that you think a partly satisfactory or just code might be possible. I would be interested in learning how you think that even a *minimally rational* ethic is possible in an atheist's universe, and how an atheist would even *begin* to evaluate whether *any* moral code is "just" or "satisfactory." I'm not asking for perfection; I'm asking for Sunday-school simplicity. I affirm that there is an entirely objective, rationally defensible ethical system, the Law of God. While our specific applications of it may be in error, the standard is there and is accessible, contrary to skeptical assumptions. On the matters of most weight, there is little dispute [even over the church's history] concerning what that law requires. >Tomorrow, in Part 3, I will pose some questions I would like for Alcuin to >answer if he is willing to do so. I hope, Ed, that you will also take the time to begin to address the specific analytic comments that I have directed at your case in previous messages. Regards, Alcuin =============================================================== Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 21:51:15 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner, 3, morality Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Before I get to my questions, below, let me concede, as gracefully as I can, on a point to "Alcuin." I confess I never heard of *any* Alcuins until this debate came up and was thus delighted to find a reference to Alcuin in a book of quotations (Seldes, The Great Quotations). I could not resist showing off by repeating the quotes listed there for "Alcuin." Except for later learning that that Alcuin was an advisor to Charlemagne, I am ignorant of this or any other Alcuins whosoever. I was guilty of relying on a secondary source, without further investigation on my part at all, and did not know that, assuming our Alcuin is right (and I have no reason to doubt him) one of the quotes was indeed out of context. The context certainly makes clear that Alcuin did NOT believe "the voice of the people is the voice of God." Since I see no evidence that there is a god, it follows that I, too, would disagree with the statement. Nor do I think "the people," however that is defined, are infallible nor always even wise or just--but more on that and on the modern Alcuin's many other points later. (For the most part my plan or expectation is to continue to post my 6 parts, and then to go back to many of Alcuin's from his Part 2--which I have only scanned briefly so far. Indeed, Alcuin has already *partly* answered some--but not all--of the questions below. After the sixth day/part, perhaps we can narrow down to a point or two at a time to argue about.) I am pleased--but certainly not surprised--to find that the modern Alcuin and I agree on the value of persuasion and the lack of value of compulsion. PART 3/Day 3 (27 Jan 97)--preliminary questions from Buckner for Alcuin I've listed below some questions I'd like Alcuin to answer (naturally I'll reciprocate by answering, as best I can, any questions he may pose for me,though I cannot promise to do so "with meekness and fear."). I'd certainly accept "I don't know" or "The question cannot be answered as asked because . . ." or "I cannot answer that question until you explain what you mean by . . ." as reasonable answers--though perhaps as answers that would lead to further questions. 1. Is slavery wrong? (Please answer either for yourself or, if you feel comfortable doing so, for all Christians.) (If some kinds of slavery are moral under some circumstances--for seven-year-periods, to get out of debt, for enemy captives, for women, for non-Jews, in different historical eras, or in some other restricted way, please briefly explain the exceptions or conditions). 2. Does the moral code ordained by the Christian God condemn slavery? If so, how do Christians know--where is it written? When, historically, did it become clear to Christians? 3. What is the best exact English translation, according to whatever you consider to be the highest or best authority, of the *entire* verse found in Exodus 20:17 (or Deuteronomy 5:21, if you prefer)--and, in context, briefly what does the verse mean? 4. Are the Commandments given in Exodus 20:1-17 (or the Deuteronomy version) the Supreme Moral Laws given by God for all humans for all time? Did Jesus supersede them for Christians (and, if so, in what way)? What is the status of the commandments given in Exodus 34: 12-26, and, if the status is different from those in the earlier chapter of Exodus, how and why? 5. Does God have to have a church and church members and church officials (and apologists) to successfully communicate moral instructions to men? 6. How do Christians know that the moral codes they accept from the Judeo- Christian Bible are the ones God declared and not instead those codes laid out in the Islamic Koran (or Qur'an), and do Christians have to accept all behavioral prescriptions from the Bible, or can they just pick the ones they like or that seem to make the most sense, or do church leaders get to decide? 7. Where Christians find evil in this world, should they resist and oppose it? Or should they, as Jesus appears to advise his followers in Matthew 6:39-48, "resist not evil"? 8. Have there been any examples of non-Christian cultures (cultures that preceded the advent of Christianity or cultures that exist without Christian influence simultaneously with Christianity) where ethical or moral codes, perfect or imperfect, were or are followed, perfectly or imperfectly? Ed Buckner , VP, Atlanta Freethought Society , POB 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 USA =============================================================== Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 10:26:50 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner, 3 correction Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Buckner blew it again: My question #7 should have referred to Matthew 5:39-48, *not* to the 6th chapter. Apologies to whoever needs them. 7. Where Christians find evil in this world, should they resist and oppose it? Or should they, as Jesus appears to advise his followers in Matthew 5:39-48, "resist not evil"? Ed Buckner Home: edbuckner@mindspring.com POB 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 =============================================================== Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 20:50:35 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner, 4, morality Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu PART 4/Day 4 (28 Jan 97)--a brief reply from Buckner regarding the "fallacy of affirmation of the consequent" According to Alcuin, I have been guilty of the "affirmation of the consequent," specifically by arguing that Christians' inconsistent behavior is a sufficient demonstration that Christianity has not provided absolute ethical principles. If that were all that I had argued, Alcuin may have been right, but Alcuin has misunderstood what I meant to be the main point of my argument (possibly I expressed it inadequately). My main point here is that the ethical principles declared by Christianity to be absolute have varied over time and space, not merely that the behavior of individual Christians has been inconsistent with the Christian ethical code. This is an attack on the so-called "absoluteness" and "objectivity" of the Christian ethical standard, and--if I can show that the standard itself shifts over time--it would seem difficult for a Christian apologist to continue to argue that the standard provided by God is immutable and, unlike nontheistic codes, based on an absolute or objective foundation. Alcuin will presumably argue that the Christian standard has not changed, only the understanding of it by weak humans (a line of argument that will lead him into logical difficulties, as I hope to show if he pursues it), or he may argue that an absolute, divinely grounded code can properly change over time (a line which I also would hope to show creates great difficulties for Alcuin), or he may take some tack I have not anticipated. As I have already suggested, I will be interested in pursuing moral questions related to