"The Miracle of Holland"


Hugo Grotius: Naturalist, Eclectic, or Theonomist?

by William Greene, Ph.D.

"Al is de Leughen snel,
de Waarheydt achterhaaltse wel."

"Though lies move fast,
Truth catches up at last."
--Old Dutch proverb,
used in the Preface to Grotius'
Defense of the Lawful Government of Holland
quoted in Dumbauld (p. 89)
Hugo de Groot of Holland, better known by his Latin name Hugo Grotius, is an almost legendary figure today in several respects. Born in Delft in 1583 on Easter Day, he was a child prodigy, and joined the University of Leyden at the age of twelve, earning his doctorate by the age of fifteen. 1 By the year 1607, he had been appointed "Advocate-Fiscal" of Holland, an office which could be said to have functioned as Attorney-General, Public Prosecutor, and Sheriff. 2 Dutch children still remember him, due to his daring escape from prison in a trunk after being arrested for being on the wrong side of a politico-religious controversy. He fled to France, where the king hailed him as "the miracle of Holland." 3
He is best known today, however, as one of the pioneering figures in the field of modern international law (called by many "the father of modern international law"); he was one of the first modern theorists to systematically propose the existence of norm s in the conduct of relations between states. His major work, On the Law of War and Peace , specifically addressed the questions of jus ad bellum and jus in bellum. Grotius considered war a "necessary evil," and he discussed problems related to war in order for the conduct of war to be regulated. Due to the "unstableness of human nature," he did not think it likely that the society of man could achieve "perfect uni ty and harmony," but he did set up an ideal to aim for. 4 Bull (1990) states that De Jure Belli ac Pacis is a work
1 R.W. Lee, Hugo Grotius (London: Oxford University, 1930), pp. 3-4.
2 Lee, p. 8.
3 Lee, p. 6.
4 William Vasilio Sotirovich, Grotius' Universe: Divine Law and a Quest for Harmony (New York: Vantage, 1978), p. 33.

which is necessary for understanding international relations today, both in Europe and elsewhere, because it puts forth the concept of "international society: the notion that states and rulers of states are bound by rules and form a society or community w ith one another, of however rudimentary a kind." 1
While the works of Grotius which deal primarily with international law are best known in international relations literature today, the works which had the greatest political implications in his time were his theological (and, to a lesser extent, historica l) writings. 2 In fact, his expectation for the "community of mankind" was to reach an "approximation to the ideal which Christ set up as the goal." 3 According to University of Florida Germanic philologist Gellinek (1984), until recent times, "Grotius' authority as an epochal biblical scholar was freely acknowledged." Today, however, this scholarship seems to have been forgotten. 4 As Sotirovich (1978) notes, though, evaluating Grotius' international theory "remains one-sided if the ethical precepts guiding that theory are ignored." 5 This paper intends to analyze those precepts, in order to ascertain whether Grotius, a premier theorist in international law, can be said to have subscribed to one of the three
1 Hedley Bull, "The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations," in Bull, et al., Hugo Grotius and International Relations .
2 Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, "Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations," in Bull, et al.
3 Sotirovich, p. 33.
4 Christian J. Gellinek, "Hugo Grotius: 1583-1983 and Beyond," in Maastricht Hugo Grotius Colloquim , p. 20.
5 Sotirovich, p. 84.

major schools of thought concerning its sources: 1 the naturalist school of thought, the positivist school, or the eclectic school, or whether in fact he falls within an entirely separate category, the theonomist school. A short overview of the major schools of thought would therefore be in order for this analysis.
Those within the "naturalist" school of thought adhered to the belief, essentially stemming from the medieval period, that all law is derived from and rests on principles of natural law. Some of the more prominent writers in this tradition include Pufendorf, Vitoria, Suarez, and Lorimer. 2 These writers all accepted the notion that "international obligations are derived from a higher law."
"Positivists," including such scholars as Bynkershoek, Gentili, Zouche, Moser, and Austin, believed that international law, rather than resting on a "higher law," is instead derived only from agreement among the actors involved. They separated law from a ny normative concepts and focused on studying such positive sources of law as customs and treaties. As Grieves (1977) observes, the positivists were fairly skeptical about the vague and abstract nature of the "higher principles" claimed to exist by the na turalists. They preferred instead as the source of law "concrete and positive human action," believing that "what nations actually did provided more relevant norms for the conduct of international relations." Austin (b. 1790) went so far as to argue that international law was not really law at all, since "true" law can only be derived from a sovereign authority,
1 Onuma Yasuaki, "Conclusion: Law Dancing to the Accompaniment of Love and Calculation," in Onuma Yasuaki, ed., A Normative Approach to War .
2 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Columbia University, 1977), pp. 28-31.