human slavery in this discussion. Despite my primary emphasis above on my attack being on Christian moral standards as changing, I would nevertheless argue that *some* inferences about a code of behavior CAN be drawn based on the preponderance of behavior among those who declare that they have adopted the code, without being guilty of the fallacy I have been charged with by Alcuin. To be sure, the reasonableness or fairness or wisdom of a code cannot reasonably and directly be called into question based only on the behavior of followers--but the *effectiveness* of the code as useful in motivating followers to behave in certain ways can be questioned, given an adequate and representative sample of the behaviors under consideration. If, to use an imperfect example, a law is passed in a given community making it illegal to use power leaf-blowers from midnight to 8 a.m., we cannot judge whether early morning leaf-blowing is harmful or otherwise wrong based only on the number or proportion who violate the ordinance--but we CAN draw inferences about how effective the ordinance is in keeping early morning leaf-blowing from happening, given a proper comparison group and a representative sample (or better yet, a time-series analysis). Somewhat similarly, if widespread adoption of Christian ethical principles in Germany in the centuries leading up to the 1930s did not have the effect of leading most German Christians to resist the horrors of Nazism, that is NOT sufficient for us to conclude that the Christian principles of the Germans of the day were unwise or immoral--but we CAN fairly conclude that their ethical principles were not sufficent to lead to effective resistance of that set of evils under those circumstances. The behavior of an unrepresentative minority of Christians of the time and place would not even allow us to make effectiveness inferences, of course--and evidence regarding whether most Christians of the time and place had the knowledge and the means to resist also affect the conclusions we should draw. If one wants to claim--perhaps Alcuin does not--that adopting Christianity, or God-based religions in general, IMPROVES the ethical behavior of the adopters/ followers, then it is reasonable to examine the ethical behavior of followers-- though not of unrepresentative samples. If such claims are made, it is most appropriate to analyze not only charity hospitals and educational establishments built by religionists but also the thousands of hideous pogroms, Inquisitions, murderous Crusades, persecutions of nonconformists, destruction of so-called witches, and the violent painful deaths of individual people like Michael Servetus who were destroyed by self-proclaimed God-fearing Christians like Calvin for nothing more than daring to dissent. And the actual behavior of adherents to a supposedly divinely ordained moral code DOES logically have a bearing on the truth of my earlier fourth assertion: that claiming and believing a code is god-based makes it more dangerous to real human beings. In fact it is hard for me to see how anyone can argue against torturing people and burning heretics if their eternal souls and those of thousands of other human beings hang in the balance--after all, what does the excruciating pain of a few hours or even a few days matter when compared to an *eternal* lake of fire? If Alcuin merely wants to make claims about the internal logic of Christian ethical principles in their present, most evolved state (in other words, as Alcuin understands them rather than as Calvin understood them), without consideration of any past or present practical effects of the principles, why then there may be no need to discuss the behavior of any Christians--but we should all admit in that case that we are engaged in no more than an arid academic exercise, without important consequence in the lives of human beings. Ed Buckner , VP, Atlanta Freethought Society , POB 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 USA =============================================================== Date: Wed, 29 Jan 1997 19:00:14 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner, 5, morality Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu PART 5/Day 5 (29 Jan 97)--a discussion from Buckner of the Christian doctrine of salvation by grace and of forgiveness, of his friend Oliver's "Jew from Dunwoody," and of a related point on theologically-based morality. As I understand the Christian doctrine of salvation by grace and of divine forgiveness--and I'm sure if I'm wrong here Alcuin will set me straight--A) one can reach eternal life simply by sincerely accepting Jesus Christ as his personal Lord and Saviour, EVEN IF he has, up until then, been a jerk in every respect, and, B) God can--and, miracle of miracles, WILL--forgive one of any sin whatsoever even if the person(s) he hurt cannot or will not forgive him. Now, imagine if you will a Jew from Dunwoody (Oliver, from whom I'm plagiarizing this story, explains that Dunwoody is a suburb of Atlanta with a good mix of ethnic and religious groups--there are a fair number of Jews there, but more Christians--so a Jew there is virtually certain to have had genuine opportunities to learn about Christ and salvation by grace). This Jew lives a long, full life. Several times when Christian missionaries come to his door, he politely and sincerely hears them quote and explain John 3:16 and 14:6. He goes to temple regularly and worships the God of Abraham devotedly; he reads his Torah religiously and follows the laws of the God of Abraham set forth therein as much as humanly possible; he raises his children with love and strong support; he is faithful to his one and only wife, and loves her unreservedly; he is fair and honest in his business and pays his full measure of taxes; he harms no one significantly (and whenever he discovers that he has harmed anyone, he goes and seeks forgiveness from the injured parties) and, in his own way, he does much good for his fellow man. At length, he dies and arrives at the Pearly Gates at the same time as his neighbor, a scumbag who abandoned six children and three wives, cheated on his taxes, ripped off his customers, raped his children's babysitter (who was too scared to report him), killed three people in an auto accident caused by his own drunken driving, insulted anyone who was different from him in any way, never gave a dime to charity--and who, just before he died, fell to his knees and sincerely asked for forgiveness from God and opened his heart to Jesus Christ, accepting Him as his Lord and Savior. St. Peter, or whoever is these days delegated to be gatekeeper, says to the scumbag-until-just-now, "You're in!" while to the Jew he says, "Sorry, go to hell!" The Jew patiently explains that he read his Torah carefully, sincerely considered the Christian message he heard but concluded that it just didn't make sense and chose instead to rely on the older (and in his mind, better established) sacred text, and asks again for entry and for forgiveness for not realizing that Christ was the Way, the Truth, and the Life--but St. Peter says, "Sorry, too late. Off you go." (We could easily make the Jew from Dunwoody a Muslim from Dunwoody if that makes the point any clearer). Now, I want to ask Alcuin, quite sincerely, if the Jew (or the Muslim) from Dunwoody would in fact be lost for eternity and if the forgiven lout beside him would in fact be saved for eternity, under his understanding of Christianity. If his answer is "Yes," then I want to ask, just as sincerely, how Alcuin can hope to believe that a religion with such obvious injustice at its very core could possibly underpin a valid, just, or effective moral philosophy or code? TOMORROW: Buckner (finally) finishes his opening arguments, in Part 6. Ed Buckner , VP, Atlanta Freethought Society , POB 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 USA =============================================================== Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 21:38:13 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Alcuin v. Buckner, 6, morality Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu PART 6/DAY 6 (30 Jan 97), a short rehash of what Buckner would see as sufficient evidence to conclude that a god is indeed necessary and desirable for morality. Alcuin has read a version of this before, but others should know that I will concede immediately that if an all-powerful, all-knowing God announced, to everyone simultaneously in their own language, what He/She/It supports as a moral code, it would be damned--I use the word advisedly--hard to argue against that code being the right one or against that approach to establishing morality as being the only tenable process. If He/She/It wants to do something a bit less dramatic (but much more positive), let Him/Her/It simply cure ALL the children in children's hospitals in any one state in one day--that would certainly produce enough extraordinary evidence to persuade me (and any other atheists/skeptics I know) to rethink ALL of this. If either of these events happens, I'll throw in the towel very quickly indeed. Theists are quick enough to tell nontheists that we should obey God, and often that we should fear for our eternal lives if we do not. What it seems to me they invariably really mean is that we should obey them, since God has filled them in on what constitutes the good and deputized them to set the rest of us straight (if only by telling us what book to follow and what that text "really" means). Since in fact I have only ever heard humans declare moral truths, however much some insist that the code they are decreeing is God-given, the question from my point of view is, "Is claiming God is on your side the best way to establish morality?" If the Christian claim that man is hopelessly depraved and can achieve morality only with the help of (and by being blindly obedient to) God is correct, there should be some evidence or logic that God or religion pays off in this way (see PART 4 on "effectiveness"). I would like to conclude my opening remarks by asking Alcuin, again in the spirit of 1st Peter 3:15, if he could tell me and the other readers what, if anything, could persuade HIM to throw in the towel and conclude that morality is and always has been merely a human invention? (Or is evidence irrelevant for Alcuin?) Ed Buckner , VP, Atlanta Freethought Society , POB 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 USA =============================================================== Date: Sat, 01 Feb 1997 07:40:07 -0500 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: Re: Alcuin v. Buckner, 3, morality (Ethics Debate--[5b]) From: apologete@orthodox.com (Alcuin) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu >From Alcuin: The following text, which I label [5b], responds to Buckner's message 3 of 7, which I label [5a]. I am adding these labels to provide a consistent means of referring to the various messages in the dialog. My numbers do not match Buckner's because his numbering scheme began at a later point than mine. At some point, when it seems most useful, I'll post a list of the labels and a one-sentence description of the nature of each message--sort of a table of contents. >Before I get to my questions, below, let me concede, as gracefully as I [snip] Buckner's frank acknowledgment of having used a quotation guide to spice up your remarks without further investigation is a paradigm of gracious concession. Thanks are due him for being forthright and setting an example of mature humility that many on this list [who allow their egos to direct their discourse] would do well to ponder. >I've listed below some questions I'd like Alcuin to answer (naturally I'll >reciprocate by answering, as best I can, any questions he may pose for >me,though I cannot promise to do so "with meekness and fear."). Wit in the face of adversity; I like that. >1. Is slavery wrong? (Please answer either for yourself or, if you feel >comfortable doing so, for all Christians.) (If some kinds of slavery are >moral under some circumstances--for seven-year-periods, to get out of debt, >for enemy captives, for women, for non-Jews, in different historical eras, >or in some other restricted way, please briefly explain the exceptions or >conditions). The question "is slavery wrong" is fallaciously complex and thus begs a simplistic answer. Let's break things down a bit. Chattel slavery, as was practiced in the United States until the Civil War, entailed [a] the differentiation of a class of people on the basis of their ethnicity or racial attributes; [b] the definition of a distinct class of persons as sub-human [or, as the United States Constitution says, three-fifths human]; [c] the commodification of the class of sub-human persons. Now, the Bible teaches that ethnicity is ethically insignificant in Christ [even though the Jewish theocracy involved ethnic separation for typological reasons]; that all human persons are equal before God and bear his image; and that commodification of a person is not mandated. Without getting into the fine details of the argument for each of these points, I'll state that I believe that chattel slavery is wrong according to a consistent Christian Ethic. Now, what about some of the economic practices that are also tagged with the word "slavery"? Well, in certain instances, bond-service is the institution in view. This institution involves the contracting of one's present and future labor--under specific defined conditions--for the settlement of an economic or social debt. Bond-service was permitted in the Jewish theocracy. In that theocracy, the treatment of a bond- servant varied according to whether the person had an inheritance in the covenant: if so, then the bond-service terminated with the Jubilee year; if not, then the bond-service did not terminate with the Jubilee year, unless the bond-servant was redeemed through adoption or the payment of his debt. I believe the Bible teaches that bond-service of this sort was particular to the Mosaic economy, for reasons which I'll mention in my answer to Buckner's question #2. It is important to keep the actual subject of our debate in view as we digress into the particulars of Buckner's inquiries. What does Buckner think the answers to these questions will contribute to his case against the necessity of theism in ethics? >2. Does the moral code ordained by the Christian God condemn slavery? If >so, how do Christians know--where is it written? When, historically, did it >become clear to Christians? The answer is: [a] it depends on what you mean; [b] it is written in the Bible; and [c] the typological significance of the restorative aspects of the Law of Moses became evident to the first generation of Christians, and is especially discussed at length by Paul and by the author of Hebrews in the Bible itself. Here's some more information: This question evokes the more broad hermeneutic question of how Christians are to handle the case laws of the Mosaic economy. In general, God's Law is immutable. This means that if God promulgates a law, that law is binding unless God rescinds it or alters its mode of fulfillment. Concretely, this means that a given subset of the Law of Moses is binding unless the Bible teaches otherwise. An example of this phenomenon is the case of proscribed foods. The case laws state that "These shall ye eat of all that [are] in the waters: whatsoever hath fins and scales in the waters, in the seas, and in the rivers, them shall ye eat. And all that have not fins and scales in the seas, and in the rivers, of all that move in the waters, and of any living thing which [is] in the waters, they [shall be] an abomination unto you [Leviticus 11:9-10]" The purpose of such a law was to provide an external cultural marker of difference between Israel and the surrounding nations; thus, such a law is called a separation law. [There is a complex rationale behind the symbolisms of the separation laws, about which you can learn more from a competent commentary]. Now, in Acts 10, we read of Peter's learning that the separation laws are no longer binding. The reason that those laws are no longer binding is that the symbolic function they served, to point to the Messiah, is no longer necessary after the advent of that Messiah. The lesson behind this explanation and illustration is that the coming of the Messiah