and there was no such authority on a global scale. 1 The rise of the "eclectic" school of thought was designed to present a middle ground in reaction to the extremes of the former schools. The eclectics argued that, while natural law is one (ultimate) source of law, positive law is another source, being an interpretation of the higher law. Since this interpretation by man is fallible, it is therefore not immutable, but can be adapted to situations as the actors involved see fit. One of the most prominent thinkers from this school was Vattel in his Law of the Nations (1758).
It must be noted, for the purposes of this enquiry, that there exists today a division of opinion among academics over the definition of natural law: specifically, the division lies over what "higher law" is being adhered to as a source of "man-made" law . Harding (1954) explains that

while the terminology of Natural Law has been virtually unchanged through the centuries, the connotations and sometimes even the denotations of the words have been subject to change. So in Justinians's Digest we find that sometimes Natural Law means the magnificent Stoic concept of order as reflected by Cicero, and at other times means merely the jus gentium, the common jural experience of divers peoples in divers environments. In other hands Natural Law means simply the command of a living God. 2

The dichotomy in existence today is between the "traditional" and the "modern" definitions of natural law. The traditional definition originally held that the norms of natural law are established by God; this may be
1 Forest L. Grieves, Conflict and Order: An Introduction to International Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), pp. 248-249.
2 Arthur L. Harding, "The Ghost of Herbert Spencer: A Darwinian Concept of Law," in Harding, ed. Origins of the Natural Law Tradition (Port Washington NY: Kennikat, 1954), p. 70.

called the "theonomist" position (theonomy = "God's law"). 1 One of the earliest examples of this attempt to equate natural law with revealed or divine law can be found in seventh-century churchman Isodore of Seville's writings; 2 another canonist in twelfth century Bologna, Gratian, was typical of the "high medieval period clerics in their tendency to fuse natural and divine law." He made an effort to not only associate natural law with both Old and New Testament Scripture, but a lso to equate natural law with the "Golden Rule" of Jesus ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"). 3
It was Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa Theologioe (1274), who established a foothold for debate as to the belief that there could be a source of norms for relations between nations apart from God's law; that source was reason. He states that
the plan by which God, as ruler of the universe, governs all things, is a law in the true sense. And since it is not a plan conceived in time we call it the eternal law ... Reasoning creatures follow God's plan in a more profound way, themselves sharing the planning ... This distinctive sharing in the eternal law we call the natural law, the law we have in us by nature. For the light of natural reason by which we tell good from evil (the law that is in us by nature) is itself an imprint of God's light in us. 4

1 Greg L. Bahnsen, By This Standard: The Authority of God's Law Today (Tyler TX: Institute for Christian Economics, 1991), p. 361. "'Theonomists' preach and promote biblical law's authority and wisdom, praying that citizens will be persuaded willingly to adopt God's standards as the law of the land." Bahnsen, p. 322.
2 Charles S. Edwards, Hugo Grotius: The Miracle of Holland (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), p. 37.
3 Edwards, pp. 37-38.
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologioe (Westminster MD: Christian Classics, 1989 [1274]), p. 281.