altered the mode of fulfillment for a subset of the Law of Moses. In particular, those aspects of the Law that were typological in nature [teaching through symbolism about God's provision of a saving Messiah] are now fulfilled not by individual adherence to separation practices, but by the reality of being set apart through salvation in Christ. The Mosaic laws pertaining to bond-service, along with the Jubilee laws, are a subset of the inheritance laws, and those are now fulfilled literally in the Messiah rather than typologically in human practice. Thus, whatever one thinks of "slavery" as it was defined by the institutions of the Mosaic Law, the symbolic economic practice is not normative for Christian Ethics. >3. What is the best exact English translation, according to whatever you >consider to be the highest or best authority, of the *entire* verse found >in >Exodus 20:17 (or Deuteronomy 5:21, if you prefer)--and, in context, briefly >what does the verse mean? "You shall not covet your neighbor's house; you shall not covet your neighbor's wife or his male servant or his female servant or his ox or his ass or anything that belongs to your neighbor." [Ex 2:17, NASB] In context, this verse establishes several general principles that are given fuller elaboration in the subsequent case laws. Among these, the commandment presupposes the concept of personal property and of definite family relationships and it emphasizes the importance of attending to one's own sphere of stewardship or responsibility. >4. Are the Commandments given in Exodus 20:1-17 (or the Deuteronomy >version) the Supreme Moral Laws given by God for all humans for all time? >Did Jesus supersede them for Christians (and, if so, in what way)? What is >the status of the commandments given in Exodus 34: 12-26, and, if the >status is different from those in the earlier chapter of Exodus, how and >why? The 10 Commandments, or Decalogue, are a summary of the "supreme moral laws". The Biblical text as a whole, including the prophets, wisdom literature, and New Testament, constitutes the supreme moral code according to which Christian Ethics is defined. Jesus regarded the Prophets, the Wisdom books, and the Torah as "Law", and regarded his own teachings as an affirmation of the correct interpretation of that Law, over against the aberrant interpretations that were circulating in first-century Palestine. Thus, Jesus said: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled" [Matt 5:17-18]. I have already touched on the issue of how the advent of the Messiah altered a subset of the Mosaic law. A law that was not altered by the Messiah's advent is binding in its original mode of application unless God alters that mode or rescinds the law in question. Again, the Bible is the sole court of appeal in determining the status of particular case laws from the Mosaic economy. The passage Buckner mentions, Exodus 34: 12-26 contains several discrete elements, so again his question invites an oversimplified answer. Suffice it to say that in the Torah [and elsewhere in the OT], God gives at least two kinds of directive: standing laws and particular commands. Standing laws are universal ethical precepts meant to be binding to classes of people over time. Particular commands are unique imperatives meant to bind a class of people at a specific time. Thus, God's statement that "you should not steal" is not the same sort of speech act as his statement to Joshua's troops that they should obliterate a particular settlement in ancient Palestine. The hermeneutic issue raised by a complex passage is whether the specific injunctions in that passage are universal or particular in scope. While much of the text that you mention consists of God's promises to Moses concerning the success of the Israeli army's military campaign, certain principles are also put forth. Among these, the notion that making treaties during wartime is bad policy, and the notion that interfaith marriages are to be avoided. While we are not called upon to invade Palestine, we are called upon to avoid the errors of Neville Chamberlain. >5. Does God have to have a church and church members and church officials >(and apologists) to successfully communicate moral instructions to men? God is not dependent on human institutions. As Jesus said, "if these [people] should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out." In one notable case, God used an ass to communicate, underscoring that people are dependent on God, and not vice-versa. God is able to communicate in a number of ways. Among these, he happens to have chosen the inspiration of human authors as the preferred mechanism for establishing an objective point of reference in the human horizon of experience. Likewise, he happens to have instituted a church, a gathering of those whom he has called, for the administration of collective concerns. >6. How do Christians know that the moral codes they accept from the Judeo- >Christian Bible are the ones God declared and not instead those codes laid >out in the Islamic Koran (or Qur'an), and do Christians have to accept all >behavioral prescriptions from the Bible, or can they just pick the ones >they like or that seem to make the most sense, or do church leaders get to >decide? Given a plurality of possible written codes contending for the status of "acknowledged revelation", one can eliminate many of the contenders on the basis that they contain inconsistencies and historical inaccuracies of so blatant and unsurmountable consequence that rationality would be undermined if one were to take them as authoritative. The bible stands unique in human history both with regard to the care with which its contents have been preserved and concerning the rigor with which its various parts concur in a single comprehensive philosophy of life. The standard of evaluation is this: does the worldview propounded by such-and-such a text comport with the preconditions of rational inquiry? >From the premise that the bible, as God's word, is necessary, sufficient, authoritative, and clear, it follows that *all* of it is normative for the Christian. There is no external standard by which to judge the parts of the Bible piecemeal, so a smorgasbord approach has little to recommend it. After all, to "just pick the ones. . . that seem to make the most sense" assumes [as Mr. Jefferson assumed] that one has some *criterion by which to evaluate* whether a particular precept "makes sense". But where does such a criterion come from, and what justifies its usage? The individual Christian is not dependent on the interpretations of an ecclesiastical hierarchy, though such interpretations should be taken quite seriously. Just as the text of scripture is objectively available, so the principles of interpretation that are appropriate for interpreting it are precisely those that are exemplified by the biblical authors themselves. The various books of the Bible make use of one another; that usage provides the model for our correct usage of the books. The nihil obstat of an ecclesiastical body should amount to a statement that a particular doctrine follows from a biblical reading of the biblical texts. This principle undergirds the production of the historic creeds of the church, including the protestant confessional tradition. >7. Where Christians find evil in this world, should they resist and oppose >it? Or should they, as Jesus appears to advise his followers in Matthew >6:39-48, "resist not evil"? In Matthew 5, the phrase "resist evil" is ambiguous. Rather than take this single passage out of the context of the New Testament's teachings, I should think we would want to gather all that the bible says about resisting evil, and determine with sound hermeneutic principles which sorts of evil are to be resisted and which not, and which species of resistance are appropriate and which not. Clearly, Jesus sees the matter as complex [though he doesn't give a full or systematic exposition in Matthew 5], since he endorses turning the other cheek here but doesn't hesitate to scourge the vendors in the temple or chastise the Pharisees for their hypocrisy [thus resisting evil]. >8. Have there been any examples of non-Christian cultures (cultures that >preceded the advent of Christianity or cultures that exist without >Christian influence simultaneously with Christianity) where ethical or >moral codes, perfect or imperfect, were or are followed, perfectly or >imperfectly? Well, the ethical requirements of God are made known to all people in all places and times to an extent that is sufficient to render them without excuse before God. The medium of this communication is the natural world and the conscience. Thus, the standards of morality that God asserts are universal. So, there have been cultures that posited moral codes [as any anthropologist will tell you], and those codes were imperfect to the extent that they failed to conform to God's specially revealed code. There is only one perfect moral code, and only one person has perfectly kept that code. Given the size and scope of the Bible, questions such as these that you have posed could be endless. May I ask that Buckner provide some rationale for the nature and limits of his inquiries, so that our discussion doesn't turn into a conceptually vagrant bible study? For Buckner, I have but one question: apart from God's revelation of absolute norms, what is|are the standard[s] by which an atheist can even *begin* to evaluate supposed ethical principles, and why should anyone believe that the standard[s] you stipulate *are* in fact pertinent? Regards, Alcuin =============================================================== Date: Sun, 9 Feb 1997 19:24:09 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Al v EB, morality; EB on Al's 2b Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu There may be some non-subscribers getting this, unawares, for the 1st time: it's part of a debate on ethics between Alcuin (Christian presuppositionalist defender of the faith) and Buckner (secular humanist, atheist, freethinker--and sender of this message). PLEASE e-mail Buckner if you want earlier bits OR want to be taken off recipients' list. AFTER my response is part "2b" of Alcuin's statement (shown there so that non-readers of this list to whom I send this can see what I'm responding to, but kept at the bottom so that regular readers can refer to it only as much as they wish.) My first responses (I've hit max message length--I may add more about 2b in a future post) to 2b are: 1. I fully understand that Alcuin is using a definition of "morality" as prescriptive, not merely descriptive, and it is in that sense that I argue--and I think Alcuin and I agree that this is the core point on which we disagree-- that the Christian philosophy of life--or the Christian God--is *not* necessary to the construction of an ethical system. (I go further and assert that Christianity is not even desirable as a basis for constructing an ethical system, but I freely admit that that is a more difficult assertion to defend.) 2. I also understand that Alcuin is asserting that an atheistic worldview permits *no* objective basis for morality. In the sense that he is, as I understand him, defining "objective"--that is, with a specific starting set of moral prescriptions, necessarily from something beyond humanity, from which all ethical standards for human beings are logically derived--I agree that no atheistic philosophy can succeed in being entirely objective or rational (more on the notion that something is either entirely rational/objective or else it is completely irrational/arbitrary--a mere matter of taste--later). While I agree with Alcuin that such an entirely rational or objective moral system is not available to an atheist, I argue that it is equally unavailable to a Christian, because the Christian is as stuck with changing consensuses (consensi?) on what constitutes the good as anyone else, and always has been. Even if a Christian God really exists and even if He set forth his Truth engraved on tablets given to Moses (or elsewhere), humans have always been the interpreters of, the writers about (starting in the Bible?), and the practicers of Judeo-Christian morality--and humans change things as they go, *subjectively* creating new rules or new variations of old rules out of old ones, always. Now "ALWAYS" is a strong word to use in a debate--your opponent only has to show one serious exception and you're beat. Nevertheless, I stand by the claim: over a few generations of human beings moral codes always change at least slightly, and over more generations, more fundamental or sweeping changes always occur, and this is true for Christians, Moslems, atheists, Buddhists, and everyone else--and I'm *not* talking about whether Christians follow their standards (no one and no group follows his/its own standards perfectly). Christians, like everyone else, CHANGE THEIR STANDARDS over time. 3. Slavery is a good example of the above: in pre-Biblical and Biblical times (whether before the supposed time of Christ or during the early days of Christianity), warring peoples took captives of their opponents and turned them into slaves of the victors. Alcuin asserts that Biblical slavery was not chattel slavery, but the Bible supports me, not Alcuin (and THIS assertion is supported both by a "reasonable man's" reading of various verses, in context, and by *Christian* interpreters--who I'll be glad to cite if Alcuin disputes this). The ancient Jews recognized, as demonstrated in their writings in what Christians call the Old Testament, that they did not like bondage for themselves, and they outlawed permanent slavery of Jews by other Jews (or their God decreed it, according to their writings), and they improved the lot & rights of slaves, at least in theory--but never is there a statement that chattel slavery in general was immoral or should be abolished. If Biblical slavery was not chattel slavery, what of Exodus 21:20-21, which makes it clear that slaves should not be intentionally or arbitrarily killed--but which also makes it clear that the damage a master might do to a slave is mostly the master's problem, because the slave is "his money?" Slaves could also be bought (see Genesis 17:12, e.g.). And that same Old Testament makes it clear that Jews still considered it (or, again, they claimed God decreed that it is) appropriate to turn non Jews into permanent slaves which could be *inherited* (see, for example, Leviticus 25:42-46). At much later points in human history, more thoughtful people, including more thoughtful Christians, gradually realized that the best way to be sure of avoiding slavery for themselves as individuals (or for members of whatever group they belonged to) was to accept a more universal ideal: no owning human beings by other human beings. Most--but not all--of the world's societies now accept this as a proper ideal (and so do I and most Christians except for fringe elements who insist on taking the Bible literally, and probably so does everyone on the apologetics list). This does *not* *prove* that any of us, Christians or others, have the "right" moral principle now finally in hand. None of us, Christians or others, can with certainty look beyond our subjective interpretations of truth, whatever we think the source of truth is. Alcuin argues that the subjectivity of human interpretation is part and parcel of the frail, fallen, corrupted nature of man--"theists are subject to sin, ignorance, and misunderstanding, even as atheists are"--but the subjectivity is still there, whatever its source, and no moral code can transcend this. History demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that this is as true for Christians as for others: the OT calls for the death penalty for adultery or for sabbath-breaking and for a long list of other things, but specifies no penalty for owning another human being (and interestingly enough, treats causing an abortion only as a property crime, not as murder--but that is assuredly another whole debate). Human culture has changed a great deal since those days, and religionists deserve some of the credit for some of the positive changes. Slavery almost certainly existed before Judaism and can hardly be said to have been caused by Jews or Christians, and Judaism and then Christianity contributed to making it less harsh and, eventually, to making it less