Edwards (1981) notes that Aquinas' formulation was of great import, due to the fact that "he, a Scholastic churchman, had legitimized a basic source for all of the precepts of a law of nations, and that source was independent of God's revelation through divine law. " 1
Suarez later built on this tradition and defined divine law as "that which was directly promulgated by God," what he called "positive divine law" (terminology adapted later by Grotius). He conceived natural law as discernible to men through natural reaso n, though its principles were unchangeable. In addition, Suarez acknowledged his belief that "human positive law" finds validity and confirmation " solely in the actual customs of nations." 2
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the traditional definition of natural law is the modern definition, that objective ethics and norms are established through reason, with no connection to God or theology. 3 Gordis (1961) gives an essential definition:

1 Edwards, pp. 80-81.
2 Edwards, p. 88.
3 Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic Heights NJ: Humanities, 1983), p. 3.

Natural law declares that only that law is legitimate and has a claim upon men's loyalty which is in harmony with human nature. Second, it believes that human nature is constant through time, not necessarily unchanging, but with sufficient continuity to make possible generalizations regarding its basic traits, its needs and desires, its limitations and potentialities. Third, it regards human nature as being universal in space, modified to be sure by environmental factors, but still sufficiently stable to permit a generalized theory. Finally, it regards human nature not as known, but as knowable, through the canons of scientific investigation and rational thought. There is nothing in natural law that negates the exploration of the dimensions of human nature as an ongoing and probably unending enterprise. 1
The enlightenment philosophe David Hume in the eighteenth century was a proponent of a similar line of thought (in addition to advocating what he called "natural" religion, based solely on reason). In the late twentieth century, libertarian philosopher Murray Rothbard has become its leading proponent.
While most scholars have been able to agree on the placement of many writers into one of the three schools of thought (Pufendorf as a naturalist, Bynkershoek as a positivist, Vattel as an eclectic, etc.), there is disagreement over the placement of Grotius. In fact, one biographer (Lee, 1930) notes that writiers who have "lit their torches at the flame which Grotius kindled" have been called all three. 2 A fairly common practice is to classify him as an eclectic, arguing that both natural law and positive rules were sources of law. 3 Edwards (1981) claims that, for Grotius, both revealed law and natural law were "not sufficient for regulating the mutual relations among nations," 4 and that he did not hold the position either that "all law had to emanate directly from the will of God" or that "natural precepts" were "wholly adequate for the validity of law." 5 Even Bull (1990) argued that "Grotius' method is in fact an eclectic one," as evidenced by the fact that "naturalists and positivist both claim that Grotius belongs to their ancestry." 6 Oppenheim and Lauterpacht even call the eclectics "Grotians;" Yasuaki (1993) admits that this may seem
1 Robert Gordis, "Natural Law and Religion," in Natural Law and Modern Society , p. 244.
2 Lee, p. 58.
3 For example, see Grieves, p. 249.
4 Edwards, p. 104.
5 Edwards, pp. 64-65.
6 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 79.

reasonable upon first examination, but "further analysis at least qualifies this view." 1
Indeed, Yasuaki is simply the latest of many to challenge the notion that Grotius was an eclectic, and was instead closer to the naturalist views of theorists such as Pufendorf. 2 Even Bull admitted that Grotius emphasized natural law as "the basis of the rules affecting international relations, for the rules of natural law were rules for all men equally." 3 This law is seen as "a body of moral rules known to all rational beings, against which the mere will or practice of states can be measured;" this natural law, says Bull, "is placed at the centre [sic] of his exposition of international law." 4 Another biographer, Edwards, believed that Grotius based the laws of war entirely on reason-based natural law. 5 He writes of Grotius' belief that, while God was the "efficient cause of social organization" since He had "willed all traits in man," including social existence, 6 he wished to separate natural law from its "traditional medieval association with Christian claims of revelation," instead formulating his theory of "rational natural law" on the "naturalistic side of religion." 7
Others, such as Elders (1984), agree that Grotius' legal works are characterized by doctrine based on reasonable argument, common to
1 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 363.
2 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 364.
3 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 80.
4 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 78.
5 Edwards, ch. 5 (pp. 115-138).
6 Edwards, pp. 60-61.
7 Edwards, p. 139.