common. But the question Alcuin cannot find a satisfactory answer for is: assuming we all now agree that chattel slavery is morally wrong, why did an all-knowing, all-powerful God not explicitly outlaw such slavery when He was handing out Commandments? (Even if the slavery of the time of the ancient Hebrews was somehow not chattel slavery, an omniscient God necessarily foresaw what would happen at other times and places.) The answer is straightforward enough: it was mere humans (thoughtful humans, morally advanced for their time and circumstances--but still only humans) that developed those "Commandments" and they just did not see slavery as the great evil that we now think that it is. Another, non-slavery-related, example: John Calvin, careful thinker and theologian though he may have been, did not see the horrific death (burned at the stake using green wood to make sure the death and the pain lasted longer) of Michael Servetus (his crime or sin was publicly stating his disbelief in the doctrine of the Trinity) as immoral murder, while most modern Christians would be appalled at the thought that such an act was justifiable. (Alcuin claims I'm the victim of some historiacl revisionism in blaming Calvin, but my sources, such as Thomas Jefferson and Leonard W. Levy, in his acclaimed scholarly book, Blasphemy, 1993, make it clear that Calvin's own words show he was convinced that God was served by Servetus's death; Calvin sat in on the trial and the 25 members of the Geneva council plainly took their direction from Calvin in fact if not in law.) Even if Calvin can somehow be shown not to have favored a miserable death for Servetus, there can be no dispute that Servetus was put to death for expressing unacceptable religious ideas by people declaring--and almost certainly believing--that they were doing God's holy work. My point is *not* just that they were immoral but that the standard they and Alcuin use is subjective--open to various conflicting, irresolvably different interpretations by different subjective humans.) Alcuin has available to him *NO* basis for declaring that the Bible-believing John Calvin was wrong about this while Alcuin is right--except for his (Alcuin's) subjective interpretation of what both he and Calvin considered to be God's clear commandments. "Who is this Alcuin," I can imagine Calvin asking in a thundering voice, "to think he understands God's Word better than I did?" Alcuin and Calvin might as well argue about flavors of ice cream for all the difference the Decalogue or other Biblical passages could make in settling which of them is right. (If Alcuin wishes to say that the standard he and Calvin both claim to adhere to lead them to the same conclusion--if Alcuin endorses Calvin's--or whoever's--role in burning Servetus at the stake--he may weaken this point, but at the cost of greatly strengthening my point about the dangers of theistic formulations of ethical rules.) Where did the theist's "objective" standard go? *IF* it exists or ever existed, history demonstrates that it is unavailable to "mere" humans. Ed Buckner , VP, Atlanta Freethought Society , POB 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 USA =============================================================== Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 21:21:02 -0500 To: Apologetics Subject: Al v EB, morality; EB on Al's 3b Cc: John David Leckie From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Below is part "3b" of Alcuin's statement (shown there so that non-readers of apologetics-list to whom I send this can see what I'm responding to, but kept at the bottom so that regular list readers can refer to it only as much as they wish.) My responses to 3b are: 1. As I've already conceded on the apologetics list (and am now doing to any other followers of this debate), I blew it in re historical Alcuin's statement about the voice of the people being the voice of God (I relied on a secondary source that apparently quoted out of context). "My bad," as a friend of mine says to me when he screws up something when we're playing a game. 2. NO, Alcuin may *NOT* "assume" that if I do not address something he considers a telling objection that he has raised that I therefore concede his point. I may just not have gotten to it yet, or I may not have understood a point, or I may have simply overlooked it. If I concede on something, I'll say so. Nor do I make any claim to be able to enforce concessions on Alcuin, either. If either of us thinks he has made a telling point that is unanswered in a reasonable period of time, let him reiterate it or allude to it or even demand a concession--but silence cannot reasonably be interpreted as concession, especially given the volume of text going back and forth and the limited time we both have to devote to this. 3. When I earlier asked Alcuin not to waste time "proclaiming how irrational or wrong-headed or naive my statements or my arguing techniques are (nor to waste time by declaring how logical and objective someone has been in concluding that I am wrong)" I meant no more than that I wanted him to demonstrate or explain whenever he made such claims--and not to be satisfied w/ merely *labelling* something I'd written as irrational, etc. (And I would have sworn--I mean affirmed--that they *DID* match the drapes!) 4. Certainly "rationality" *is* "the standard of persuasiveness" for me--but that hardly means that a mere assertion of rationality or irrationality is sufficient. My personal, subjective statement of my goals for this exchange remains accurate, and I deny that Alcuin has succeeded in stating goals that are not subjective--even if there is an objective, extra-human source or standard, Alcuin ain't Him or It (I'm *not* saying Alcuin has claimed to be--only that he cannot be "objective" any more than I can be). I certainly agree that gaining converts to one's viewpoint does not tell as to the correctness of the view and that satisfaction with one's expression and defense of some views tells nothing about the objective merits of those views. Where did I ever say otherwise? A *demonstration* (not merely a claim to have demonstrated) that my views make no sense would of course be adequate to persuade me to abandon those views, and that is exactly what I said in my subjective list of ways I could "win" (third one). I would still prefer to debate about whether the Christian God (or any god) is necessary for human morality--and not to debate about debating. More to come. Regards, Ed Buckner =============================================================== Date: Sat, 12 Apr 1997 10:24:19 -0400 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: EB on Al's 4b (1 of 2) From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu ANYONE RECEIVING THIS WHO DOES NOT WANT IT--just e-mail me. Alcuin's responses or counterpropositions below follow mine in each case. I have not changed his or mine except to put an "AL:" (for Alcuin) in front of his and a "EB1:" (for Ed Buckner's original) in front of mine, for clarity. My *further* responses, here and now offered, are labelled "EB2:" > >AL: In response to Buckner's offering of several propositions which >he personally reckons true, I offer the following counterpropositions. >Not intending that these should be taken as proof or argument, I >offer them as Buckner did, to provide stimulating brain candy to >the readers of this exchange. EB2: I did not intend for mine to be taken, as I said at the time, as proof of the truth of any of them. I did--and do--intend for them to be a part of the argument, though perhaps not in some more formal sense where propositions are carefully tied together in what is intended to be an order in accord with formal logic. > >EB1:1. Human beings have developed ethical principles and moral codes with no >>help from any supernatural forces. > >AL:1a. Human persons cannot so much as think or breath without the knowledge >of God; the knowledge of who God is and what he requires is a *precondition* >of the possibility of human predication, differentiation, logic, science, >and morality. EB2: One can arrive at 1a as a conclusion only by assuming its truth to start with; if there is no god of any