everybody, while consistently excluding religious motives. 1 Lee also states that God's revealed law is not invoked as an "independent source" for international law, but merely to confirm the law of nature, and to inculcate a desirable ideal. 2 Rothbard goes so far as to state that Grotius elaborated an independent natural law in "a purely secular context," since his interests were not "primarily theological." 3 Yasuaki follows the same line, insisting that the key to Grotius' "normative approach" was a "secularized" natural law. 4
According to commentators such as those above, the reason Christian ethics appear to be the basis of Grotian norms is that his contemporaries in Europe were still heavily directed and influenced by Christian-based societal norms. Since natural law therefore came to embrace many aspects of these ethics, "Grotius' concept of natural law was substantiated not only by rules of law but also by moral, ethical, and religious values shared by contemporary Europeans." 5 Some note that Grotius quoted extensively from many authors, and he simply added force to his arguments with Biblical texts (along with classical Greek and Roman texts). 6 White (1925) even claims that Grotius had to make concessions to his age by paying "every respect to the Old Testament authorities," lest his book be
1 J.L.M. Elders, "Good Faith and Equity in the Doctrine of Grotius and its Implementation in the New Civil Code of the Netherlands," in Maastricht Hugo Grotius Colloquium , p. 32.
2 Lee, p. 54.
3 Rothbard, p. 5.
4 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 338.
5 Yasuaki, "Conclusion," p. 339.
6 Barbara Kwiatkowska, "Hugo Grotius and the Freedom of the Seas," in Maastricht Hugo Grotius Colloquium , p. 26.

suppressed "as blasphemous." 1
It is the contention of this paper that, while many of these authors are correct in their rebuttal of claims of Grotius' eclecticism, they are likely mistaken in their arguments that his system of norms was purely secular and reason-based. A probable cause of these errors is the failure to read Grotius' works in context. This could be done fairly easily, if only certain passages are selected from his various writings.
For example, Grotius writes that divine or revealed law - "contrary to the practice of most men - I have distinguished from the law of nature, considering it as certain that in that most holy law a greater degree of moral perfection is enjoined upon us than the law of nature, alone and by itself, would require." 2 He also states that "Natural Law is the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act ... is forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature ... Natural law is so immutable that it cannot be changed by God himself." 3 He goes on to discuss how, while all laws originate with God, human laws are created by man (and are temporary) and approved by God; Divine laws (which are eternal) are created directly by God: 4 "This law proceeds from God... it is approved by the common consent of all mankind ... the mutual agreement and the will of individuals ... 'the
1 Andrew Dickson White, "Grotius' 'De Jure Belli Ac Pacis,'" in Lysen, Hugo Grotius , pp. 55-56.
2 Hugo Grotius, Prolegomena to the Law of War and Peace (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1975 [1625]), p. 31 (#50).
3 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , vol. 1 (Cambridge: John W. Parker, 1853 [1625]), pp. 10-12.
4 Sotirovich, p. 15.

common pact of the state.'" 1 Standing apart from the rest of his writings, such quotations could be misconstrued in the direction of secularization. However, such a direction was not Grotius' intention at all.
Grotius' works must be taken in context, as a whole, in order to fully grasp his normative orientations. For many, this task is not simple; Bull admits that Grotius' writings are "difficult to read, even in English translation, encumbered as they are with the biblical and classical learning with which in Grotius' generation it was thought helpful to buttress theoretical arguments." 2 There are more important reasons, though, as Dumbauld (1969) notes:
Biblical writers are drawn on copiously ... His erudition seems somewhat excessive and distracting to a modern reader. But Grotius desired to be complete and comprehensive, esteeming lack of historical documentation (from which alone the rules of the law of nations can be proved) to be the chief fault of previous writers. 3
A reading of the primary source material suggests that man-made (positive) laws, even when "deduced" from natural law's ethical concepts, were not always valid. 4 Grotius believed in a "primary law of nations" which was applicable to all men and nations, and in a "secondary law" which was defined in written pacts and agreements between states and in
1 Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950 [1868]), p. 23 (in Sotirovich, p. 52).
2 Bull, "The Importance of Grotius," p. 65.
3 Edward Dumbauld, The Life and Legal Works of Hugo Grotius (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma, 1969), p. 76.
4 Sotirovich, p. 3.