kind, none of Alcuin's list must be abandoned nor can persuasive arguments to that effect be constructed except "within" the closed system of presuppositionalism. >Al:1b. All human persons who make use of such skills as predication or >casuistry *know* God necessarily, though many such persons do not *know >that they know* God, having suppressed that ineluctable knowledge for >psychological reasons. EB2: The only basis for believing 1b to be true is that one can indeed find a Bible verse to back it up; otherwise it makes no more sense than it does for me to argue that Alcuin "really" believes in pink unicorns with magic brass earrings that make him a fine breakfast every morning, but he has "suppressed that ineluctable knowledge for psychological reasons." Or I could argue that Alcuin merely wants to impress everyone with his Christian belief but in fact he is at heart an atheist or a Satanist. (How can he disprove such a claim? Well, he can't, at least not to mere human beings.) >EB1:2. There is no persuasive evidence that any supernatural being has >ever made any declarations about desirable or undesirable human behavior. > >AL:2. There is persuasive evidence that human persons have never been without >the explicit verbal revelation of God, and that apart from such a revelation, >it is in principle impossible to interpret human experience at all. EB2: I've been answering this bit all along, and will continue to try to do so. >EB1:3. There are a) great fundamental inconsistencies in the ethical principles >>allegedly promulgated by various gods; b) there are as well great >>inconsistencies in the ethical principles allegedly ordained as absolute >>and immutable by the Christian, Biblical God; and c) there are as well >>great inconsistencies in the ethical principles understood by Christians in >>different places and times as being THE principles by which all Christians >>should live. > >AL:3. There are [a] inconsistencies among ethical principles posited by >the world's religions and philosophies; [b] there are no inconsistencies >in the ethical principles of Christian Theism; [c] there has been >disagreement in the history of virtually every philosophical and religious >system concerning the meaning of its ethical precepts; [d] neither point >[a] nor point [c] have logical relevance to the claim that Christian >Theistic Ethics is necessary and consistent. > >AL: When Buckner asserts: >>Nor is there any reason to believe that these inconsistencies are now >>resolved or likely to be in the foreseeable future. No Christian I have >>ever known accepts as valid, much less follows, all of the clear behavioral >>prescriptions in the Bible. >He is perhaps being autobiographical but is hardly being historical. >There is a solid tradition of biblical hermeneutics within the framework >of which theological discussions and disagreements take place. However, >none of those disagreements is of such a nature that the taking of one >position or another would undermine the ethical system as a whole. Those >of a Calvinist stripe, a Lutheran stripe, and an Augustinian stripe can >join hands in praising the holy perfection of God's law and in thanking >God for the mercy of Christ's having kept that law perfectly. > >AL: What I assert is this: >Non-Christian ethical systems present a boggling panoply of stipulations >and assertions while offering nothing by way of justifying, in even a >rudimentary way, the claim that any such recommendations have >prescriptive force. While Christian Theists may have to work out the >tiny particulars of classical protestantism, atheists have no cogent >particulars to work out at all. EB2: "boggling panoply of stipulations and assertions" I'll certainly accept--true as well for the many theistic codes, including a bewilderingly broad and rich range that all claim to be a part of the one true Christian version of things. The "holy perfection of God's law" has allowed and encouraged more than just a "boggling panoply" of prescriptions for Christians. Nor am I merely talking about fringe variations--there are large blocs of Christendom who interpret their Revealed Truth in ways that are sufficiently and significantly different enough *TO THEM* to lead to division and even outright warfare; Alcuin himself suggests that these differences *ARE* important by excluding Catholicism in his formulation. It is startling what variety Alcuin is willing to sweep together under the heading of "tiny particulars." Atheists have the same cogent particulars to "work out" as all other human beings and human societies. >EB1:>>4. Those humans who proclaim that the moral system that they would urge >>others to follow is based on something bigger and more important than the >>interests of the "mere" human beings involved--whether that something >>bigger is "God" or "the Aryan People" or "the Proletariat"--have repeatedly >>proven to be dangerous to individuals and to groups and, sometimes, to >>human society itself. MORE TO COME, IN PART 2 OF THIS POST Ed Buckner , VP, Atlanta Freethought Society; address: POBox 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 USA =============================================================== Date: Sat, 12 Apr 1997 10:25:55 -0400 To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Subject: EB on Al's 4b (2 of 2) From: edbuckner@mindspring.com (Ed and Diane Buckner) X-Sender: apologetics-list@mcu.edu Reply-To: apologetics-list@mcu.edu PART 2 OF THIS POST Alcuin's responses or counterpropositions below follow mine in each case. I have not changed his or mine except to put an "AL:" (for Alcuin) in front of his and a "EB1:" (for Ed Buckner's original) in front of mine, for clarity. My *further* responses, here and now offered, are labelled "EB2:" >AL:>4. Those humans who proclaim that their moral system is either subjective >or based on something immanent and material in human experience--whether >that something is "the historical dialectic" or "the will of the majority" >or "the [supposed] greatest good for the greatest number"--have repeatedly >proven to be dangerous to individuals and to groups and, sometimes, to >human society itself. EB2: All manner of humans who get power have proven to be dangerous; my assertion is merely that those claiming to have found THE answer, theists or otherwise, have historically been the deadliest, whether "God" gave it to them or they claim it is derived from a dialectic or from "the majority." >AL:>Moreover, the *reason* immanent, naturalistic bases for morality are >dangerous is precisely because they are *not* transcendentally grounded >and therefore *always* reduce to pragmatic implementations of political >or social power apart from any external standards of justice. EB2: If there IS no transcendental ground out there (or even if there is one, but not one mere humans can access), then those who can falsely persuade others that THEY have the transcendental keys become the most powerful and thus the most dangerous. >EB1:>>While the interests of human beings extend well beyond their immediate >>survival needs, only real interests of humans, individuals and groups, >>should be considered in developing or changing moral principles. > >AL:>For any standard S, the atheist cannot provide an account of why S >should be taken as the "real" factor to be considered in developing >moral principles. Likewise, for any standard S, if an atheist posits >a moral principle P on the basis of S, the atheist cannot provide an >account of how to determine whether P is, in fact, a moral thing >to practice. EB2: The atheist can but posit standards that are of "self-evident" importance to fellow humans and start there. (For one example--which may not be from an atheist but is not theistically based--see Mortimer J. Adler, "Moral Values," pp. 108-127 in his book, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, Macmillan, 1985). Such standards posited as "self-evident" work, in real life, only modestly and inconsistently well. The theist invariably claims a "god" gave him his starting points, but how can anyone ever know which claims by which theists are right? --and therefore, often after lots of pontificating, the theists start at the same