the established custom among those states. 1 The key lies in Grotius' interpretation of the "law of mankind: first, the human reading of that law in nature; second, Christ's definition of that law as derived from Divine law. The function of the law of Christ is, therefore, to lead man from the fi rst to the second stage." 2 Lee agrees that Grotius believed that natural law is the law of God, "for God is the author of nature," and that God's will is declared in the Bible, which is a source for law. 3 For Grotius, God was not just "Nature's God" (as Thomas Jefferson believed), or the "Supreme Being" of the French Revolution, but was the "Omnipotent Christian God." 4 When he uses the term "natural law," it may be taken to mean the same concept as Aquinas' "eternal law," not as something "derived from" revealed law. 5 Grotius writes:
the law of nature of which we have spoken, comprising alike that which relates to the social life of man and that which is so called in a larger sense, proceeding as it does from the essential traits implemented in man, can nevertheless rightly be attr ibuted to God because of his having willed that such traits exist in us. 6
God wills that we should protect ourselves, retain our hold on the necessities of life, obtain that which is our due, punish transgressors, and at the same time defend our state. 7

1 Sotirovich, p. 88.
2 Sotirovich, p. 41.
3 Lee, pp. 53-54.
4 Sotirovich, p. 9.
5 Sotirovich, p. 4.
6 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 11 (#12).
7 Grotius, Commentary , p. 31 (in Sotirovich, p. 22).

There are some who urge that the Old Testament sets forth the law of nature. Without doubt they are in error... 1
What is Divine Law is sufficiently apparent from the term itself; namely, that which has its origin from the Divine Will; by which character it is distinguished from Natural Law ... To the human race, the Law has thrice been given by God; at the Creation ; immediately after the Deluge, and at the coming of Christ. These three sets of Laws oblige all men, as soon as they acquire a sufficient knowledge of them. 2
Grotius was obviously not proposing a new "universal religion"; the rules necessary for the law of mankind and for the maintenance of peace in the society of nations were sufficiently provided by Christianity. 3 All rulers of all states are "bound" to observe God's law, 4 and when rulers establish laws that contradict God's laws, Grotius says that subjects "have the right to disobey such laws, and they are encouraged to terminate the rule of a sovereign who is a tyrant" (an argument earlier supported by Aquinas): 5
It is beyond controversy among all good men, that if the persons in authority command any thing contrary to Natural Law or the Divine Precepts, it is not to be done. For the Apostles, in saying that we must obey God rather than men, appealed to an undoubted rule, written in the minds of all. 6
"Natural" religion was certainly seen by Grotius as inadequate for explaining revealed law, since reason and nature could not fully reveal the
1 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 30 (#48).
2 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , pp. 20-21.
3 Sotirovich, p. 60.
4 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , p. 140.
5 Sotirovich, p. 55.
6 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , p. 165.

truth about God; only "the supernatural revelation of God in Christ" could accomplish this, since in his "Divine positive law, Christ defined the Will of God." 1 Grotius would also have rejected the atheism of modern naturalists such as Rothbard; he "would never have conceded that a system of law could exist without God, especially if the expectation of men was that such a system be good." 2
In his works on law and on government, Eidsmoe (1987) notes, Grotius was attempting to apply principles of Christianity to politics, both national and international, believing as he did in the superiority of God's laws to human laws. The basis of his principles of international law was his belief that "God's law transcends the laws of individual states and nations. It provides a basis by which both men and nations are to be judged." 3 Sotirovich explains that "Grotius used the ethical precepts of the New Testament ... combined this with the moral code of the Old Testament and with the classical theory of natural law, thus producing a Christian interpretation of law." 4
In Grotius' eyes, the law of God had not been superceded, even by the New Testament: "the law of Christ took away only the law of Moses in so far as it separated the Gentiles from the Jews: Ephes. ii. 14." 5 By "virtue of origin," revealed law prevails over man-made law; 6 in all instances,
1 Sotirovich, p. 27.
2 Sotirovich, p. 10.
3 John Eidsmoe, Christianity and the Constitution: The Faith of our Founding Fathers (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Book House, 1987), pp. 63-64.
4 Sotirovich, p. 31.
5 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , p. 60.
6 Dumbauld, p. 37.