not-really-so-objective place as the atheists, and all can develop a logical, consistent system of morality ONLY to the extent that they can start with self-evident standards that all can assent to. >EB1:>>5. Human life doesn't have--but, luckily, does not need to have--a >>"Purpose" imposed from "outside" of life. Human life can nevertheless be >>interesting, pleasant, productive, or good (in each case, by various >>subjective definitions) > >AL:>5. Human life does have a purpose, and apart from such a purpose, it >is not even possible to make sense of such concepts as "interesting", >"pleasant", "productive", or "good", subjectively or otherwise. The >very possibility of subjectivity presupposes the necessary objective >knowledge of God as its precondition. EB2: Only if you accept that as a precondition of thinking further. >EB1:>>6. Human morality has evolved rather than been derived from some set of >>objective first principles; almost never have people actually living in >>complex groups based their behaviors on a moral code which has been >>logically derived from agreed-on basic principles in a rigorous and >>well-defined way-- > >AL:>6. Ethical standards are absolute, universal, and objectively available >in finite special revelation [scripture]; though human behavior has >evolved, changed, and though humans have failed to apply true ethical >precepts to their behavior in many circumstances, such personal failures >are irrelevant to the question of the truth of the standards in question. > >AL:>I assert that the plurality of moral codes and material practices is >not a problem for the theist but rather for the atheist. The theist >has a historical and psychological account of why such plurality >obtains. An atheist perspective can provide no cogent account >whatsoever for why any particular aspect of human experience is as >it is. EB2: This is silly. The theist can provide no such cogent account while the atheist can easily do so, in anthropological terms--in terms, in other words, of cultural development (and no, this is not the same as Social Darwinism). >EB1:>>neighbor as thyself" (Leviticus 19:18) is a reasonably good variation of >>the same theme, though not the best, IMNSHO. Moral codes, even though >>always imperfectly related to first principles, are far more important than >>mere matters of taste because they relate to our behavior in ways that >>protect the interests of individuals and groups of humans. > >AL:>Though Buckner likes to talk about the fact of moral codes, the real >challenge that he will face is why *any* first principle should carry >weight in an atheist's universe. To say that it should "because it >relates" in a protective way to special interests is merely to push >the problem back a step. The challenge for Buckner, then, is why >any particular interests should be privileged over any others in >an atheist's universe. No amount of mere description or assertion >will meet this challenge to justification. EB2: It's not as grand as Alcuin wants us to believe but is more difficult, for theist or atheist. A first principle must carry weight in preserving what is of obvious importance to all (in general the preservation to the extent possible of each individual's rights while still maintaining societies that allow for the exercise of those rights to have meaning and value)--but in practice, as I have repeatedly said, actual workings out of moral codes are messy and dangerous, since different people or groups of people interpret matters differently and have differing amounts of power to enforce their own interpretations. But saying "God said it" does not add any real light nor keep theists from having the same problems as anyone else with justification--and cannot do so, even in principle, unless all are agreed as to what it means to say "God said it." >EB1:>>That such codes are much more than matters of taste can easily be >>demonstrated to any human being with even a modicum of intelligence >>and interest in his own safety and well being--and the most important >>parts of such codes can be enforced much of the time by sanctions >>such as criminal penalties or social ostracism even with those lacking >>the minimal intelligence needed for understanding morality. > >AL:>While Buckner wishes to align the possession of intelligence with >the acceptance of his arbitrary viewpoint, no such alignment will >be allowed to go unquestioned in this debate. Buckner's claim that >moral codes are not reducible to matters of taste is arbitrary just >because it has no justifying basis. His claim that criminal >penalties constitute evidence that moral codes are not mere matters >of taste is a specimen of question-begging par excellence. After >all, the application of a socially promulgated penal sanction to >some behavior merely tells the intelligent, informed person that >a legislative process has marked certain displays of power and >coercion on the part of the civil government as correlates to >particular behaviors. But the exertion of power *does not at all* >justify the principle that was enacted through legislative power. >So, the issue of whether the morality being legislated in such a >case is a matter of taste is unaddressed by Buckner's example. >The challenge for Buckner is not merely to *descriptively* declare >that certain behaviors by individuals meet with certain behaviors >by institutions, but rather to account *prescriptively* for why >such a response *should* occur, and *how*. EB2: See above. >EB1:>>I do not, however, claim that it is possible to derive an entirely >>rational or objective moral code for human behavior, no matter what >>principles or assumptions one starts with (whether or not one >>includes supernatural elements). Indeed, I insist that no completely >>satisfactory, completely just, comprehensive moral code ever has been >>developed--and that none is likely to be. > >AL:>Including the word "entirely" seems to suggest that you mean to >salvage *some* rationality in your view of ethics. Likewise, your >inclusion of the word "completely" suggests that you think a partly >satisfactory or just code might be possible. I would be interested >in learning how you think that even a *minimally rational* ethic >is possible in an atheist's universe, and how an atheist would even >*begin* to evaluate whether *any* moral code is "just" or "satisfactory." >I'm not asking for perfection; I'm asking for Sunday-school simplicity. EB2: As I have already said, "just" or "satisfactory" must in fact be defined in particular social contexts, and can be "rational" only within particular contexts. What Alcuin and I really disagree on is whether it is possible to escape such context-based values regarding ethical values. He asserts that it is but cannot demonstrate any such thing unless we accept his key conclusions--regarding the existence and qualities of his God--as a precondition for further discussion. >AL:>I affirm that there is an entirely objective, rationally defensible >ethical system, the Law of God. While our specific applications of >it may be in error, the standard is there and is accessible, contrary >to skeptical assumptions. On the matters of most weight, there is >little dispute [even over the church's history] concerning what that >law requires. EB2: This is either in direct contradiction to the most straightforward reading of history (the church's or in general) or else Alcuin has an incredibly high threshhold beyond which something must rise before it becomes a "matter of most weight" and likewise an astonishing notion of what constitutes "little dispute." EB1:>>Tomorrow, in Part 3, I will pose some questions I would like for Alcuin to >>answer if he is willing to do so. > AL:>I hope, Ed, that you will also take the time to begin to address the >specific analytic comments that I have directed at your case in previous >messages. EB2: I hope (and assume) that Alcuin will point out anything of his posts about my arguments to which I've not responded. I'll do likewise, as soon as I get caught up. Ed Buckner , VP, Atlanta Freethought Society; address: POBox 813392, Smyrna GA 30081-3392 USA ===============================================================