God's laws are superior to human laws. 1 In this respect, Grotius writes:
Thus what happens is, and how to be secured, men may make some conjectures; but if there be anything concerning it revealed from God, that ought to be esteemed most true and most certain. 2
What God has shown to be his will that is law. 3
As can be seen, while Grotius does not deny the existence of man-made (positive) law, or the existence of natural law (as defined by him), it is revealed law which possesses primacy. This is best summed up by Sotirovich:
According to Grotius, the ontological origin and source of all law is in God. Men create laws; they are a secondary source of law. But, if these laws are to be just, their true source must always be in God. Grotius separates the two sources only for the sake of making a clear, systematic classification, but, in the final analysis, the reference is always to 'the unerring mind of God.'" 4
In answer to charges that Grotius incorporated Biblical references as a possible "post facto" rationalization of secular ideas, in the manner of writers such as Thomas Hobbes, it must be emphasized that Grotius did not write merely in the field of law, but also (at the same time) as a theologian. While he intended to treat law as "a science independent of contemporary religious opinions," his basic presuppositions nevertheless
1 Sotirovich, p. 51.
2 Hugo Grotius, True Religion Explained, and Defended against the Archenemies Thereof in These Times ( The Truth of the Christian Religion ) (New York: Da Capo, 1971 [1632]), pp. 59-60 (in Sotirovich, p. 27).
3 Grotius, Commentary , p. 13 (in Sotirovich, p. 46).
4 Sotirovich, p. 23.

rested on his Christian beliefs. 1 He published many theological writings; some of the more noteworthy include De Satisfatione Christi in 1617, De Coenae Administratione in 1638, Via ad Pacen Ecclesiasticam in 1642, and Votum pro Pace Ecclesiastica in 1642. 2 His most famous and well-published theological work was The Truth of the Christian Religion in 1632, written for Dutch seamen to enable them to spread the Gospel to "the Turke, the Jewe, and the Pagan" during their travels. 3
For Grotius, the Christian religion was not merely a useful tool for proving his ideas; it was "the final revelation of God to mankind ... the turning point of history. Its significance consisted in the fact that God finally revealed Himself to the individ ual, the nations and the whole community of mankind. 4 The Bible was essential in establishing the foundations of international law. An example is Grotius' defence of the concept of just war as opposed to pacifism: he spends thirteen pages to prove "that war is not made unlawful by the law of Christ," and another eighteen pages to disprove (again from the Bible) the opposing viewpoint. 5 Later, he asserts that
1 Sotirovich, Introduction.
2 Dumbauld, p. 14.
3 Grotius, True Religion .
4 Sotirovich, pp. 27-28.
5 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , pp. 49-78.
6 Sotirovich, p. 60.
7 Sotirovich, p. 60.

religion is even more useful in that larger society [of states] 6 than in civil society [of a single state] 7 ... in that wider community, the execution of law is very different ... these [laws] too have their sanction mainly from the fear of the divine power: and hence, they who transgress the Laws of Nations, are everywhere said to violate the divine laws. And hence the Emperors have rightly said that the infraction of religion is a wrong against all. 1
Considerably better and more dependable is the method chosen by those who prefer to have such questions decided on the basis of the Holy Writ... 2
The Bible was to be the basis for settling disputes among nations, so that justice (and its resultant "peace, freedom, and equity") could be preserved. It is God's "Divine Positive law" which should serve as "the guide for breaking any deadlocks in inter national affairs." 3 Rewards for its observance were not limited to the afterlife, either; instead, Grotius believed that the implementation of laws based on revealed law would "transform man and human society on earth," because the citizens of the states and their rulers would realize that their individual commonwealths benefit from promoting the good of mankind. 4 On this concept, Grotius wrote:
Nevertheless law, even though without a sanction, is not entirely void of effect. For justice brings peace of conscience, while injustice causes torment and anguish ... in the breasts of tyrants. Justice is approved, and injustice condemned, by the common agreement of good men. But, most important of all, in God injustice finds an enemy, justice a protector. He reserves his judgements for the life after this, yet in such a way that he often causes their effects to become manifest even in this life , as history teaches by numerous examples. 5

1 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , vol. 2, pp. 318-319.
2 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , vol. 1, p. ii.23.34 (in Sotirovich, p. 58).
3 Sotirovich, p. 58.
4 Sotirovich, p. 33.
5 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 15 (#20).

As a devout Christian, Grotius cherished a "burning desire" for the promulgation of Christendom. 1 He "expected that the community of mankind would enjoy order and harmony if each individual commonwealth were ruled by a prince who accepted God as his Supreme Sovereign," 2 and he believed that the Biblical predictions and promises could be realized. 3 According to his eschatology, then, "order and harmony" in the world would come when the majority of people became Christians and followed Biblical law (an impossibility by human efforts alone; it required God's grace and immanence in the world): 4
"and [they] shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore" (Isaiah, II.4.). But this prophesy, as many others, may be taken in a conditional sense. With such an interpretation undoubtedly we are to understand that such will be the state of affairs if all people receive and fulfil the law of Christ; to this end God will not suffer that there be any lack of assistance on His part. It is moreover certain that if all men were Christians, and were living the Christian life, there would be no wars. 5
In assessing Grotius' works taken as a whole, then, it can be concluded that this premier theorist in modern international law was most certainly not an eclectic, nor was he a naturalist in the modern sense of the word. He could possible be characterized as a "traditional" naturalist, but with the preponderance of evidence that he subscribed to the ascendancy of revealed law over all other sources, it is more likely that he comes closest
1 Dumbauld, p. 14.
2 Sotirovich, p. 7.
3 Sotirovich, p. 33.
4 Sotirovich, pp. 83-84.
5 Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace , pp. 61-62.

to the theonomist school of thought.
The question may legitimately be asked, then, whether Grotius' teachings and opinions have any significance for today. Röling (1990) believes they no longer do, for three reasons: technological development, the "process of democratization within the nation-state," and the "process of democratization in the world at large, that is, in the expansion of the number of states forming the legal community in which international law plays it role." 1 In other words, we are more advanced than people in Grotius' time, we are more secularized, and there are more countries than the few that Grotius needed to contend with. Therefore, Grotius is fairly irrelevant today.
Others disagree. Sotirovich, for example, contends that
the influence of Grotius on human thought has been of a lasting value. His basic propositions remain the necessary requirements for the international order. With his law of peace, he presented to the world the ideal conception of a family of nations, united under the Sovereignty of God, in a comonwealth of mankind. Thus, Grotius must be regarded as one of the chief expounders of the basic ideals that are contained in documents like the League of Nations Covenant, the United Nations Charter, and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 2
Perhaps the most important contribution Grotius made is also among the most rejected in today's positivist (and realist) approach to international law: the belief that a state is always "a composite of individuals," and not "an abstract entity with a personality of its
1 B.V.A. Röling, "Are Grotius' Ideas Obsolete in an Expanded World?" In Bull, et al.
2 Sotirovich, p. 85.

own." 1 To many modern writers, international law is "a law between states creating rights and duties for states, not for individuals. This involves the dangerous consequence that individual morality is one thing, state morality (if such there be) another. But this is not what Grotius intends." 2 His whole system has the underlying assumption that moral laws apply to the individual and the state equally, with "a potential dynamism in both for the preservation of peace and for the promotion of the common good." 3 It is this idea that has come into greater prominence of late, and it is one aspect of that "ideal" towards which Grotius saw international society inevitably moving.
And now if anything has here been said by me inconsistent with piety, with good morals, with Holy Writ, with the concord of the Christian Church, or with any aspect of truth, let it be as if unsaid. 4

1 Edwards, p. 210.
2 Lee, p. 55.
3 Sotirovich, pp. 74-75.
4 Grotius, Prolegomena , p. 36.

Back to Top of Page

Back to MCU Home Page